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11
Chronology of event
in El Salvador
1526 dians, 1823 After separating from Spanish Guatamala in 1821, El Salvador joins Central American Federation.
1839 El Salvador becomes independent state.
1930 Following political ferment and growth of trade unions in 1920s, formation of Salvadorean Communist Party (PCS) led by Farabundo Marti, recently back from fighting US marines in Nicaragua alongside Sandino. Mass march of workers and peasants on San Salvador.
1931 Brutal solidates first of military Juntas.
1932 President Hernandez Martinez refuses to recognise PCS gains in municipal and legislative elections.
Abortive uprising met with savage repression, 30,000 killed in the 'matan. za'. Military consolidate control of state apparatus through National Guard and Police.
1944 brought
Land, inhabited by conquered by Spain
coup long
d'etat consuccession of
Hernandez dictatorship down by general strike.
1950 Colonel Oscar Osario becomes president, attempting, under conditions of world upswing, to modernise and industrialise the economy.
1960 Formation of Christian Democratic Party (PDC) advocating 'national development' and reforms; under Duarte made gains in 1960s in local and national elections.
1961 Central American Common Market (CACM) set up, promoted by US and fostering industrial development, especially through injection of US capital. Rivalry develops within oligarchy between traditional planters and capitalists favouring industrialisation, the latter more inclined to some 'modernisation.' United States also sets up the 'Alliance for Progress' to foster reform from above in Latin America to prevent revolution from below.
1964 United States sponsored
establishment of Central American
Defence Council (CONDECA) to co-
ordinate action against social unrest, channelling military support to rightwing military leaders in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatamala and Honduras.
1968 Emergence of socialdemocratic party, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) based on intellectuals and professionals, followed by formation of National Democratic Union (UDN), legal front for banned PCS. General strike shakes 'liberal'
Sanchez regime. Ultra-right vigilante group, ORDEN, linked to army, formed to counter rural workers' organisations like Federation of Christian Peasants (FECCAS) which grew in 1960s.
1970 Cayetano Carpio, generalsecretary of the PCS splits from Communist Party to form Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Front (FPL), based on strategy of 'people's war.'
1971 Formation of Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) by former members of Christian Democrats (PDC).
1972 Election successes of National Opposition Union (UNO), alliance of MNR and UDN, blocked by electoral fraud.
1974 Formation of United Popular Action (FAPU) based on students and urban workers, with some trade union support.
1975 Military-orientated ERP split, with formation of Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) calling for preparation for mass insurrection.
Also formation of Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) following June massacre of peasants and students; one of biggest organisations with support of peasants' organisations, FECCAS & Farm Workers Union (UTC), and some newer industrial unions.
1976 Government of general Molina attempted mild land reform, provoking reaction from oligarchy organising through National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) and Eastern Region Farmers' Front (FARO).
1977 Oligarchy's candidate, general Humberto Romero, installed as president; reforms shelved.
1978 ERP, attempting to link up with mass movement (throughout this period: strikes, factory occupations, demonstrations and land seizures, etc), set up Popular Leagues-28 February (LP-28). Repression stepped up through death squads like Armed Forces of Liberation-War of Elimination (FALANGE) and White Warriors Union (UGB).
1979 July: fall of Samoza and victory of Sandinistas in Nicaragua, also success of New Jewel Movement in Granada.
October: young officers overthrow Romero and proclaim programme of reforms, but behind the scenes rightwing reassert control of Permanent Council of Armed Forces (COPEFA).
1980 January: after military repudiate reforms and intensification of repression, reformist politicians (from MNR, PDC and UDN) who joined the Junta after the coup resign en bloc. Revolutionary Co-ordinating Council of the Masses (CRM) formed by all popular ogranisations, now including PCS.
March: new Junta with Duarte and Christian Democrats providing civilian front for military. Liberal archbishop Romero assassinated, military and death squads step up mass killings, and the country slides into full-scale civil war.
April: CRM included in new Democratic Revolutionary Front (PDR), with MNR, Popular Social Christian Movement (split-off from PDC), and Democratic Front of TUs, professional and small-business groups.
June: Massive general strike, followed by less successful general strike in August.
July: US government (Carter and then Reagan) steps up military aid to Junta. October: five main guerrilla groups come together in Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMNL) under FDR's broad 'anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchy' programme.
1981 January: FMNL launches major offensive, military step up mass assassinations, torture and kidnappings; by mid-1981 guerrillas control about a third of the country in "liberated zones.' Country gripped by economic crisis, US again increase aid. 1982 March: elections for constituent assembly called under pressure from Reagan to bolster Duarte, but resulting in victory for ultra-right d'Aubuisson and oligarchy's recently formed Arena party.
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of vitally important political issues, not only for the workers and peasants of that country, but for the workers' movement throughout Latin America. In particular, ever since the recent experience of Nicaragua and El Salvador we have witnessed a certain resurgence of guerrillaist or terrorist tendencies in other Latin American countries, including Chile. Without putting in question for a single moment the honest intentions of these comrades, we consider it our duty to warn them that the ideas and solutions which they are advocating (which in point of fact, had absolutely disastrous consequences in the previous period) represent a fundamentally false interpretation of the ideas and methods of Marxism and also of the experience of the revolution in Central America. Were this tactic to become generalised once again throughout the continent of South America, it would not represent, as these comrades imagine, a short-cut to the socialist revolution, but a recipe for a new series of bloody defeats.
For this reason, it is an opportune moment to work out a critical analysis of the revolutionary process in El Salvador and, specifically, of the theory of a 'people's war'. • It is hoped that this analysis will provide a serious contribution to the debate on the strategy and tactics of the revolution in Latin America.
El Salvador, like the other countries of Central America, is an artificial nation. Under the Spanish crown, Central America was governed as a single nation, and in 1821, it attained independence also as a single nation. Later on, the process of 'Balkanisation' of Central America led to its division into five tiny republics, formed under the rule of the dominant caste of creole aristocracy. This division of the living body of Central America into a string of small, and more or less unviable, countries was the pre-condition of their collective subordination to imperialism. The revolutionary aspiration of the oppressed peoples of the zone towards reunification and the setting-up of one great Central American nation runs, like a red thread, through the historical struggles of the Central American revolution.
The interdependent nature of the revolutionary struggles throughout the zone is evident today from the effects which the Nicaraguan Revolution has had in El Salvador and Guatemala. At a more or less accelerated rhythm, the process will spread sooner or later to Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama. The "domino theory" is applicable not only to Asia, but also to Central America, one of the most vital points of American Imperialism. From the first moment, therefore, the destiny of the revolution in El Salvador is intimately bound up with the revolution throughout Central America and the rest of the Latin American continent, and the situation in the USA itself.
The importance of Central America for the economic interests of the USA is clear. Four countries in this region (Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) are in third place in the South American league in terms of exports of sugar and coffee; second in terms of export of meat; and in first place in the export of bananas to the US market. Nevertheless, their population have the lowest living standards in Latin America in terms of life expectancy (56 years); illiteracy (70%); access to education (42%); child mortality (more
than 100 for every 1,000 births) and malnutrition (70% of children under five years old).
The region's social and political instability has been reflected in an interminable series of coups, military dictatorships and popular insurrections throughout its history. That of El Salvador is particularly bloody. Suffice it to recall how general Maximilius Hernández Martinez rose to power after the massacre of 30,000 peasants in 1931. The country's economy is dominated by an oligarchy of fourteen families. Ten per cent of the population owns 90% of the wealth of the country, and 2% owns 60% of the cultivatable land. Even before the civil war, 50% of the population was unemployed. Three quarters of children under five years old suffer from serious malnutrition. Ninety per cent of the population earns less than $100 a year.
Since 1927 the "Fourteen families" have ruled the country through the agency of military dictatorships. However, one of the features of the El Salvador oligarchy was the ability to combine the bloodiest repression with trickery, fraud and deception. There have been elections many times in the history of El Salvador, but elections in which the military always announced the results and in which their candidate always won, and the leaders of the Opposition were obliged to flee into exile.
The division of Central America into a string o small, more or less unviable countries was precondition of their collective subordinatio.
imperialism
The El Salvador working class has great revolutionary traditions. The first workers' organisations sprang up in the 1920s as a result of the enormous impact of the Russian revolution. The shoe-makers' strike of 1921 initiated a period of great strikes and workers' struggles. The first permenent trade unions were formed in 1923 and had to fight from the very first moment against the savage repression carried out by the National Guard.
In 1931 the falling price of coffee sparked off a wave of trade union agitation in the countryside. Some 80,000 agricultural labourers, centred mainly in the coffee plantations, became organised in militant unions. The oligarchy responded to the wave of strikes and demonstrations with the brutal coup d'état of general Martinez on 2 December 1931. The attempt on the part of the Communist leader, Agusta Farabundo Marti, to organise a heroic but ill-prepared insurrection, lacking clear perspective, led to a terrible massacre in which 30,000 peasants were executed in a war of extermination against the rebels.
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Nevertheless, the workers had their revenge in 1944, when the Hernández Martinez dictatorship was brought to an end by a general strike which turned into a popular uprising. In recent years, prior to 1980, the workers' movement in El Salvador had clearly entered once more into a period of upswing, with yet another general strike in 1968 which had great repurcussions.
The enormous potential power of the El Salvador proletariat has been one of the most important factors in the situation. In spite of the backward nature of the economy, there is quite a strong working class in El Salvador. One third of the Gross National Product stems from industry, mining and construction as against only 26% from agriculture. Slightly more than half the active population is accounted for by agriculture. In other words, the specific gravity of the El Salvador proletariat is far greater than that of the Russian working class in 1917.
El Salvador is a far more industrialised country than the majority in Central America, with factories devoted to the production of cotton, canning of food and drink, bricks, cement, chemical products, leather, tobbacco and footwear. According to the official figures for 1968, there were 34,712 industrial workers. But this figure, apart from being incomplete in itself, does not give an accurate idea of the strength of the working class in El Salvador. To this figure must be added the workers in transport and the building industry, mining, commerce and fishing, as well as a very numerous class of artisans and other semi-proletarian elements which play a very important role in the economy and society of a country such as El Salvador. On the other hand, this figure excludes the workers of the coffee plantations, one of the key sectors of the economy who quite clearly form part of the working class.
At the beginning of the 1970s there were clear symptoms of a reactivation of the workers' movement, such as the strikes in the biggest shoe factories of the country. The terrible living conditions of the masses in the towns and villages helped to swell the support for opposition to the regime. The growing gulf which separated the Catholic Church from the government was another symptom of the self-same process. There were increasingly evident divisions within the ruling class itself and even within the ranks of the army officer caste. The most intelligent wing of the bourgeoisie, represented by the Christian Democrats, were advocating a reform from above, to forestall a revolutionary explosion from below.
Nevertheless, the most reactionary wing of the ruling class, represented by general Humberto Roberto, refused to accept the idea of change. The end result of this was the coup d'étât of 1980 which was backed by Washington at the time. Undoubtedly, the victory of the Sandanistas in Nicaragua was the decisive factor in these events. US imperialism came down in favour of a "controlled reform" in order to avoid a repetition of a Nicaragua type situation in El Salvador.
At the bottom of the crisis in El Salvador, as in the other countries of the region, is the problem of agrarian reform and the disastrous living conditions of the peasantry, both the 'colonos' (sharecroppers) and the 'peones' (farm-labourers). Thus, one of the first issues to come to the forefront was the question of land-
reform. This was a fraud in the finest traditions of the El Salvador ruling-class. More than 500 hectares were 'expropriated' but with lavish over-compensation paid out to the 'hacienderos' (big landowners). The most profitable land beloging to the coffee producers was untouched by this 'reform'. And despite all this, the oligarchy set its face squarely against it, and put pressure upon the government, utilising the services of the most reactionry wing of the military caste, whose representatives in the Junta was colonel Gutiérrez.
The self-styled "Revolutionary junta" which formed the government after the coup, dissolved Congress, promising new elections. It also suspended the Supreme Tribunal and promised amnesty for political prisoners and exiles and freedom for the political parties. However, within the junta itself, contradictory elements were at work. In theory, it was a coalition of "social democrats" and bourgeois "liberals" with representatives of the armed forces. In practice, it was nothing more than a government suspended in mid-air, trapped between the revolutionary movement of the masses and the resistance and sabotage of the "fourteen families"
The fall of the hated dictator Humberto Roberto opened the flood gates of the mass movement. All the discontent and frustrations accumulated for decades surged to the surface overnight. In the maelstrom of social ferment, the junta's "reformist" projects were doomed to failure beforehand. The contradictions between the classes were too strong. The gulf between rich and poor, too deep to allow a "half-way" solution. The divisions within the ruling class found their reflection in the tensions inside the junta between colonel Gutiérrez and colonel Majano. Aware of the danger of a social explosion, the spokesmen of the "progressive" wing of the bourgeoisie headed by Majano, advocated the drawing-in of the left-wing parties into the government. This was turned down by the reactionary tendency represented by Gutiérrez. The oligarchy and the officer caste launched a counter-offensive from the right. The Land Reform served as a pretext for a new wave of murders in the countryside carried out by members of the Armed Forces and right-wing gunmen.
The situation at this point in time bore a clearly prerevolutionary character. The government, hard-pressed from the left and the right, found itself paralysed. The ruling class was deeply divided and demoralised. The rifts in the ranks of the ruling class had affected those of the Army, where an important section of the officers and junior officers were in open conflict with the oligarchy and the right. The middle class had turned against the oligarchy. Under pressure of the masses, a split opened up within the Christian Democracy. The mass of the working classand the peasantry were clearly willing to fight for power. Even US imperialism was vacillating. Cyrus Vance warned the most reactionary generals against staging a coup, not for any humanitarian sentiments on Carter's part, but for fear of provoking a revolutionary movement of the masses.
In this situation, a revolutionary offensive of the proletariat, mobilising the peasantry and the semiproletariat and petit-bourgeois masses behind it for the seizure of power, would undoubtedly have led to a split in the ranks of the army, whose internal cohesion
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had been seriously undermined, preparing the ground for the passing-over of the most progressive soldiers and officers to the side of the working class. Nobody can assert that, at this juncture the working class was not ready to fight. In the months after the coup, the workers took part in one general strike after another, in spite of all the difficulties and dangers which this supposed. Throughout 1980 there was a wave of working class mobilisations unprecedented in the history of the country. In June, for example, there was a general strike, called by the "Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses" which, despite being declared illegal by the Junta, brought about the closure of the majority of businesses in the capital, the schools and the Administration.
The extreme weakness of the government at that time is shown by the concessions made by it to the mass movement (at least on paper). Among other things, the Junta announced the nationalisation of the banks, including foreign banks, and credit in general. This was a clear expression of the ruling class's fear and desperation in the face of the revolutionary movement of the masses. A general strike poses the question of power: "Who is master of the house, you or us?" If the leaders of the movement in El Salvador had linked the slogan of the general strike to the idea of workers' councils or 'soviets', generalised and extended to include the elected representatives of the housewives, the associations, the students, peasants and soldiers, the revolutionary movement could have acquired an irresistable strength. The decisive confrontation between the forces of the revolution and the counter-revolution would have taken place in an entire. ly favourable situation for the working class. In point of fact, the elements of soviets already existed within the tenants' associations and trade union committees which had been set up in El Salvador with the encouragement of different groups on the left. But these committees never succeeded in transforming themselves into soviets for one reason. Almost the whole of the groups and political parties with a serious mass presence in El Salvador, under the influence of Castroite ideas and with the example of Nicaragua at their back, had opted in favour of the tactics and strategy of guerrillaism. This fact determined their attitude towards the working class and the strike movement, which was seen by them fundamentally as an auxiliary arm of the guerrilla struggle. Although the different guerrilla groups took an active part in the general strikes, at no time did they explain the role of the working class as the protagonist. In practice, the heroic struggles of the working class were subordinated to "a guerrilla offensive." They spoke confusedly about the creation of a "people's state," but as a perspective after the victory of the guerrillas. Without the shadow of a doubt, in a situation like that of El Salvador, guerrillarist tendencies are the product of decades of the most brutal and ferocious oppression. Advanced layers of the youth drew the conclusion that the only possible way of fighting against the oligarchy was to take to arms and follow the example of Cuba, Vietnam and Nicaragua.
Compared to the alternative of a tardy and laborious work of organisation in the factories and workers' worker-cadres and grouping districts-educating together the forces capable of carrying out the seizure of power in the cities by means of the conscious movement of the proletariat which would gather to its side semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois the peasant, masses, on the basis of the programme of socialist revolution-the guerrilla solution seemed more immediate, more practical and more rapid. Nevertheless, there are times when the search for short-cuts has caused the shipwreck of the revolutionary process. The conscious workers of the world actively support the heroic fighters of the El Salvador guerrilla war, and will do everything in their power to facilitate their victory and the defeat of the murderous junta. But this solidarity cannot, and must not, serve as an excuse for the encouragement and extension of a servile imitation of the methods of guerrillaism in other countries where they do not have the slightest justification from the point of view of objective conditions and the needs of the working class.
It was inevitable that decades of repression, murders and tortures would give rise to a burning desire for vengeance on the part of the youth. Long before the collapse of the Humberto Roberto dictatorship there existed a whole series of guerrilla groups, some of which enjoyed a certain support among workers and peasants. The main reason for this situation was the vacuum produced by the reformist degeneration of the PCS (the El Salvador Communist Party) which did not offer a revolutionary perspective to the youth and the working class.
The enormous potential power of the El Salvador working class has been one of the most important factors in the situation The fraudulent nature of the elections held in El Salvador was exposed once again by the general elections of 1977 which were manipulated by the government party, the PCN. The reply of the working class was a general strike which was brutally repressed with the murder of 80 workers. In this situation, and in the absence of a revolutionary alternative on the part of the "Communist" Party, the guerrillaist tendencies were multiplied tenfold. The kidnaps and assassinations of the gunmen and torturers of "ORDEN" (an ultra-right wing vigilante organisation, organising death-squads linked to right-wing officers) were stepped up. A number of spectacular actions were staged, such as the occupation of the Mexican Embassy in January, 1979. Undoubtedly, these actions reflected the unbearable tensions which existed at all levels of society. But, in and of themselves, they were incapable of presenting a serious threat to the regime. The overthrow of Humberto Romero on 15 October, 1979, was not a consequence of guerrilla actions, but of the pressure
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15 A guerrilla patrol (above) rests after an engagement with the Army, February 1982. This was near Jucuaran, where an estimated 400 civilians had recently been massacred by the Junta's forces. Below: Two guerrilla soldiers stand guard (February 1982) after stopping and burning a government truck used to transport harvested cotton on a major El Salvador highway outside of Usulutan. Photo: POPPERFOTO -1
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16
from Washington, which feared the extension of the Nicaraguan revolution to El Salvador, if there was no change from above (Somoza had been overthrown in July of the same year).
The wave of radicalisation which surged up and became rapidly intensified after the fall of Humberto Romero offered enormous possibilities for a revolutionary party based on the proletariat. The slogans of "workers, councils" and "general arming of the working class" against the attacks of the repressive forces of the state were on the order of the day. The actions carried out by the working class showed an increasingly advanced level of revolutionary consciousness.
Under the pressure of the irresistable mass movement, there took place a process of unification of different opposition groups BRP [Popular Revolutionary Bloc]; PL-28 [Popular Leagues, 28 February.; FAPU [United Popular Action Front]; etc) to which the CP added its name in January, 1980. Initially, a revolutionary programme was adopted based on the overthrow of the Junta and the formation of a "revolutionary democratic government, based on the nationalisation of the means of production, the banks and credit, foreign trade, the creation of a new army and the investigation of 'missing persons'."
This programme, in a general sense, reflected the most pressing needs of the situation. The economy was in ruins. The oligarchy was resorting to massive outflow of capital. Only the seizure of power by the proletariat, in alliance with the oppressed masses of town and country, could save society from total disintegration. What was lacking was the organisation and generalisation of the organisations of workers' power, the workers' council or "soviets" organised around the programme of the seizure of power. In reality, in the workers districts and the factories, commit-
Instead of basing themselves on the leading role of the working class, the guerrilla leaders treated the workers'
movement as an auxillar arm of the central tactic of guerrilla warfare
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Photos: POPPERFOTO FINTO AL PUEBLO The Junta's soldiers (above left) armed and trained by the US, but easily demoralised.
Right: Mass loft wing protest, December 1979, against government murders and kidnappings.
tees existed, but the guerrilla leaders did not concern themselves with the task of uniting them, on the basis of elected representatives, with a view to creating the basis of an alternative power to the Junta. All the power to decide, all the initiative remained in the hands of the guerrilla leaders who, instead of basing themselves on the leading role of the working class, treated the workers' movement as an auxiliary arm of the central tactic of guerrilla warfare. Instead of organising the working class for a decisive assault on the government, they once more limited themselves to the tactic of occupations of embassies and ministries, 17 POPL kidnaps and isolated short-cuts.
The crisis of the Junta rapidly concretised in a split. On the 2 and 3 January, all the civilians in the Cabinet resigned from the government. On the 15 January a new cabinet was formed, with a Christian Democrat majority. On 24 March, the counter-offensive of the reaction found its expression in the assassination of Ar-, chbishop Romero, which increased the radicalisation of the petit-bourgeois masses. Colonel Majano, hardpressed by the reactionary wing of the Army, fled abroad.
In April, the Democratic Front (Frente Democratico
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18 Salvadoréo) was set up, composed of the representative of the "progressive" bourgeois (the National Revolutionary Movement) and the "popular" fraction of the Christian Democracy, including people who had participated in the first government of the Junta. Later on, these bourgeois sections were included in the Front (FDR) which Democratic Revolutionary nominated the ex-Minister Enrique Alvarez Córdova as general secretary.
The formation of an alliance with these bourgeois "liberals" meant a drastic change in the programme defended by the left parties. To the guerrillaist tactic was added a new programme which did not transcend the limitations of bourgeois society. Hitherto, there was confused talk about a "people's state" after a guerrilla victory. Now they defended the formation of a "revolutionary democratic government" representing a coalition of forces"
representative nominated by the guerrillaist organisation, the FMLN (The Farabundo Marti Forces of National Revolution), and its political expression, the FDR. Instead of the previous programme of the nationalisation of the means of production, the programme of the "revolutionary democratic government" consisted of peace, national sovereignty and independence, a non-aligned foreign policy, the creation of an army based on the FMLN forces and "honest officers and soldiers of the present army", the democratic representation of "all popular, revolutionary and democratic sectors" who contributed to the overthrow of the military dictatorship and "support for all private businessmen who collaborate and promote the economic development of the country and the programme of the revolutionary government."
The fall of the hated dictator Humberto Roberto in October 1979 opened the flood gates of the mass movement The revolutionary enthusiasm of the working class was clearly manifested in the magnificent general strike of 24 and 25 June. In the workers' districts, committees and even self-defence groups were set up. In the ranks of the guerrillaist organisations there were undoubtedly many militants who believed in the seizure of power by the working class.
Nevertheless, after months of partial struggles, with no clear perspectives for the seizure of power, came the first symptoms of tiredness on the part of the workers. The second general strike, called by the FDR for 13-15 Of August had much less support than the first one. The strike movement had clearly gone further than a phase of protest strikes of one or two days. The threat of reprisals by the Junta and its hired killers against any worker who participated in political strikes was undoubtedly an important factor in the minds of many workers. But, precisely for this reason, a new general strike "of protest" would inevitably have less success than an open struggle for power. The moment for political actions had already passed into history. The basic problem was that the "guerrillaist" leaders did not believe in the general strike as an efficient weapon for the seizure of power and had already decided in favour of the strategy of "people's war" after the style of Nicaragua and Vietnam.
On 16 August, the leaders of the FDR affirmed that the strike had been very effective, and that the people had shown that "insurrectional measures to be daily more feasible." In practice, the Junta, interpreting the lack of response for the strike as a symptom of weakness, went over to the offensive with the declaration of a state of emergency on 23 August, using as a pretext the political strike of 1,500 workers of the electrical industry which caused a 24-hour blackout in the capital.
The barest analysis of the events from the fall of Humberto Romero in October 1979 until September 1980 shows clearly how the guerrilla leaders had never conceived of the workers' movement as the leading force in the insurrection, but as an auxiliary arm of the guerrilla war, subordinated to the central strategy of "people's war" based in the countryside. The function of strikes was not the preparation of the proletariat for the seizure of power, but the disorganisation of the Junta. In a word, they acted as though the general strike were simply an extension of the "propaganda of the deed" of the previous period.
The working class cannot remain in a situation of permanent ferment. If the strike movement at a given moment in time does not become transformed into an indefinite general strike and an open struggle for power, the movement inevitably begins to decline and the initiative passes temporarily to the reaction. After nearly one year of struggles which did not show a way out via decisive showdown with the Junta, the movement in the towns found itself momentarily in an impasse. At that moment the leaders put forward the idea (which they had never actually given up) of launching a "people's war" against the Junta, concentrating the forces of the revolution in the countryside. The perspectives of these leaders were based on a mistaken perspective, both politically and militarily. In spite of subsequent declarations made by the spokesmen of the FDR which imply that the guerrilla offensive towards the end of 1980 had relatively modest objectives (the setting up of a series of "liberated zones" as guerrilla bases in the countryside), it is clear that they expected to obtain a more or less swift victory. Fernan Cienfuegos, a leader of the FARN (Armed Forces of National Resistance) guerrilla organisation, stated that the guerrilla offensive counted with sufficient forces to impose an "irreversible political and military situation in El Salvador" before the confirmation of Reagan as President of the USA-that is to say, before 20 January, 1981!
The guerrilla leaders took as their models the ideas of Castro, Mao and Giap, of conquering the rural areas and later the cities. However, if there is a countryside in the whole of Latin America less suitable for guerrilla
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A young woman fights with the guerrillas. Brutal repression has increased support for the guerrilla organisations, especially among the youth and peasantry.
warfare, that country is El Salvador. Here there are no great tracts of jungle, as in Vietnam, or enormous expanses, as in China. The only neighbouring countries are hostile to the revolution, and bases of counterrevolution: Guatemala in the North and Honduras in the North-East. The density of the population creates enormous difficulties for the application of the classical theories of guerrilla warfare. The smallest country in Central America, El Salvador has, at the same time the densest population (307.5 per square metre, according to the census of 1961). For all these reasons, it was more than evident that a guerrilla war, if it were not immediately successful, would be particularly bloody, with enormous loss of life, and would mean a colossal drain on the most heroic and and self-sacrificing forces of the Revolution.
The guerrilla offensive, which succeeded in liberating a series of provinces, was very costly in lives and did not succeed in inflicting a decisive defeat on the government forces.
19 From that time, the El Salvador conflict has resolved Photo: POPPERFOTO itself into bloody war of extermination, backed up by the murderous gangs of the "death squads" of ORDEN. The government's air force is using bombs made of pesticides, defoliants, and white phosphorus in a diabolical repetition of the methods of US imperialism in Vietnam. The brutal repression unleashed by the Junta will undoubtedly serve to increase the support for the guerrillas among the masses, above all among the peasantry, the principal victim of these indiscriminate massacres ad tortures.
This will be a long drawn-out conflict. After the defeat of the first offensive, the guerrillas were capable of renewing their attacks by the beginning of March, 1981, although on a lesser scale. The airforce and artillery of the Junta has not been able to eliminate the guerrillas who continue to control a series of areas of the country, in the Northern provinces of Morazan, in the province of Cabranas, in the North of Santa Ana, in San Vicente, Usulutan and in the area of Guazapa, 60 kilometres from the capital. The USA has carried out a complete rearmament of the Army. Nevertheless, the Junta's military campaign has not been very brilliant, despite the presence of US "military advisors." The Junta's troops are demoralised. According to sources of the FMLR-FDR "after three days' fighting, the morale and fighting capabilities of the Junta's forces tend to deteriorate rapidly, which means that they have to be relieved by fresh troops more or less every week." This army is only "effective" in the massacre of defenceless civilians. It is a mixture of conscripts, forced to fight against their will, mercenaries and gangsters. It was more than evident that a guerrilla war, if it were not immediately successful, would be particularly bloody, involving a colossal drain on the most heroic and self-sacrificing forces of the revolution Nevertheless, the Junta continues to control the cities and nerve-centres of the country. Backed by the USA, the Junta could last much longer, so that there exists the danger of a deadlock in the conflict, which might last years, with a ghastly waste of life and a total dislocation of the economic and social life of the country. There have already been more than 30,000 victims, most of them at the hands of the repressive forces of the government.
Conscious of the danger, the representatives of the FDR-FMLN have raised the possibility of "mediation" and "a negotiated solution to the conflict." The
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problem is: negotiation on what basis? The army generals will not accept negotiations which might imply recognition of the guerrillas as a political force in equality of conditions. In response to the proferred negotiations, the Junta is pressing ahead with its plans for elections in March. These elections will be open also to oppositional elements. They will only have to hand over their arms and embrace "legality" in order to qualify. Under present conditions, this would be tantamount to signing your own death warrant! And to underline the fact, the Junta has published a list of 138 "traitors to the Fatherland" which includes the names of all the leaders of the FDR.
It is clear that "negotiations" in this situation have no sense. The Junta has published a document supposedly written by the FDR-FMLN in which it is stated that the mediation offer is a tactical manoeuvre to gain time and win international support. This is a possibility. The conditions made by the guerrillas for negotiation are, among others, an end to repression, the ending of wartime legislation, complete freedom of expression and the substituation of the army High Command! Mao Tse Tung also made similar offers more than once during the Civil War in China as a manoeuvre to gain time and win support away from the enemy. The manoeuvre of the "elections" called by the Junta has the same significance. But the issue at stake now is not one of elections but state power.
Only the USA could force a negotiated settlement. But Reagan continues to believe in the possibility ofthe military victory of the Junta. After the loss of Nicaragua, he does not want to lose El Salvador. According to a study carried out by Cynthia Anderson in 1981, the Junta had received $107 million from the USA as against only $9.8 million in the two previous years. In terms of military aid, it received $5.9m in 1980 and $35.4m in the first four months of 1981, as well as 14 'Huey' helicopters (most of them subsequently destroyed by the guerrillas) and 56 "military advisers." However, the real amount of aid is much higher. if we include the money channelled to El Salvador via the international Banks in Washington, the real figure is $532m.
Without this support, the government would not be able to continue the war. According to Napoleon Duarte himself, the war is costing $15m a month. In addition to the very high figures of dead and wounded, the government itself recognises that 157,000 persons
have been left homeless or been obliged to move to
other areas. A further 150,000 have fled abroad. In a small country of five million inhabitants, this
represents an enormous movement of population.
The effects in the economic sphere have been
disastrous: "The Gross National Product suffered a
decline of more than 10% in 1980, according to figures
of the Planning Ministry, arriving at a level lower than
that of 1976. The per capita income was only slightly
more than $250. The director of Social Security has
stated that at least 34,000 industrial workers in
San Salvador (20% of the total for the sector) lost
their job as a result of factory closures." (El Pais
17 July 1981, emphasis added)
The danger exists of a process of disintegration and
atomisation of the working class and of a growing
lumpenization and demoralisation of the proletariat with very negative consequences for the future of the socialist revolution. The working class no longer sees itself as the protagonist of the revolutionary process, but as the passive object of forces outside itself. There will undoubtedly be a widespread sympathy towards the "guerrillaism" and hatred towards the Junta amongst the workers. But it is the relation between an oppressed class and an army of "saviours." Behind this lies a feeling of impotence and passivity in the face of the oppressors which did not exist before. This is the direct consequence of the theory and practice of the "prolonged revolutionary war." The socialist revolution demands as its prior condition of existence the conscious self-movement of the working class. Without this, even a revolutionary war with a base among the masses in the countryside (and, without doubt, the guerrilla movement in El Salvador enjoys mass support) even in the event of victory, could not lead to the establishment of socialism, in spite of the good intentions, the heroism and sincerity of its leaders.
Isolated from the working class in the towns, the exworkers, ex-peasants and ex-students of the guerrilla army will have a tendency to become turned into declassed elements under the control of a military bureaucracy. The exigencies of war will serve to augment the tendencies in the direction of bureaucratic command. This is the experience of all guerrilla movements in China, Cuba, Argentina, Yugoslavia, etc. The more prolonged the conflict, the deeper will be the bureaucratic tendencies, which will have their most negative effects in the event of a guerrilla victory. "The task of the emancipation of the working class is the task of the working class itself." Any attempt to substitute the leading role of the proletariat with other social forces will inevitably result in the creation of a privileged bureaucratic caste from the word go.
The working class of the entire world desires and fights for the victory of the guerrillas of El Salvador against the rotten reactionary regime of Napoleon
Durte. A guerrilla victory would mean an enormous step forward and would have very important repercus-
sions in all the other countries of the region and
throughout South America.
On the basis of their experiences, at times painful ones, the working class of Central America will come to understand the need for a Marxist programme as the only means of changing society
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US HANDS OFF EL SALVADOR El Salvador solidarity demonstration, London, 28 March 1982 Under capitalism there is no future for the peoples of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, etc. The rise to power of the FMLN-FDR would mean the beginning of the end for landlordism and capitalism in El Salvador. In spite of the limited character of the Front's programme, in practice it would be impossible to keep the revolution within the limits of the capitalist system. An FMLN-FDR government would have to nationalise the key points of the economy or suffer a complete debacle. The stupidity and short-sightedness of US imperialism, with its unconditional defence of reaction in El Salvador will only serve to accelerate the process.
American imperialism is in difficulties. The wave of chauvinism which accompanied the triumph of Reagan has subsided to the degree that the working class has realised the consequences of his economic policies and the youth has understood the danger of armed intervention in Central America. The protests by certain bourgeois politicians against growing participation of US "military advisers" in El Salvador reflects the fears of a section of the bourgeoisie of "a new Vietnam" in Central America.
Given the desperation of the strategists of capital in the USA the possiblity of a military adventure in Central America or the Caribbean cannot be altogether excluded. But such an adventure would be totally counter-productive and would spark off a wave of protests in the USA, radicalising the opposition to the Reagan government. Therefore, it is possible that the Pentagon might limit itself to a presence of "military advisers" on a relatively small scale, mercenaries, with indirect intervention through Honduras or, possibly, Venezuala.
At this moment in time, all Central America has become a powder-keg. The revolutionary movements of the workers and peasants might suffer this or that setback, but after each defeat, it will arise again with still greater strength, like the giant of Greek mythology who arose, each time he was hurled to the ground, having drawn new strength from his Mother, the Earth. The contradictions of capitalism in these countries are insoluble. We have definitely entered into a period of revolution throughout the region. The Central American Revolution will triumph under the forms of the socialism revolution, or it will never triumph at all.
On the basis of their experiences, at times painful 21 Photo: Andrew Wiard (Report) U.S MARINES GET OUT ones, the working class of Central America will come to understand the need for a Marxist programme as the only means of changing society. It will learn the need for a policy of complete class independence from this "progressive" bourgeoisie in order to forge the alliance of the working class with all the other oppressed sections of the town and village. It will also learn the futility of the methods of individual terrorism and guerrillaism and the need to have confidence in its own strength, its own organisations and its own class consciousness.
The conscious workers of El Salvador are fighting for the overthrow of the bloodstained regime of Napoleon Duarte-Goutierrez. They are enthusiastic is about the successes of the guerrilla army in its war against the forces of the Junta. With all their heart and soul they desire the victory of the FMLN. But the working class can never renounce its historic mission, or entrust it to other social forces. If the revolution is carried out by forces other than the proletariat itself, this fact will necessarily have very serious consequences for the future, as is shown by the experience of those countries where the revolution has taken place as the result of a guerrilla war or so-called "people's war." Socialism means the conscious participation of the working class at all levels on the tasks of running the state, industry and society. It means the administration of society as a whole by the councils of workers and poor peasants and the creation of a workers' democracy, like the state which exised in Russia under Lenin and Trotsky. A bureaucratic state, dominated by a privileged caste, even though it is based on a nationalised, planned economy can never lead to socialism, and will eventually tend to degenerate into a totalitarian system and a new kind of slavery for the working class, as we see clearly in the Stalinist states in the East.
In order to avoid the possibility of such deformations of the revolutionary process, the working class, beginning with its most conscious and revolutionary elements, must base itself on the principles and programme of Marxism: the ideas worked out by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, the only ideas capable of leading the working class to the socialist transformation of society and a classless society.
Once the workers and poor peasants of Central America are organised and armed with the revolu-
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