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IRAN: NEW STAGE IN
REVOLUTION
BY BOB LABI
The rapid development of the
Iranian revolution since the February
10/11 insurrection has demonstrated
clearly that the Iranian masses saw
the Shah's overthrow as a green light
for deepening their struggle for a
better life. The past few months have
shown how the tremendous pressure
of the workers and peasants has forced the new regime, headed by
Ayatollah Khomeini's unelected
Central Revolutionary Council, to sanction the most radical measures.
Barely four months after the Shah's rule collapsed Iran's banks, insurance companies and the major part of its industry were nationalised without the owners being able to offer any open resistance. These nationalisations marked a new stage in the Iranian revolution. The takeovers were ,a major blow against capitalism and imperialism which will have an impact throughout the Middle East and Asia. Imperialism's inability to organise any open opposition, for the present, exposed its weakness in the face of the Iranian working masses' immense pressure for a fundamental change in society.
The February insurrection opened the floodgates to a deluge of struggles. But Khomeini and Bazargan, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, immediately attempted to restrain the masses. After striving to avoid an uprising Khomeini frantically tried to limit the scope of the Tehran fighting, so as to preserve at least part of the old army. Alarmed by the arming of the masses the next day Khomeini demanded the immediate return of
Demonstrators raise blood stained
all the captured weapons
barracks or mosques.
When following the insurrection a wave of industrial struggles began, Khomeini urged workers to ignore militants with "attractive slogans" and denounced those workers who wished to continue the general strike until all their demands had been met as "traitors. We should smash them in the mouth." Bazargan began at once complaining about the masses' "ludicrously high expectations of material gain as a result of the revolution"
But all these pleas and threats were to no avail. Workers maintained their struggles to secure a better deal. Strikes and factory occupations developed. In many workplaces workers elected committees which challenged the bosses' authority to run the plants. In those factories where the bosses had fled the workers attempted to re-start pro-
hands in revolution.
to the duction themselves and demanded
that the Government take their
plants over. Mass demonstrations of
the unemployed took place and there
were mounting clashes with Kho-
meini's Revolutionary Islamic Guar-
ds as they attempted to restrict the
workers' movement.
Bosses
The driving force behind this upsurge is the grave crisis gripping Iran and the workers' new-found consciousness of their own strength.
In the insurrection's aftermath over a quarter of the working population, 3 to 3.5 million, were estimated to be unemployed. Many factories had shut down due to lack of supplies or because their owners and managers had fled. Most of the bosses got out either before the
17
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insurrection or as soon as Iranians were allowed to leave the country. The mass exodus of the Iranian capitalists was similar to the Eastern European bosses, abandoning their property, before the advancing Red Army in 1944/45. Only a pale shadow of the Iranian bourgeois remains in Iran at present.
Many of the bosses were not prepared to consider re-starting production or new investment, let alone even returning to Iran, until the country was once again under the control of a stable capitalist government. This is what Bazargan tried to create, but the movement of the
masses, and their impact on
Khomeini, has blocked this so far.
Economic
crisis
Khomeini and his unelected Central Islamic Revolutionary Council have attempted to maintain their position and power by balancing between the different classes. Khomeini and the circle around him had no clear idea of where they were going. They held various utopian ideas like abolishing interest charges and holding down prices by pleading with the shopkeepers. But Khomelni's religious dogmas alone are not capable of satisfying the masses' demands. The scheme to abolish interest charges is likely to be dropped, though they will be called 'service charges' to give the appearance of change! Despite Khomeini's pleas inflation is estimated to be running at 10% per month!
The extreme weakness, at present, of the capitalist class and the fragile condition of what remains of the
capitalist state machine at the same
time as there is a mighty revolution-
ary upsurge unfolding has led to
Khomeini being pushed into gran-
ting the masses enormous conces-
sions. These concessions, often made
under pressure on the spur of the
moment, include free medicine and
transport, cancellation of power and
water bills and the putting aside of
£500 million in the budget to
subsidise essential consumer goods.
The nationalisation decrees were
by no means planned in advance.
Indeed in the first days after the final
collapse of the Bakhtiar government
Khomeini.
and the Shah's regime various spokesmen of the new 'revolutionary' government gave no hint of any planned nationalisations. The new Central Bank governor Mohammad Ali Mowlavi stated that there would be no bank nationalisations and that "free competition would be encouraged as a means of strengthening the private sector." But unfortunately for Mowlavi and the capitalists the Iranian workers did not see things their way.
The Iranian capitalists' flight lett a vacuum which the working class immediately began to fill by assuming the responsibilities of management themselves and demanding that the Government take the companies over.
The drastic economic situation
forced Khomeini to declare in
mid-March that Iran's "economic
system is bankrupt." With workers
securing their wages despite their
factories not operating, prices rising
by 10% a month, mass bekaran
(jobless) marches and the develop-
ment of peasant land seizures
Khomeini was being pushed into
both sanctioning and taking radical
action to satisfy workers demands or
else risk the undermining of his
support. Against this background
Khomeini was forced to ratify the
workers' moves to take over large
sections of industry with the
nationalisation decrees at the begin-
ning of July.
The tremendous workers' move-
ment which has wrung these
concessions from Khomeini has
developed from below. Not one of the
main 'left' organisations were pre-
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pared or able to give a socialist lead. The Tudeh ('Communist) party trailed behind Khomeini, urging him to join with them in a 'United Popular Front'. The 'Marxist' guerrilla group, the Fedayeen-e-Khalq, while putting forward general 'leftist' slogans' did not advance any rounded out socialist programme and petitioned Bazargan for a place in his capitalist government! The Islamic based Mojaheddin guerrilla leader Massoud Rajavi went further when he said that "ownership by industrialists faithful to the nation was in no danger". In reality the policies of all these groups have trailed behind the masses* demands, which have forced Khomeini to go further than any of these tendencies called for after the old regime's collapse.
Despite the absence of any clear ideas of where they are going
Khomeini and the mullahs around
him have risen to power in this, the
first stage of the revolution. This was
fundamentally because, in the
absence of any alternative revolut-
ionary leadership, the mosques
became the fulcrum for the working
masses' battle against the Shah.
Khomeini's basis
The Iranian workers spearheaded the struggle against the Shah through the mass demonstrations, the four month long general strike and the February 10/11 Tehran insurrection. But despite this leading role, as yet no independent working class leadership has come to the fore, rather it has been Khomeini's supporters (now organised in the Islamic Republican Party) who have appeared as the dominant force in the revolution. This is rooted in the enormous growth of Khomeini's influence in the last year which resulted from a number of factors.
Firstly Khomeini's clear position against the Shah provided a pole of attraction to the masses, especially in comparions to the repeated offers of compromise the liberal National Front leaders made to the Shah.
As Khomeni's support developed,
helped along by the sizeable
publicity he was getting, all the other
major opposition forces began to
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tail-end him, thereby further increa-
sing his standing. The Tudeh
repeatedly made declarations of
support for Khomeini, deliberately
ignoring his reactionary and
anti-communist statements. The
Tudeh's Central Committee state-
ment of January 17th 1979, for
example, stated its "full support for
the formation of the Islamic
Revolutionary Council initiated by
Ayatollah Khomeini...The Party,
having found the political prog-
ramme of Ayatollah Khomeini (particularly the position adopted
by the Ayatollah in the past few
weeks in his speeches and interviews) in accordance with the position adopted by the Tudeh...declares itself ready to support the following statements made by the Ayatollah." This was followed by an extremely selective list of quotations from the Ayatollah, which omitted any hint of reactionary policies.
In this situation where there was no other alternative programme or leadership being put forward, it was inevitable that Khomeini would come to head the anti-Shah movement.
More fundamentally, however, Khomeini's strength reflects the role and influence of religion in a backward society like Iran, where over 65% of the population are illiterate and over half still live in the countryside. The Iranian working ciass is a very young working class, both in terms of its age structure and history. In many factories the unskilled workers' average age is 20, which is one of the reasons for the enormous energy and resilience which it has demonstrate in the last year
Bazargan
weakness
The crushing of the trade unions after the Shah's August 1953 coup against the liberal Mossadeq government and the massive recent expansion of industry have meant that most Iranian workers are first generation workers without a tradition of organisation, having moved directly from the countryside into
industrial work. While the working
class made giant strides forward in
its understanding and organisation
as the revolution has unfolded there
has not yet been the development of
an independent working class move-
ment.
During the Shah's dictatorship the
Mosques, as a result of the Shah's
clashes with the mullahs in the
1960s, tended to become centres of
opposition to the regime. They
provided a relatively safe venue
where the masses' grievances could
be aired and opposition developed.
This further re-inforced the mosques
and mullahs' position in the develop-
ing mass movement.
Khomeini's call for an Islamic
Republic' undoubtedly caught the
imagination of the working masses.
The 'Islamic Republic' was inter-
preted by workers as a republic of
the 'people', not the rich, where
their demands would be met. There
was no mass support for Khomeini's ideas of turning the clock back to the
Middle Ages. Indeed Khomeini's reactionary whims and policies. along with the continuing inflation and unemployment, are already beginning to undermine his support.
Since the insurrection Bazargan, the Prime Minister appointed by Khomeini, has attempted to stabilise the situation in the capitalists' interests, but has so far failed by the in this task. The Bazargan government has attempted to rebuild the state machine crippled by the mass uprising, but while certain progress has been made in this area Bazargan has been incapable of creating any real alternative to Khomeini's forces.
The Provisional Government's attempt to organise a capitalist democracy was in reality an effort to restrain Khomeini and so gain time to recreate the capitalist state machine. But the rapid pace of developments undermined these plans for the moment. The Government has no forces with which to confront Khomeini and this weakness has forced Bazargan to co-operate with Khomeini, both to co-operate in restraining the left and in the hope of preventing the Ayatollah from stumbling into carrying out even more anti-capitalist measures.
But while the masses' tremendous pressure and the capitalists flight
19
has forced Khomeini both to ratify and himself take anti-capitalist measures, this has been balanced by attacks on the developing left and workers' movement. Khomeini has continuously attempted to restrain the working class and delay the development of political parties
Constituent Assembly
At first last year Khomeini called
for a republic and the restoration of
the 1906 constitution, which gave the
mullahs constitutional power to
supervise the Majlis, the elected
assembly. Under the pressure of the
mass movement Khomeini was
forced to then call for an elected
Constituent Assembly to draw up a
new constitution. But as soon as the
old regime collapsed the Ayatollah
sought to abandon any idea of a
Constituent Assembly. Khomeini's
group correctly feared that the
holding of elections would accelerate
a political polarisation and the
growth of rival political parties,
thereby awakening their support.
Only under pressure did Khomeini
agree to the election instead of a 73
man Council of Examiners, with limited powers to check the new draft constitution.
During the election campaign for the Council of Examiners Khomeini's unelected 'Immam komitehs' continued attempting to hinder the development of any independent working class activity and oppositional political parties. Harrassment, arrests, press censorship and shootings have all been used against workers' organisations and activities.
Un the same day that the insurance companies were national. ised Khomeini's Central Council published a Bill setting up special courts with the power to impose two to ten year jail terms for 'disruptive tactics in factories or worker agitation'. The Ayatollah's draft constitution, finally published in June after four months secret wrangling, provides for a strong President with wide powers and a Supervisory Council-made up of priests, professors and judges-to check that all laws passed are in accord with Islam Khomeini's
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constitution is designed to limit the Majlis's powers and give the clergy effective control of the country.
A glimpse of what this could mean has been shown as Khomeni has given vent to his obscurantist feudal prejudices. The banning of music and mixed swimming, the whipping of unmarried lovers and the shooting of prostitutes as "a lesson for innocent girls who must stay with their families" are just a few examples of how Khomeini would like to order society. Khomeini is relying on the enormous following which he still has, re-inforced by the anti-capitalist measures he has taken, to allow him to implement his reactionary social policies and turn the clock back to the Middle Ages. But already these ideas are encountering opposition.
Reactionary
measures
Khomeini's retreat in March over the wearing of the veil was forced by workers being opposed to the attempt to victimise and attack unveiled women. Compulsion smacked too much of the old regime which the workers had battled over for over a year to remove. Gradually the enforcement of Khomeini's reactionary whims is alienating more and more Iranians. Additionally the continuation of mass unemployment, roaring inflation, high rents and unsolved social problems, despite the overthrow of the Shah's regime, is radicalising the working class. Consequently Khomeini's position, while appearing strong at present, is by no means permanently secure.
A further source of opposition to Khomeini's regime has been the national minorities. In Iran only just over half the population are Farsi (Persian) speakers, most of the rest being national minorities. The
removal of the Shah's dictatorship provided a signal to these minorities
to attempt to end the repressive
measures which the Shah imposed,
such as the suppression of their
languages and seizure of their lands,
and to win autonomous rights. The
proposed constitution, however, does
not grant the minorities autonomy,
let alone the right of self-determin-
ation. Both Khomeini and Bazargan pursuing a Persian nationalist policy, have resisted the minorities' demands' and relied on the Farsi speaking population in the minority areas to retain their power.
These policies have resulted in the armed clashes in many areas as Bazargan and Khomeini have used the army and the Revolutionary Islamic Guards to maintain control, particularly in the oil-rich Arab areas in southern Iran.
Iran is in a contradictory situation. While the capitalists have fled and the nationalisations have made massive inroads into capitalism's power, unless this process is taken to its conclusion-with the drawing up of a plan of production and a state monopoly of foreign trade-there will be the possibility of a capitalist restoration.
Monarchist officer bids Shah goodbye. Khomeini's position reflects the contradictions opening up. On the one side the Ayatollah denounces the left and attempts to enforce vicious reactionary laws. But at the same time Khomeini's Council has been compelled by the pressure of the situation to ratify the takeovers. Khoemini has been pushed along by events, being forced, for example, to retrospectively approve the executions carried out by the local Immam komitehs', which themselves have been under pressure.
A vacuum exists in
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there will be a consolidation of the nationalisations, leading to the overthrow of landlordism and capitalism, or there will be a victory for reaction.
Reaction in Iran would be unlikely to be based upon the Shah's old ruling elite, most of whom have now been liquidated by the firing squads, rather it would coalesce around a new pole of attraction. Already in the recent months steady progress has been made by the officers in rebuilding the army. The reactionry policies of those officers who remain was demonstrated by the now retired military police chief General Rahimi who demanded that armed force should have been used sooner against the minorities and was "concerned that the army was being forced to hold back when there was unrest in the country". It would only be a matter of time before the officers attempted to use the troops against workers, as well as the national minorities. But at the same time the army is by no means immune from the turmoil in society. In the first five months since the insurrection there have been three
Chiefs of Staff, their short spells in office reflecting the unrest in the
miliary's ranks.
Despite the anti-capitalist meas-
ures which he has been forced to
sanction Khomeini could become the
head of a future counter-revolution-
ary movement. The Ayatollah has
already revealed his fundamentally
reactionary views. In the course of
mounting conficts with the working
class and nationalities Khomeini's
committees and milita could develop
into the spear-head of the counter-
revolution.
But under the pressure of events
Khomeini could be forced to move in
the opposite direction and complete
the expropriation of capitalism, as
did the Dergue in Ethiopia. This
would be an immense step forward in
Iran. A planned, nationalised econ-
omy would lead to an enormous
development of the economy, a
raising of living standards and a
strengthening of the working class's
size and potential power. But such a
movement under Khomeini's clergy,
while breaking Iran free from the
chaos of capitalism, would not create
a workers' democracy
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The fact that it is conceivable that a feudal religious obscurantist like Khomeini could preside over the overthrow of capitalism in Iran is a reflection of the depth of the crisis and the world balance of forces.
Capitalism cannot develop Iran. The oil-based boom of the mid-1970s —while producing, for a short time, dramatic growth rates-not only failed to resolve the old problems but created new evils, like the 40 shanty towns around Tehran's centre. Indeed in this period of world economic upheavals capitalism can only continue in Iran on the basis of grabbing back the gains the workers have won, even in 1976 the Shah tried to impose an austerity programme.
However the Shah's overthrow demonstrated the workers' power and it is this power which, at present, stands in the way of counter-revolution and is forcing Khomeini in an anti-capitalist direction. On a world scale imperialism cannot openly intervene in Iran at present, any more than it was able to do so in Nicaragua.
Workers' Party
needed
The Iranian working class overthrew the Shah. In this struggle it became conscious of its power, but not conscious of how to organise the power it held in its hands after the February uprising. This resulted from the absence of a Marxist leadership and a mass party capable of drawing the necessary conclusions from the course of the revolution and the crisis gripping Iran. A Marxist party would have explained the necessity for the working class, in alliance with the national minorities and poor peasants, to take the power in its hands and carry through the tasks of the socialist revolution.
The absence of such a party allowed Khomeini and the mullahs to utilise their great popularity and the mosque's organisation to step into the void created by the Shah's fall and the workers' failure to take
hold of the state power. Nevertheless it is still the Iranian workers' power
and demands which are determining
Army power behind the mullahs.
the pace and direction of events Iran today, despite being without cohesive socialist leadership.
The breaking of capitalism and landlordism and the continuation of the mullah's power would result in the creation of a regime in the image of Russia, Eastern Europe, China etc, with the difference that in place of the Stalinist ideology of those regimes Khomeini would impose the ideas of Islam. In such a regime, a deformed workers' state, the rulers of society would be a religious-bureaucratic elite living off the back of a nationalised, planned economy. Though it would be likely that with a further development of industry the mullahs would tend to lose power to those sections of the bureaucracy based in the state machine, armed forces and industry.
But while the establishment of a planned, nationalised economy even on these distorted lines would mark a huge step forward for Iran and be a terrific blow to world imperialism, the Iranian workers would then be faced with the task of overthrowing the new ruling eite in a further, political, revolution and establishing
a workers' democracy before there
could be a movement towards
socialism.
The Iranian revolution has dem-
onstrated the working class's enor-
mous power and its instinctive desire
to transform society. But at the same
in
2
time the revolution's rapid, even it distorted development shows how the depth of the crisis can propel the movement along even in the absence of a revolutionary party. But the grip of Khomeini's reactionary influence and the still present threat of counter-revolution shows the urgent necessity for the creation of an independent, mass workers' party, armed with a Marxist programme. Only on the basis of the Iranian workers consciously taking power and beginning the re-organisation and re-building of society will it be possible to prevent either the establishment of a new dictatorship in the future or of a deformed workers' state requiring a second, political revolution.
Already however the Iranian revolution has overthrown the Shah, weakened imperialism and set an example towards the rest of the world of how no dictatorship can survive forever. The revolution is far from over. The Iranian workers will as a result of their own experiences increasingly see the need for a
Marxist party. Only on this basis can
capitalism and landlordism be
overthrown and a Socialist Iran
created, uniting on a free and equal
basis all the peoples in Iran, and
setting a revolutionary example to
the workers and peasants of the
world. July
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