Tories green hypocrisy

[page 28]

Tories green hypocrisy The Tories have supported major expansion of the nuclear waste and disposal industry - hardly the mantle of the greens. S SENTRY By Lynn Walsh Hypocrisy has turned green. Speaking to the Royal Society in September last year, Thatcher appeared in a new guise:

scourge of polluters, protector of the environment, and champion of planet earth.

Even the Financial Times found this hard to take. Its headline was "Thatcher's green mantle seems an ill fit."

sermonised Thatcher about the 'greenhouse effect'. She called for international action on the ozone layer and acid rain.

Yet on vehicle exhausts and power station emissions Britain's Tory government has been obstructing measures since 1983, delaying and diluting EEC directives.

The Tories have also dragged their feet on the control of aerosol propellants which help destroy the ozone layer.

The Natural Environment Research Council is being forced to abandon major environmental monitoring programmes because it is being starved of funds by the Tories.

NERC expects to lose 170 staff next year, bringing the total shed over the last five years up to 700- So why has Thatcher turned green?

One motive is the need to preempt a 'green backlash' which coula pose political dangers for the Tories. In West Germany the Greens have damaged the conservative Christian Democrats as well as the Social Democrats, who have failed to put forward socialist policies on the environment.

Green belt Growing fears about environment have the surfaced even within the Tory Party. There were 73 resolutions on the 1988 Tory conference agenda.

One of the biggest Tory gripes, it is true, is from landowners and 'county'

people up in arms about plans to relax 'green belt' restrictions on lucrative DUMP STE housing developments.

Thatcher's green man, the Environment Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, is about as friendly to the environment as a dog in a children's sand pit.

The other reason for Thatcher's new concern is that the pollution and environmental problems have become so bad that they are beginning to rebound on big business.

Thatcher herself hinted at this. "Stable prosperity,"

she said, "can be achieved throughout the world provided the environment is nurtured and safeguarded."

Stable conditions for the profit-making activities of the big corporations are under threat.

The reaction to deadly hazards, appalling accidents, and environmental catastrophes affecting millions also threatens to provoke explosive upheavals in society.

Just a few recent exbring amples this home.

The circular voyage of the Karin B, a toxic waste ship almost as lost at sea as the Flying Dutchman, highlighted the chronic failure of big business to provide for the safe disposal of their waste products.

The mass epidemic of dying seals focussed attention on the extensive pollution of the North Sea.

Floods Then there was the flooding of the Ganges delta. Poets like Dante in the Divine Comedy used their i imagination to create images of Hell.

We have television pictures from Bangladesh.

One of the main causes of the flooding is the silting up of the river system because of systematic exploitation of the upland forests.

"Mankind," according to Thatcher, may have "unwittingly begun massive experiment with the system of this planet itself." It is not 'mankind, however, but cap- 29

[page 29]

MIR Spring 1989: Science Report

italism. There is nothing 'unwitting' about it. Nor has it just begun.

From the very beginning, capitalism based itself on the ruthless, wanton drive for profit through the exploitation of human labour, the land, and all the earth's resources. What Karl Marx said about agriculture applies to natural resources in general.

"The whole spirit of

production, capitalist which is directed towards the immediate gain of money, contradicts agriculture, which has to minister to the entire range of permanent necessities of life required by a network of human generations."

Capital Volume III.

Pollution

Thatcher has called though not without some escape clauses) for a war against pollution. Big business, of course, would welcome a less polluted, more favourable environment in which to operate. Competition in the global market place, however, means that the overriding concern of each firm is with its own profits. As far as they are concerned, the social costs, the wider effects, and the long-term consequences can all appear on someone else's

balancesheet.

In the period of postwar economic upswing, the state increasingly stepped in to limit some of the excesses of capitalist industry. But Thatcher is now cutting back the role of the state which, apart from its police role, is seen as an expensive overhead.

Most of her Royal Soc- 30

amli

Asbestos pollution is a product the drive for profits over safety at work.

of

iety speech was concern-

ed with "the need to

spend science budgets

wisely." The govern-

ment's civilian science

spending is being steadily cut back, while funding is increasingly being dir-

ected towards 'useful'

projects - ie of immediate interest to big business.

Remedies for pollution, says Thatcher, must be "founded on good science to establish cause and effect." But who decides what is good science'? The Friends of the Earth? The labour movement? Or-the directors of multi-nationals and Tory ministers?

The call for international co-operation from Thatcher appears laudable. Toxic effluent and poisonous gas flow freely across national frontiers.

It is impossible to tackle

ecological damage with-

out international planning.

But within days of this clarion call, the Tory leader was denouncing other European governments for their modest proposals for greater harmonisation of the EEC economies. Thatcher's crude assertion of the narrow national interests of an enfeebled British capitalism hardly squares with her call for international action on the environment.

The whole 'spirit of capitalism'. , which is based on private ownership of production, the drive for profit, the anarchy of the market, and competing nation states, 'contradicts' the balanced, planned development of the planet's resources.

The Friends of the Earth, the Greens, and other groups have played a val-

uable role in arousing and educating public opinion. In some cases, they have helped force companies and governments to take some action. But while one lot of symptoms are tackled, new symptoms appear.

They are rooted in the malignant pathology of the system.

The environmental pressure groups are right to warn that unless the destabilisation of our ecological system is halted, the whole basis of earthbound society will be threatened. But if they believe that by propaganda, pressure on governments, and the enlightenment of political leaders they can bring about fundamental solutions, they are mistaken.

Such solutions cannot be separated from the struggle to abolish capitalism and establish socialist production based on the democratic, planned development of the world-wide economy.

Ownership

From the standpoint of the future socialist society, Marx wrote in Capital, Individual ownership of land and resources will appear as obscene as the ownership of one human by another. All the present societies put together "are not the owners of the earth."

"They are only its occupants, its beneficiaries, and...have to leave it in an improved condition for succeeding generations."

Judged from this perspective, what credibility can be given to Thatcher's speech to Fellows of the Royal Society?

[page 30]

Food

researci

goes

private

Dickenso

The food industry and the government are responsible for the epidemic caused by the deadly microbes,

salmonella and listeria They have colluded in covering up the extent of the scandal, particularly the policy of handing over responsibility for preventative research to the food companes themselves. Even the House of Lords has condemned the shambles this has produced.

Poisoning

Yet again, however, the Labour leaders have completely failed to expose this crude and criminal attempt to boost still further the massive profits of the agricultural monopolies at the expense of public health. The body in charge of research to prevent food poisoning, the Agricultural and Food Research Council, is gradually being bled to death by cuts.

The only research centre dedicated to examining the safety of meat processing techniques is facing closure. The centre will have half its three million pound budget cut next year following the

recommendations of the Barnes report. This said that the food industry should fund research projects that are commercially exploitable.

The Ministry of Agriculture is withdrawing £150,000 each year from a project at the centre to examine ways of preventing salmonella from entering poultry. This research is being axed from the public sector because it is said to be ready for private exploitation, although it is against the interests of the food monopolies to continue it. Not surprisingly no firms so far have said they will take it over.

The spending on research and development (R&D) by the Ministry of Agriculture is planned to fall by 15 per cent over the period 1987-91. This is part of general cuts in research spending by the Tories. The theory is that the private sector should make up the difference.

British capitalism cannot afford state funded basic research,

especially when embarrassing findings threaten profits in the short-term.

British capitalism's international rivals, however, can still rely on their

governments subsidising them by doing basic research. Between 1981 and 1986 the West German government increased its spending on civil R&D by £1 billion, France by £1.5 billion, Italy by £1 billion. Over the same period Britain increased spending by only £500m.

Britain lags behind all its main rivals in this area in spending on civil R&D including Italy.

Military

Britain however 'leads'

the field in military research and development spending ie producing high-tech scrap metal. A quarter of all scientific and technical effort in society is squandered on arms. The military themselves admit that there is virtually no spin-off into civil applications.

The record of the private sector on research and development shows they will not fill the gap left by the state. Despite some increased spending in the present boom, their position relative to their rivals has probably continued to worsen.

Between 1966 and 1983 industrial R&D outlays in mechanical engineering fell by 36 per cent, electrical engineering by 52 per cent and aerospace by 18 per cent.

Between 1981 and 1986 the number of technicians, laboratory assistants and draughtspersons employed in government R&D fell by 20,000.

The desperate rush for profits by the food companies, while the going is good, is behind the food poisoning scandal. The long-term interests of capitalism to maintain basic standards in public health are ignored such is the depth of the underlying economic crisis.

This phenomenon is international and not restricted to the food industry. The potentially lethal faults found on numerous Boeing aircraft are an example of this. These faults were only discovered as a result of the M1 crash.

As the world economy moves into recession the pressure to cut corners further will intensify. The battle over health and safety will assume even greater importance for the Labour movement.

31

[page 31]

A lost opportunity

for Left in Sri Lanl

for Left in Sri Lanka

by Mukesh

Moorthy

Following the bloodiest election campaign in Sri Lankan history, threatening to outrival even the blood-spattered streets of Beirut for numbers of people killed, President R Premadasa and the right-wing United National Party (UNP) emerged as 'victors' from the December 1988 Presidential and February 1989 general elections.

Today, many of the bodies found on Sri Lanka's idyllic beaches are dead corpses, victims of communal, state and inter-party terror. Such is the level of killings that it is often hard to discern who is killing whom. Most recent killings were carried out by the Sinhala communalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front or JVP) and the Tamil nationalist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) both pursuing their election boycott demand. Killings totalled 1,200 in December 1988, 800 in January 1989 and 400 in the last week before February's general elections.

But how could the right-wing UNP the most repressive government in Sri Lankan history - win a fourth consecutive election victory in a country which for 30 years previously had rejected every government at elections after only one term of office ?

Its victory in the Presidential elections paved the way for the UNP's general election victory. But the word 'victory' must be greatly qualified. Although winning just over 50 per cent of the poll in the Presidential elections, Premadasa actually won the support of only 27 per cent of the total electorate. This increased marginally to 30.2 per cent in the February parliamentary elections.

The narrow Presidential victory was greatly helped by the lower turnout. In 17 traditionally anti-UNP electorates in the Sinhala south the voter turnout (traditionally 80 per cent and higher in Sri Lanka) slumped to between five and 40 per cent. Had there been a higher turnout it is doubtful whether Premadasa would have won the Presidential elections, given the narrow margin of 0.43 per cent in his first ballot victory. The artificially low poll was the product

32

Jaffna

-'Trincomalee

Anuradhapu

Sigiriya• Puttalam

Batt/calo.

Mahaveli

Kandy

u1a

Nuwar

Eliy

Colombo

Bad

Kalutara

Gal

of the terrorist boycott enforced by the JVP and LTTE. This affected the anti- UNP areas and thus the opposition vote the most. The JVP and LTTE actions assisted the UNP back to power.

Other factors must also be adduced for the UNP's election victories: certain economic benefits accrued by sections of the population under the UNP; the vote-catching promise of a 2,500 rupee ($85) per month 'poverty alleviation allowance' to the poorest seven million; the UNP's electoral alliance with the half million strong Ceylon Workers Congress (Tamil tea estate workers union); Premadasa's demagogic appeal as a low-caste candidate; and his verbal opposition to the Indo-Lanka Accord

(signed in 1987 between India and Sri Lanka) which brought the Indian army into the island.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the opposition parties _ the capitalist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United Socialist Alliance (USA) composed of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Sri Lanka Mahajana (Peoples) Party (SLMP), Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) and Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP) failed to gather the considerable mass discontent generated by UNP rule to inflict electoral defeat over the UNP.

The general elections were contested under a new system of proportional representation intended to fracture the opposition by allowing any small party

KEY:

Tamil

Mixed Muslim

Tamil/ -Sinhala

'Indian Tamil

with just five per cent of the vote the opportunity of winning a seat. Under this system the UNP won 125 seats to give it an overall majority (although it has lost its two-thirds majority in parlia-. ment). The SLFP captured 67 seats and the USA just three.

Among the Tamils and Muslims in the north and east, the Sinhala capitalist parties failed to win a single seat. Instead. the nationalist and anti-Accord Muslim Congress won four seats and the anti-Accord nationalist Tamils (including supporters of the Tamil Tigers) won 13 seats. The pro-Indian government alliance of the guerrillaist Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the bourgeois Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) won 10 seats.

The victory of the UNP represents a grave setback for the Sri Lankan labour movement, and can only strengthen the dictatorial repressive tendencies already manifested by the UNP state machine. The national vote for the four combined

'Indian estate

Tamil workers

[page 32]

Left parties of the USA collapsed to just 160,000, compared to over 600,000 votes for the LSSP and CP alone in 1970. The only encouraging result for the Left was the election to parliament of militant class fighter and NSSP leader Vasudeva Nanayakkara.

The election defeats are the culmination of a long series, stretching back through the 1983 anti-Tamil holocaust, the victory of the UNP in the 1982 presidential elections and referendum (which abolished for six years the general elections due in 1983). the smashing of the 1980 general strike, and the 1977 general elections which led to the defeat of over 20 sitting Left MPs - the first time since independence the Left had no representation in parliament.

1977 represented a turning point for the country and the Left movement. What were the mistakes that led to this debacle ?

The UNP's overwhelming electoral victory in 1977 was the consequence of the disastrous policies of the popular front government between the workers parties (LSSP and CPSL) and the capitalist SLFP between 1970-77. The LSSP leaders labelled this as a 'united front' government when it was in reality a surrender of the class interests of the workers to the capitalist policies of the SLFP - what Marxists term a popular front government, or in the words of Trotsky - 'a strike-breaking conspiracy.

Popular front

The danger of widespread opposition to the capitalist system focusing behind the LSSP and CP worried the capitalist class and leaders of the alternative capitalist party: the SLFP. Therefore, the workers' leaders were enticed with parliamentary portfolios to join a capitalist government (in 1964 and again in 1970) in order to contain the workers" opposition and discredit the workers' parties in the eyes of the masses. At first workers hoped that the 'socialist ministers' would bring about fundamental improvements. But. because the government did not aim for a socialist transformation of society. it inevitably became, in the words of the Trotskyist' finance minister NM Perera. "the instrument not of easing but of heaping additional burdens" on 'the poor and the humble" (Budget speech 1971).

After 1973 the popular front government was faced with a world recession and rising world oil prices. These burdens were offloaded onto the poor. It became a government of emergency rule, food shortages, queues and rationing. Strikes (print and bankworkers)

Jayawardene hands over to Premadasa

were crushed. It was not the kind of 'socialism' people expected.

If the LSSP had kept out of the popular front, it would have gained massively from the mounting unpopularity of the SLFP regime, gathering behind it the discontent of the Sinhala and Tamil youth and been faced with tremendous revolutionary opportunities.

The 1977 electoral defeat for the LSSP generated internal opposition to the LSSP ieadership from within the trade unions and party branches. The Left ('Vama') tendency led the opposition.

The LSSP leaders had not held a party conference since 1972 and had imposed mass expulsions, including those of popular mass leaders such as Vasudeva Nanayakkara MP. After the 1977 electoral defeat the demand for a conference became overwhelming. The Left tendency invoked its constitutional right to convene a congress of party members by collecting signatures from one-third of the membership. They invited the leadership to come and defend its position, but they declined. In December 1977 a new leadership of the LSSP was elected (and subsequently changed its name to Nava (New) Sama Samaja Party - NSSP).

From the outset the NSSP forewarned that in order to carry out its pro-big business, pro-multinational 'open-economic policies, the UNP government would confront the organisations of the working class.

The 1977 UNP government, led by JR Jayawardene, introduced a new constitution which created an all-powerful executive presidency not directly accountable to parliament and began to attack the reforms won by the struggles of the working class.

Sri Lanka can be described as a parl- ¡amentary bonapartist state'. It is a capitalist regime combining features of a military police state and a parliamentary democracy. A feature of all bon-

apartist regimes is dependent role of 'leader' and the state rest of society.

The bonapartist UNP regime combined a policy of brutal repression with occasional 'injections' of parliamentary democracy, while at the same time balancing for support between the classes, nationalities, and even factions within parties, including the ruling UNP itself. The UNP rulers also cynically played the racial card - continuing the 'divide and rule' policies of British imperialism - by diverting mass opposition to the regime along racist 'anti-Tamil or anti- Sinhala' lines.

The UNP maintained its rule for :: years because of its repression and manoeuvreing, a certain amoun: of arinomic development, and a series at iriustrial and political defeats inflicted er the working class.

The UNP government concentrated its attack on the traditionally militant and well organised public sector workers. Spiralling inflation and falling rea: wages pushed the workers into strike activity culminating in the general strike of 1980. Out of two million urban and estate workers, about 150,000 struck in the cities, mainly Colombo.

the relatively in-

the all-powerful machine from the

Defeat

The NSSP played a heroic role in leading this movement. It launched its entire trade union membership (over 60,000 workers) into battle. But the other Left leaders failed to deliver the support they had promised. Consequently, the majority of the working class remained largely passive. The heavy battalions of the working class, such as the railway workers and clerical workers, were severely affected by this defeat. Tens of thousands of workers were sacked and union activity in the public sector effectively banned.

On the economic front the government received a massive influx of foreign aid and loans (10 times higher than that received by the previous popular front government), and it 'exported' hundreds of thousands of labourers to work in the Middle East, thereby gaining foreign exchange remittances. Likewise tourism, service industries and the import-export trade were extensively developed. A Free Trade Zone employing 47,000 workers was set up, housebuilding and dam construction projects embarked upon.

There was a temporary fall in unemployment and economic growth at five per cent per year between 1977-83 was one of the fastest in the colonial world, providing a safety valve for discontent. This contrasted with the shortages and rationing of the popular front government (when the economy grew by only

33

[page 33]

Funeral of NSSP member killed by JVP. NSSP leaders, Siritunga, Vickramabahu and Vasudeva MP hold coffin.

2.8 per cent 76).

However, the fundamental economic malaise of a colonial society remained unresolved. Manufacturing production's share of GDP fell from 23.1 per cent in 1977 to 16 per cent by 1987. Despite their Thatcherite privatisation programmes the UNP rulers, reflecting the weakness of capitalism, were forced to rely on the state sector for 60 per cent of total industrial output and 60 per cent of tea production. Foreign debt reached $4.7 bn (70 per cent of GDP). Organised workers' wages declined in many sectors, while subsistence and minor crop producers (especially Jaffna Tamil farmers) were particularly badly hit.

Even the limited economic developments under the UNP were reversed by the war in the Tamil areas. Although the middle-class Colombo Tamils initially benefited under the UNP, the Tamil farmers of Jaffna and the east suffered. The Tamil youth were discriminated against in higher education and many of those who gained qualifications were unemployed because of the lack of industrial development in the north and east.

The simmering discontent of the Tamils was bred from a history of discrimination since independence and the failures of the popular front government. It had antagonised the non-Buddhist Tamils by introducing a Sinhala Buddhist constitution which was actually drafted by a 'Trotskyist' minister. So in the 1977 elections the Tamils voted en masse for the TULF which campaigned for a separate Tamil state.

The upper class TULF leaders had no intention of fighting for a separate state and instead hoped for concessions from the UNP. The UNP offered no substantial concessions, preferring to whip up 34

per annum between

anti-Tamil and anti-Indian jingoism to divert the Sinhala masses.

The predominantly Sinhala Sri Lankan army engaged in intimidation and brutal torture of the local Tamil population. In response. small groups of Tamil youth began to form guerrilla organisations like the LTTE to fight for a separate Tamil state called 'Eelam'

When thousands of Tamils in Colombo and the south were burned out of their homes and killed in the July 1983 pogrom, the Tamils exploded into open revolt. The riots had been organised by racist sections within the UNP government as 'revenge' for the killing of Sri Lankan soldiers by the Tamil Tigers. They went completely out of control when impoverished lumpen sections began to loot Tamil homes and shops.

The riots transformed the national problem into the major political issue in the island. The failure of the Sri Lankan security forces or the workers parties to defend them pushed the Tamils into open support for a separate state. Tens of thousands of youth joined the Tamil guerrilla groups.

Jayawardene falsely blamed the riots on the Left parties and banned the NSSP, JVP and briefly the CP. The UNP regime leant heavily on the Sinhala communal sections and even expelled the harmless TULF MPs from parliament - driving the Tamils even further down the path of separatism.

From 1983 to 1987 the UNP government attempted to suppress the Tamils, using the brutal methods of the Israeli Mossad (which had trained the Sri Lankan army). They killed thousands of innocent Tamils. But this policy ended in abject failure.

The young Tamil

fighters represented

the flower of the lamil nation, dedicated to make the supreme sacrifice in order to defeat the oppressive capitalist state. But the guerrilla leaders worked according to the blind methods of individual terror. They never attempted to mobilise a mass movement of the Tamil workers and peasants. Sinhala villagers and workers were hacked to death or bombed in 'revenge' for the Sri Lankan army massacres. Such actions only deepened Sinhala chauvinism in the south. Tamil guerrilla groups used the same methods to settle internal political differences and destroy rival Tamil guerrilla organisations.

They completely neglected the massive Tamil plantation proletariat in the central highlands who on their own possessed the potential to bring down the UNP. These workers had been brought from south India by the British in the 19th century. But they are regarded as a lower caste by the Tamils in the north and east. Furthermore, prior to the Indo-Lanka Accord all the Tamil guerrilla organisations believed that India would help form a Tamil state.

The war had already cost the economy 150 bn rupees (nearly £3 bn). Tourism and foreign investments had collapsed. Annual growth rates fell from 6-8 per cent in the late 1970s to 2-3 per cent by 1987. The drain of increasing war expenditures created rising unemployment and poverty among the Sinhalese, threatening a social explosion in the south.

Separatism

By the end of 1986-87 the guerrillas had effective control in Jaffna and many other Tamil areas. The Sri Lankan army could not launch an all-out military offensive to recapture Jaffna, because mass protest in south India would have been used by the Indian rulers to invade the island under the pretence of coming to 'liberate the Tamils'. . The imperialist powers refused to give military help to Jayawardene to crush the Tamil separatist movement and instead threatened to cut off aid if the war continued.

Jayawardene therefore turned to India to achieve what he had failed to do: the disarming and neutralisation of the Tamil guerrilla movement. The Indian government tried hard to reach an agreement with the LTTE but failed. So the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed in July 1987. India acted on behalf of all the Western imperialist powers in forcing acceptance of this Accord on the UNP government. An Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent into Sri Lanka to enforce the Accord.

Despite the Sinhala chauvinist background of Jayawardene and the UNP, they had no alternative but to accept the humiliating terms of the Accord. It

[page 34]

offered the promise of some conces-

sions to the Tamil minority but made Sri

Lankan foreign policy subservient to

the interests of India.

The LTTE made a token surrender of arms but refused to abandon their demand for a separate state. The UNP

regime attempted to undermine certain provisions of the Accord - by refusing

to resettle Tamil refugees in the east and arresting LTTE fighters. The LT- TE's large-scale attacks on Sinhalese civilians in the east was used by the IPKF as the pretext to launch a military offensive against the LTTE. dispelling the guerrillas' illusion that the Indian government which had nourished and nurtured their fighters in Tamil Nadu would not try and crush them.

During the autumn 1987 IPKF offensive, the Indian forces conducted themselves in an even worse manner, if that were possible, than the Sri Lankan army. They brutally suppressed all opposition to their rule in the Tamil areas. At one stage 300-400,000 Tamil civilians were forced into refugee camps in the Jaffna peninsula. The Tamils' illusions in the IPKF as liberators were rudely shattered.

The Tamils rapidly moved into oppusion wine irkt. In the east, the Accord and IPKF were feared as anti- Muslim and pro-Tamil by the Muslims. In the south, the Sinhalese saw the direct entry of the Indian army as a foreign invasion. Nationalist feelings were roused and thereb! prevented any partial stabilisation of the UNP regime.

The UNP accepted the Accord partly because they feared the working class opposition in the south which had been mounting since 1984. The UNP had used large-scale rigging. impersonation and intimidation to win the presidential elections and the referendum to postpone elections in 1993.

Left-wing

Although the SLFP is led by landlords and capitalists, its mass following is composed of poor peasants. the city poor and sections of workers. The failure of the parliamentarist SLFP leadership to defeat the UNP led to a radicalisation of their mass base. A left-wing opposition crystallised around popular film star and son-in-law of Mrs Bandaranaike - Vijaya Kumaranatunge and his wife Chandrika. Vijaya and Chandrika, with the support of leftward layers of the SLFP, split away to form the Sri Lanka Mahajana (Peoples) Party (SLMP) in 1984.

The SLMP rejected the increasingly

communal leadership of the SLFP. It

grew rapidly, representing a striving,

albeit confused, for a revolutionary

alternative by sections of the middle

class, workers, unemployed and radical-

isca youth. However, it was a confused

political formation. Its leaders, while

proposing more 'radical' solutions, still

retained a firm belief in the capitalist

policies - the so-called 'middle path'

mixed economy ideas of Mr SWRD

Bandaranaike (founder of the

SLFP).

Following the formation of the

SLMP, the May Day demonstration of

the Left parties (when the NSSP was

still banned) in 1984 attracted huge

crowds of up to 50,000. In the same

period the hill country Tamil estate

workers, led by Thondaman (a minister

in the UNP cabinet) had won a historic

strike securing equal wages for women

plantation workers. Later struggles of

the estate workers helped force the gov-

ernment to promise their right to vote.

Bank workers and nurses, and even

middle class layers such as doctors and

university lecturers, went on strike

between 1984 and 1987. Peasants fought

the multinational sugar companies and

opposed the onerous water tax. The

youth in particular were frustated with

government policies. Constant student protest led to the closure of all the country's universities. In March 1986 a conference of 5,000 workers delegates from all around the country demanded the calling of a national day of protest.

Clearly the situation existed leaders of the Left parties to broader campaigns against the involving the Tamil masses in struggle against the UNP

The July 1987 signing of the Accord led to the UNP's greatest crisis. Open splits emerged in the government, with MPs and ministers resigning and a haemorrage of party and trade union members. This was the moment for the workers' movement to seize the offensive. The Left parties should have taken an anti-racist, class position of total opposition to the Accord, the IPKF and the governments of India and Sri Lanka. They should have defended the rights of the Tamils for an autonomous region or homeland in the north and eastern provinces, combined with programme of mass class action on the main economic issues. Then the Left parties could have challenged and undermined both the Tamil Tigers and the JVP; won over large sections from the SLFP and emerged as the main opposition to the UNP.

Instead, the bonapartist UNP regime now leaned to the Left for support. This

for the launch regime a joint

UNP regime which had smashed the 1980 general strike, imprisoned NSSP leader Vasudeva on numerous occasions and banned the Communist Party and NSSP now looked to, and succeeded in finding, 'friends' on the Left. They even distributed hundreds of guns to the Left leaders. Obtaining support from the workers' movement for the Accord and IPKF, the UNP government managed to re-stabilise their regime.

The fatal mistake of the reformist leaders of the SLMP, together with those of the CPSL and LSSP. was to believe that the national question could be "solved' through negotiations between the capitalist governments of India and Sri Lanka. They argued that the Indian ruling class was anti-imperat: and played a progressive role i. ine Indian sub-continent - because : -ac 'liberated' Bangaladesh in the !": ::: against Pakistan. and because :::.-. paigned for the Indian Cies : become a Zone of Peace'

Reactionary

This position cannot be further trum

reality. The Indian ruling class plays j

reactionary role in the sub-continen:

which it tries to conceal by posturing an

anti-imperialist position within the non-

aligned movement and cleverly balani-

ing between the USA and USSR in the

international arena.

The 'divide and rule' policies of

British imperialism were responsible for

the bloody partition of India and Pakis-

tan which the Indian landlords and cap-

italists exploited for their own reac-

tionary ends. They systematically trod

upon the rights of the national minor-

ities - from Kashmir and (most-rec-

ently) Punjab, to the North-Eastern

tribal states and have failed abysmally to unite the nationalities of India.

In the sub-continent, which it regards

as its own backyard, the Indian bour-

geois acts like an imperialist power dominating the small countries or ine Himalayan region (Bhutan and Nepal), even forcibly annexing the previously independent state of Sikkim in 1974.

The invasion of Bangladesh was carried out for its own 'great power' intentions - to strike a blow at the Pakistani bourgeois and to smash the (Bangladeshi) Mukthi Bahini guerrillas. In doing so it prevented the overthrow of capitalism and landlordism in Bangladesh which would have had repercussions throughout India with its bordering state of West Bengal itself in ferment. The Indian bourgeois has proved incapable' of uniting these two halves of

35

[page 35]

ented are merely an instrument of This was ignored by thousands of SLFP MIR Spring 1989: Sri Lanka While they are building up a powerful naval fleet and acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, the Indian ruling class hypocritically cries out for a 'Zone of Peace' in the Indian Ocean. The interests of the Tamils mattered least in the calculations of India. Initially, the Indian secret service (RAW) helped to arm and train the Tamil guerrillas, aiming to use them for their own foreign policy interests. But the Indian rulers did not want a Tamil separatist guerrilla victory which even on a capitalist basis would have destabilised southern India and given encouragement to the many nationalist move- Although none of the Tamil fighting groups were 'Marxist', the danger existed that if one of them came to power in an independent Tamil 'Eelam' state, they would be pushed by the utter collapse of the war-ravaged economy in the direction of overthrowing capitalism. In any case capitalism was extremely weak in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka - where most industry (cement, sait, pharmaceuticals and paper) was already state- Accord hoped that a quick and easy foreign policy success in Sri Lanka would head off domestic opposition while simultaneously widening India's sphere of influence. These were the cold class interests behind the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka.

But the Left leaders held to the illusion that the Accord could solve the national question and restore peace. They welcomed the Indo-Lanka Accord and in February 1988 launched the United Socialist Alliance (USA) combining the SLMP, LSSP, CPSL and NSSP on a political platform of doing "everything we can to ensure its proper implementation"

• They supported the IPKF, saying that its presence was required to "facilitate the implementation of the Accord. They even called for the "neutralisation" of "all forces opposed to the Accord"

, thereby justifying the military campaigns of the IPKF and Sri The Accord did contain the promise of 'concessions' for the Tamils. This was the democratic facade used by India to hide its reactionary policy of propping up the UNP government, smashing the Tamil liberation struggle and legitimising the Indian government's sub-continental supremacy. Under conditions of occupation those concessions implem- 36 On 12 February 1988, the NSSP majority carried out a turn in policy announced in a document presented as a "basis for agreement with the other members of the USA" that "we should defend, against chauvinist and tionary forces, the Accord when mit into effect, as a means of arriving at a political solution to the Tamil national question by the formation of the provincial councils, with the Indian Keeping Force to facilitate the implem- " Within the NSSP Siritunge Jayasuriya and a minority of the leaders Over the last decade, the NSSP has campaigned consistently for a united front of the left parties against the UNP. The Third International under Lenin and Trotsky's leadership emphasised the key role of forging action - the united front tactic - with other workers organisations in order to ensure the maximum mobilisation of the working class against the class enemy. This would show in practice to the rank and file of the reformist parties the inadequacy of their leaders and programmes and the superiority of revolutionary Marxist politics and organisation. In this manner, the revolutionary party, from being a minority of the working class, could be built into a mass party supported by the overwhelming majority of workers and peasantry. But Trotsky warned of the importance of maintaining the complete political independence of the revolutionary party within the united front - "No common platforms with Social Democracy...March separately but strike together!...Agree only how to strike. and when the United Socialist Alliance leaders demanded that the NSSP adopt a joint political platform of support for the Accord and IPKF. What is more, in the last year no serious, extra-partiamentary campaign of action has been organised against the UNP regime. This was despite the fact that 1988 was a year full of opportunities, as well as dangers, for the Left parties. In 1988 SLMP leader Vijaya Kumaranatunge was assassinated by the JVP. Up to 500,000 people turned up for the funeral in a massive show of sympathy for Vijaya and the Left. This sympathy continued up to the time of provincial council elections in May-June 1988. Then the USA received 1.3 million votes and in many areas narrowly missed defeating the UNP, although a significant share of these votes were gained by default because the SLFP and JVP organised a racist-terrorist bovcott. voters who voted for the USA so as to try and defeat the UNP.

But these favourable openings were not capitalised upon by the Left who refused to organise a sustained programme of mass action against the state. So these votes later returned to the capitalist SLFP.

The reformist and Stalinist workers leaders have forgotten all the lessons of the Sri Lankan independence struggle in which the LSSP built its mass base only because of its uncompromising opposition to British imperialism. Although to their credit the Left leaders have taken an anti-racist stance, their policy of supporting the Accord has now led to their massive electoral defeats in the presidential and general JVP A questioning of past policies will inevitably open up among the rank and file in which the Marxists will intervene. The Stalinists and some sections in the LSSP and SLMP will argue that the Left parties should have had a popular front with the SLFP. But it was precisely the class betrayals of the last popular front government which led to the present As in 1971, because of the mistakes of the workers'

movement, the JVP has mushroomed into a mass force among youth. The JVP has opposed the UNP and the Accord, albeit from a poisonous racist viewpoint.

The JVP originated as a left split-off from the pro-Chinese Ceylon Communist Party in the 1960s. Reflecting disillusionment with the LSSP, it was attracted to guerrillaism following the Cuban revolution. It advocated armed insurrection and began to draw in unemployed but educated rural youth. But the JVP insurrection of 1971 took place when the popular front government still had a degree of support. So it was crushed with the murder of 15,000 youth. The LSSP and CP leaders remained in that government despite those brutal massacres.

The JVP and its "patriotic front organisations concentrate Sinhala chauvinist opposition to the merger of the north and eastern provinces and oppose the very idea of a Tamil autonomous 'homeland' - although, to win Tamil votes in the 1982 Presidential elections, the JVP oppor- 'self-determination' to the Tamils. This refusal today to accept in practice even limited aut-

[page 36]

onomous rights for the Tamils, renders

their claim of being the only 'true Left

party' truly laughable:

The JVP appears to favour the righ-

tist UNP government staying in power in order to portray themselves and their

terrorist methods as the only alternative

to the UNP and then to engage in a

purely military struggle for power. In

order to exercise a dictatorship of ideas

and methods over the working class, the

JVP have tried to destroy rival opposi-

tion organisations by killing hundreds of

Leftists and SLFP members. Such bar-

baric methods are completely alien to

the democratic traditions of the Sri

Lankan labour movement and cannot succeed in intimidating the Left move-

ment to accept the JVP's ideas.

Nevertheless, the JVP has significant

support among the peasants and youth.

To many young people the JVP has at

least campaigned against unemploy-

ment, privatisations. for land reform,

better education. wage rises etc. It

appears more revolutionary' than the

'parliamentary' Left. because it offers a

short-cut military solution to all their

problems. But these 'short-cuts' are

actually very very long diversions to a dead-end. as the Tamil vouth who took to such short-cut solutions 10 years ago have discovered. They are still far from reaching their goal.

In the south, even more so than in the north, the existence of a strong working class in the cities and the plantations, renders the methods of the JVP completely obsolete and reactionary. The only reason why the working class is not playing the leading role in the opposition to the government is because of the surrender of the Left leaders to the government.

The JVP terror has raised to prime importance the question of the defence of the workers organisations. Certain leaders propose an open or disguised policy of support for the capitalist state machine to smash the JVP. On the other hand. militants within the Left have correctly understood the need for armed defence. But this has led to armed groups being formed which have engaged purely in revenge killings of suspected JVP-ers. This is tantamount to engaging in individual combat with the JVP over the heads of the masses and itself threatens to degenerate into internecine terrorism.

Marxists argue that a sound defence must primarily be based on a correct political programme and by appealing for and building mass workers defence. This would mean arming the workers and peasants organisations against JVP. LTTE and state terror. The JVP killers must be rooted out of the workplaces and villages. But this cannot be done

Tamil Tigers leader Parabakarani, still in without a struggle against the government and the social conditions which have led to youth joining the JVP. Guns alone are insufficient. Already the Left parties possess hundreds of guns supplied by the government. But in the absence of a mass mobilisation on a programme of struggle against the regime, these arms have proved inadequate to defend the Left.

Although Premadasa released many JVP-ers from prison and appealed to them to come to an agreement, he will ultimately be forced into a military showdown with them. In preparation Premadasa has announced a doubling in police numbers.

The Indian bourgeois are firmly backing Premadasa economically and militarily. In addition Western imperialism will provide aid to prop up the UNP regime and to enable Premadasa to implement part of his reforms.

Through a policy of populist concessions plus brutal military repression Premadasa will try and smash the JVP movement. This will involve a repetition of the 1971 massacres of youth but on a far larger scale.

Tamils

Under the excuse of combatting the JVP the Premadasa government could also take measures to restrict democratic rights and lean more towards a military-police dictatorship. attempting to suppress other opposition organisations and trade unions. including the Left. This would be Premadasa's repayment to the Left for its opportunism.

But such developments are not inevitable. A number of complicating factors can intervene to frustrate Premadasa's plans.

The Tamil question resolved. The Accord

remains allowed

far the

from tem-

hiding (left).

porary merger of the north and eastern

provinces to be finally decided by a

referendum, announced for July 1989.

to be held in the eastern province. The

merger of the two provinces to create a

Tamil homeland has been one of the

main Tamil demands for decades.

But many of the Sinhalese in the east were introduced as settlers by successive Sinhalese governments to under-

mine the original Tamil demographic

majority there. Because of the nationalism and terrorism of the Tamil guerrillas in the past and fearing 'Tamil domination', the Sinhala and Muslim masses (now 60 per cent of the east province) have been alienated and may vote against the merger. The JVP and the Sinhala communalists will campaign to break the merger which they regard as a virtual separate Tamil state.

A compromise could be worked out on the basis of re-dividing the eastern province boundaries, creating a far smaller Tamil province or offering autonomy to the minorities within the merged eastern province. But because of the intermixed population, it is not guaranteed that either the merger, the breaking of the merger, or a re-division, would satisfy either the Tamil, Sinhala or Muslim populations in the north and east. The referendum could bring communal passions to the boil once more, with both the LTTE and JVP from opposite poles, opportunistically trying to gain out of the situation.

On the basis of capitalism the national question remains an intractable problem. The Muslim and Sinhala minorities of the east could be won to support a permanent merger of the north and east only by advocating a socialist programme which guaranteed equal rights to all. Ultimately the minorities must be allowed the right to decide their own fate. It would be wrong and impossible to forcibly expel or incorporate these populations into a permanently merged

37

[page 37]

north-east province against their Any attempt to do so would only voke violent opposition.

The Muslims speak Tamil and are part of the Tamil-speaking nation. But the mistakes of the Tamil nationalist guerrillas and the Indo-Lanka Accord has pushed sections towards the idea of a separate Muslim province.

Just as with the Left parties, the jo-called 'Marxist' guerrilla groups in :he north and east supported the Accord. The EPRLF guerrilla group which won the elections to the eastern provincial elections in November 1988, adopted the stance of total support for the IPKF. They collaborated with the IPKF in their military campaigns against the LTTE and civilians. In return, the IPKF organised the former EPRLF and other pro-Indian guerrillas into a local police force, which is to be armed by the Sri Lankan state and incorporated into the Sri Lankan police forces.

Any regional police force should be fully under the control of elected committees of peasants and farmers in the region. The only guarantee of security from communal or Indian and Sri Lankan state terror is the organisation of united armed defence committees of the trade unions and farmers of all three communities. Otherwise, the Muslims and Sinhalese will view it as a purely Tamil police force, while the EPRLF will be distrusted as stooges of the Indians among the Jaffna Tamils.

will.

pro-

Estate workers

Over half the Tamil and Muslim populations live outside the north and east alongside the Sinhala workers and peasants. Only the socialist revolution, guaranteeing the right of complete autonomy and separation, can sweep aside the economic root causes of national antagonisms, and begin to lay the basis for the solution of the national question.

In the south, the future strength of the Premadasa regime depends to a large extent on developments in the economy. In 1988 growth fell to 1.5 per cent and unemployment rose to 20 per cent. Premadasa's vote-catching promise of a monthly Rs2,500 'poverty alleviation allowance' will be eagerly awaited by the seven million poor. This allowance will only be partially implemented and can rapidly be eaten away by the fires of inflation. It is also a double-edged weapon which can be used to meet the IMF demands for abolition of all food subsidies, rises in indirect taxation and massive cuts in public sector wages and jobs - something that even the Jayawardene regime dared not implement.

Sri Lanka is heavily dependent on imperialism for aid and the advanced capitalist countries for 50 per cent of its

IPKF commander with EPRLF leader. export sales. The coming world recession will also severely affect the economy. If the economic situation worsens, despite their present unpopularity (because of their terrorist methods) Sinhalese youth could once again turn towards the JVP, given no alternat-

In the long-term, capitalism and landlordism can only offer the peoples of Sri Lanka a future of unending misery - a continuation of racial strife which in the last resort could lead to civil war and the intervention of the IPKF in the south, if the UNP regime loses control of the situation. This could possibly lead to the partition of the island, resulting in horrific massacres of the minorities of each community.

The workers movement remains the only obstacle to this nightmare. This movement must be rearmed with a Marxist programme based on the best revolutionary traditions of the old LSSP. Despite the defeats of the past, the election of three Left MPs to parliament provides a platform from which to campaign against the UNP and appeal to the oppressed masses of the crisisridden SLFP.

But there can be no truck with either the Indian capitalists, the UNP regime or their false solutions. Likewise there should be no return to the disastrous policy of alliances with the capitalist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

Premadasa's capitalist policies will provoke opposition from the working class which will move into battle on the trade union front following its parliamentary defeats. The workers' leaders must particularly target the huge plantation proletariat of 500,000 hill country workers, who remain the only undefeated section of the class. The estate workers possess thousands of arms and contain the potential to paralyse the economy and halt Premadasa in his tracks. The present capitalist leaders of the estate workers can be undermined by the workers' leaders through a sustained programme of propaganda and agitation.

If the Left Alliance adopted a correct position, mass support for the Left can be rebuilt. The immediate tasks are to

unite the unions to defend democratic and trade union rights from the future onslaught of the Premadasa regime. Premadasa must be forced to implement immediately and fully his promise of the Rs2,500 allowance. There can be no support for the IPKF or the terror of Premadasa's army against the Sinhala and Tamil youth.

A campaign of action on the basic economic issues facing the ordinary masses - against privatisation; defence of free education; decent housing; full citizenship rights for estate workers; for jobs and wage rises, abolition of the water tax and abrogation of the farmers debts, etc - should be mounted to regain mass support.

But the movement must have a clear internationalist perspective. In Tamil Nadu (south India) the Accord has little attraction to the 60 million Tamils there, as the crushing defeat for Rajiv Gandhi's Congress(I) party in the January 1989 state elections and the victory for the pro-LTTE Tamil nationalist DMK party shows.

Internationalism

The mistakes of the Sri Lankan Left are mirrored by those of the Left Front in India (composed of the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPM), Communist Party of India (CPI), and two smaller parties) which falsely supported all the failed 'Accords' of Rajiv Gandhi's government from Punjab and Assam to Sri Lanka. But despite their mistakes, support for the CPM and Left Front is growing throughout India. Three years ago a Left Front re-captured power in the southern state of Kerala and last month the two Communist parties won 18 seats in the state elections in adjoining Tamil Nadu.

The Indian and Sri Lankan revolutions became inextricably interlinked after the signing of the Accord. The overbearing presence of the Indian army will ultimately be used to smash any revolutionary challenge developing in southern Sri Lanka.

Neither the Sinhala nor Tamil nationalists can force out the Indian army. This can only be done by patiently building up a movement of the working class and peasantry; and by making an internationalist appeal to split and win over the ranks of the Indian army through appealing for support from the workers of India.

Based upon the programme of Marxism, the workers movement could win support from the workers and peasants of all communities and overthrow the Premadasa regime, bringing to power a workers and peasants government. This would spark off a revolutionary conflagration leading to the socialist transformation of the entire sub-continent.

[page 38]

Algeria - lessons of The early days of the revolution - Ben Bella (centre) and Boumedienne (second right). October riots For two weeks last October the youth of Algeria took on the forces of the state in the manner of the Palestinian 'Intifada'. Wave upon wave, including 10 and 12-year-olds. faced tanks and machine guns unarmed. Even as the bodies of their comrades were piled up by the soldiers, the youth would form up and move onto the attack once more with nothing but sticks and stones. Their bravery - their sheer recklessness - stemmed from the feeling that there was nothing to lose. Unofficial reports put the death toll as high as 700. every section of sodety was attected and joined the louth in angry protest teachers, doctors.

civil servants and shopkeepers. In some instances the police were seen to traternise with the demonstrators. On others. they were humiliated and ridiculed.

- stripped And more generally: they participated in horrific and bloody reprisals. As the movement begun to die down in response to the government's promises of change, violence still broke out, and some unusual layers of society demonstrated their defiance. As the Observer reported: "In the picturesque Algerian resort of Tizzi Ouzou...pro- Government demonstrators attempted to bully bystanders into joining their procession. Ihe onlookers resisted. A fracas broke out. The police opened fire, and 10 more deaths were added to hundreds in the period of turmoil. "Next day...the angry owner of a souvenir shop just off Tizzi Ouzou's main street, said: 'It I want to shout slogans in support of the Government, I Will do so of my, own frce will. But we Calm was restored at great cost - first brutal repression, concessions.

Food was rushed into the shops, wages were raised and political reforms were promised. Top members of the government were sacked by the President, Bendjedid Chadli, as scapegoats for the All these measures temporarily defused the crisis. But, seeing cracks opening up in the monolithic regime, all layers of society pressed home the advantage. A wave of strikes broke out, including in the big oil and gas terminals.

Meetings, marches and petitions were organised in protest at the government's actions and a rash of unprecedently outspoken newspaper articles appeared in the hitherto tightly controlled press. There was what a Financial Times journalist called an 'untying of ton- Among the demands of the strikers were the sacking of the top managers and the removal of the official union and party cells from the factories. There Is a widespread perception of the party - the FLN - as being the party of the privileged elite. During the street clashes in October, the party headquarters were attacked and ransacked, along with police stations, ministries, state-run supermarkets and jewellers' Shops.

In Oran, Algeria's second city, people took to the streets to demand that the military governor be sacked for the repressive measures he had employed. If the Interior Minister's career was at an end, then what was sauce for the goose could also be ladled out to the Brutal reprisals had been taken against the demonstrators, not only on the streets but against those arrested and detained - more than 4,000 in total. The Algerian Human Rights League delivered evidence to Chadli that more than 100) people were shot, tortured, killed or went missing after arrest. The League called for a general amnesty for those prisoners still being held without trial in football grounds, army garrisons and police cells throughout the country. Even doctors marched on the streets in protest at the vicious police repress- The memory will not be rapidly erased of youths being mown down by machine gun fire and then of thousands being arrested and tortured. Newspapers have carried testimonies from the victims bringing back memories of the atrocities of the Algerian war against French imperialism.

What angers the youth particularly is that those who led that struggle 25 years ago have now usurped their positions and flout their wealth.

They strut around in Pierre Cardin suits, drive big, fast cars and help themselves to the lion's share of increasingly scarce 39

[page 39]

resources.

"People queue all night outside the local state semolina shops" said one man, "and in the morning when the director arrives, he tells them there is not any. Then in full view of everyone, a Mercedes or a BMW draws up and a Tchi-tchi takes a sack away. They do not even try to hide it." The "Tchi-tchi' are the material beneficiaries of FLN As the Observer comments: "At a time when the purchasing power of ordinary people has been falling sharply, the arrogant display of wealth by the and rapidly spreading and widely visible corruption among senior Algerians will remain an inflammatory issue unless it is tackled." Youngsters who could not afford the price of a cinema ticket would see the children of the political elite driving in their BMWs to private parties. In Algiers, with a population of 3 million three quarters of whom are under 25 there are only 11 cinemas, two swimming pools and one discoteque. The youth in the teeming slums of a city built to accommodate no more than 800,000 have nothing to look forward to. Families live with up to 15 to a room and spending on public housing has been slashed. Education, traditionally 25 per cent of the state consuming budget, has also now come under attack. There are no jobs for schoolleavers.

Mass unemployment is being exacerbated by lay-offs in state-run firms. Working class families are unable to buy meat at f10 a half kilo or even vegetables at £2 a kilo. Clean drinking water has been unavailable in many working class areas for whole periods of Life had time.

become intolerable.

Enough was enough!

Strikes The movement of last October welled up trom below - without leaders and against the old organisations. Strikes were already taking place in the post office, Air Algerie, the car industry. electronics and among office clerks. A general strike had been called against the new wages freeze for 5 October but was overtaken by the movement of the youth onto the streets. Their slogans included: "The people are hungry!' 'Down with the crippling cost of living!' They have murdered children!' and most significant of all, the determined cry of 'This time we will go to the end!'

The present 'stabilisation' in Algeria is a very fragile plant. Nothing will be the same again. Expectations and ambi- 40 After the riots, food was rushed in. tions have been fuelled. New demands and new movements will develop. The crisis within the economy will prevent the regime from making anything but token concessions; they will be incapable of satisfying the most basic needs of the Algerian population. The regime has obviously run into the sand - partly for external reasons and partly internal. The economy of Algeria is extremely vulnerable, even in a period of upswing in the advanced capitalist countries with whor most of its trade is carried out. Ninety eight per cent of its foreign earnings come from the sale of hydrocarbons - oil and gas. The recent fall in prices has wraught havoc with the economy. It has meant a wiping out of £3bn worth of Algeria's foreign earnings - from £8bn to The response of the government to this was to slash food imports by $2.5bn (60% of Algeria's food comes from abroad) and to intensify the already harsh austerity measures with massive price rises, following on from devaluation and the withdrawal of subsidies on essential goods.

The explosion of anger that these measures provoked rocked the Chadli regime. Divisions had already appeared in the ruling circles on how to deal with the crisis. The President had been trying to liberalise' the economy, introducing the cold winds of competition and 'mar- But there had been opposition trom the old guard of the ruling FLN, fearing for their own future. There were allegations at the time of the street-fighting that it had been orchestrated by them. The Algerian Communist Party, incidalso had its own 'conspiracy theory' to explain the uprising! A few 'manipulators' were behind it, not an elemental movement of workers and youth against the regime!

Reflecting the head of steam building up in Algerian society, even the handpicked FLN members of the National Assembly fell out with the newly appointed Prime Minister. If democratic 'openness' was the new policy, why was Kasdi Merbah seeking their approval for a government plan he had neglected to circulate to them? He was howled down. When eventually the debate took place, 150 out of the 261 members spoke against the plan. When it came to the vote, most fell in line but 21 actually voted against!

Reforms put forward by Chadli that might be seen as aiming to end the oneparty monopoly will inevitably be resisted by those whose careers depend on the entrenched position of the FLN. But these measures of so-called 'political pluralism' are so hedged around with qualifications that it seems unlikely for the moment that any genuine opposition parties will be allowed to develop. Associations of a political character will be allowed only as long as they are not 'directed against state interests' A massive bureaucracy lies like a ton weight on the top of Algerian society. The regime has had decades of experience of ruling in a Bonapartist fashion. It employs the iron rod of the army supposedly 'balanced' by the pseudodemocracy of the referendum. The military in Algeria penetrates every sphere of life. One-fifth of the delegates at the party congress are from the armed forces.

Socialism The Algerian regime, like so many one-party dictatorships in Africa and elsewhere, claims to be 'socialist'. According to the constitution, ular assemblies are the basic institutions of the state. The irreversible option of socialism is the only path to complete national independence.

"The individual ownership of property for personal or family use guaranteed. Non-exploitative private property is an integral part of the new social system. The cultural, agrarian and industrial revolutions and socialist management of enterprises are the basis for the building of socialism". This 'National Charter' also freedom of expression and assembly. Little of the constitution has been operated in practice. But the nature of a regime is not determined by its constitution. It is first of all necessary to establish the direction in which it is moving; and second, the material basis on which the system rests.

In 1962, after eight years of horrific blood-letting in the war against French imperialism, with one million dead one tenth of the population - and up to three million herded into resettlement camps, it looked as if socialism was on

[page 40]

the order of the day.

One million French 'colons' (settlers) left the country as a result of the war capitalists, technicians, teachers, skilled workers. No indigenous national bourgeois seemed capable of taking over the task of developing the Algerian economy.

In the colonial and semi-colonial world none of the tasks traditionally carried out by the bourgeois in the advanced capitalist countries can completed by the feeble national bourgeoisie. Industrialisation, land reform, unification of all nationalities, even basic democratic rights, cannot be Algeria proved to be no exception to this rule. The leadership of the struggle for national liberation was taken by the radical petit-bourgeois. Leaning on the working class and peasantry, who bore the brunt of the struggle, these leaders gave the FLN a "socialist' complex- If the Algerian war had ended with complete military victory for the FLN, the leadership might have been pushed, under the enormous pressure of the masses, to clear out landlordism and capitalism immediately.

The FLN leadership. however, did not carry the struggle through to the end, merging the tasks of national liberation with steps to rebuild society under the leadership of the working class. This would have required giving the struggle clear socialist aims and linking the Algerian revolution to a perspective of socialist revolution in France and other advanced capitalist countries.

Profit motive The working class of Algeria was relatively weak. and there was no cons- Marxist leadership, a decisive cious factor in carrying through a socialist transformation. The state which emerged from the war of independence, therefore, was a bureaucratic bonapartist regime dominated by the petitbourgeois elite which led the FLN Under the Evian agreement of 1962, however, assurances were given to the French firms and government that they maintain could their interests and bases.

But the assets of the French settlers who left the country were frozen and even to this day foreign companies do not relish operating in Algeria. At the end of the Algerian War. the prospects of revenge being taken against anyone associated with the old rulers was very real.

French President Giscard meets Boumedienne in 1975. The hatred of the French was deeprooted, not only in the atrocities of the War itself but also in the horrific conditions of virtual slavery in which the Algerian population had been held for more than a century.

The consumption of grain per person in Algeria in the 1950s was less than half that of 1871 - 2241bs per annum. The average carnings of European Algerlans was seven times as high as Arab Algerians. Two-thirds of the land (the best land) belonged to big French comand other landlords.

In 1954 one million Algerians were permanently unemployed and two million partially employed. No less than 82 per cent were illiterate while every European in Algeria was taught to read and write. Infant mortality was one of the highest in the world - 284 per 1,000 - four times the rate of European end of the war, factories, farms and shops had closed, leaving 70 per cent of the population unemployed. I'he new government was able to continue functioning only with the aid of large loans and technical assistance from France and other emergency for- Near civil war had broken out over who was to take the biggest share of power. It was averted, however, partly because of mass demonstrations against the fighting organised by the Algerian General Workers' Union (UGTA). After the provisional government handed over to the Political Bureau of the FLN, the new constitution was approved in a plebiscite. and Ben Bella as President in September Traditional national rivalries between the Berbers and the Arab peoples flared up and died down again as the measures being introduced by Ben Bella promised to benefit the whole of the population. In summer and autumn 1962 the remaining foreign-owned estates were In March 1963 decrees legalised the workers' committees which had taken over the operation of many of the deserted European estates. Over half of cultivable land was now state-owned. In 1963, a system known as 'autogestion' under which the workers elected their own management board to work alongside a state-appointed director, became the basis of 'Algerian socialism'. Through autogestion, a limited form of participation by workers, the state leaned on the working class for support in developing the economy. But without workers' management of the economy as a whole, through a democratic plan of production, factory committees, whatever their formal powers, inevitably have little power to affect vital economic decisions.

But Ben Bella became isolated snubbed by Moscow during the war and only aided in a half-hearted manner after it. He was thought to be modelling himself on Tito in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, he was incapable of driving through the necessary measures to recover from the war and adequately provide for the anxious and deprived In June 1965 Ben Bella's Minister of Defence and close comrade from the war, Boumedienne, ousted him from power and it looked as if the wheel of government would be turned sharply to the right. However, the exigencies of the economic and social situațion forced Boumedienne and his 'revolutionary council' of predominantly army officers to proceed with widespread nationalisation.

In 1966 the judiciary was 'algerianised' and tribunals to try economic crimes with powers to impose the death penalty were set up in July. The regime increased state participation in fields left previously to private enterprise. A 41

[page 41]

MIR Spring 1989: Algeria

state-owned construction company was set up and in May the nationalisation was announced of 11 foreign-owned mines and of the property of absentee owners. All insurance activities were placed under state control. The National Bank of Algeria was inaugurated.

By 1971 the long running dispute between the Algerian government and the major French oil companies and the French government on the price of oil reached a dead end and in February a 51 per cent stake was taken by the government in the two French companies and the gas and pipelines were completely nationalised.

In the same year a programme for the redistribution of land, known as the 'agrarian revolution' ', was initiated and a form of elected 'workers' councils' was promoted throughout the nationalised industries. Food distribution was nationalised.

The second phase in 1973 tackled the question of absentee landowners, obliging them to cultivate or hand over their land to peasant farmers. A programme for the construction of 'socialist villages' was started. Young people were encouraged to spend their holidays working and teaching in rural areas. In 1976 private education was abolished.

Bonapartism

When in 1977 Boumedienne died, the Central Committee of the FLN took power. In 1979, Colonel Bendjedid Chadli was installed as President, just as a new world recession was beginning to bite.

In the previous period of boom and through the exploitation of oil and gas, phenomenal growth rates had been achieved. A large proportion of GDP had been invested and the third highest GNP per capita in Africa was achiexed - $2,550. Massive progress was made in the sphere of health, education and welfare. Infant mortality was halved from 1962 - from 160 per thousand to 40 per thousand in some areas. Life expectancy as late as 1970 was 52. By 1983 it was 57.

In 1962 there were 1,279 doctors, now there are 29,506. Since 1974 all Algerian citizens have had the right to free medical attention. Education is officially free and compulsory from the age of six to 15 years. Literacy among women has gone from 12 per cent in 1962 to 80 per cent.

But the boom on which this rested came to an end. The Algerian economy was badly hit by the world recession which developed at the end of the 1970s and then by the dramatic fall in oil

42

prices. This brought into sharp focus the diseased state of the economy and society. A severe sclerosis of the arteries had resulted from a long period of bureaucratic obstruction and mismanagement.

The most phenomenal growth rate was reached in 1980 of 16 per cent. But the very next year it had plummeted to 1.2 per cent.

In 1980 a clean-up campaign had been organised initially to improve the appearance of streets in preparation for the 25th anniversary of the revolution. But it came to include the arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of "social parasites' and a campaign against inefficiency and corruption. This was extended to the highest level of state organisations, with numerous senior officials being arrested and tried for financial mismanagement.

The attempt to remove the most cumbersome sections of the bureaucracy was accompanied by an 'opening up' of the economy to private investment and foreign involvement. But even today few takers have been found.

The Third World Encyclopedia indicated that after 1965 the state had assumed increasing control over the industrial sector and adopted socialisation of the means of production as its official ideology: "The state controls 90 per cent of Algerian industry through 60 corporations which employ about 70 per cent of the labour force. These include heavy industries, textiles, tanning and food stuff industries.

"Banks, mines, transport services and hotels have also been brought under state control. The state sector has also been expanded through nationalisation. Over 100 French companies were taken over between 1962 and 1974

"All private foreign investments in Algeria were liquidated by 1974. At the United Nations General Assembly 1974, Boumedienne characterised • nationalisation as an act of 'positive development for the poorer nations'. Seventy-tive per cent of forests belong

An inflexible application of collectivisation had led to a large-scale collapse of agricultural production in the 1970s. In September 1988 220 state farms were offered on long leases to new cooperatives and individuals. And in December 1988 the government put up all 3,000 state farms occupying the most fertile land in Algeria for rent. There is talk of setting up a stock exchange and Chambers of Commerce have been re-established in the major cities.

However,

the Economist Intelligence

Unit Report for 1988-9 comments that "although the government's overtures to private enterprise have encouraged small-scale manufacturing, especially in light engineering and food processing industries, the industrial economy is still 90 per cent state controlled." And the state monopoly of trade remains.

Some 5,000 private light industrial firms employ a total of 60,000 people about half in the textile sectors. The total employed population is around four million. Some of the state corporations have been broken up into smaller units (50 into 400) to be 'autonomous' and responsible for their own profitability. However, such private enterprise that has emerged has been widely attacked for profiteering.

The Financial Times comments that "foreign investors have not been easily lured into Algeria, given the weak incentives offered by a leadership which collectively at least - continues to harbour a strong antipathy towards capitalism"

It also describes the aim of enterprise promotion as being to "use the billions of dinars now tucked into Algerian mattresses for investment in business, but there is strong resistance from the old-timers in the FLN." At the end of 1987 a draft law for employee share schemes was thrown out by the National Assembly

Recession

There has been no outlet for private capital in the past - apart from building. The Sunday Telegraph, October 9 1988, reported on "a thriving new tower with shopping malls, cafes, car parks and duty-free shops, (which) happens to be owned by the Minister of Planning and a local footballer." But it also goes on to comment that, "genuine entrepreneurs try to export their funds by hook or by crook to invest in France, Britain or the USA."

Both the laws of the country and what the Financial Times termed as "officials inherently suspicious of the profit motive" make foreign and private investors unenthusiastic. Foreign companies are forbidden to own more than 49 per cent of any joint venture.

There is no doubt that the state sector is highly inefficient. One factory producing steel sheeting, tubes and water pipes, cited by the Wall Street Journal, gets its rolled steel from a mill that was built with Soviet equipment 20 years ago. It operates way below capacity.

There is a chronic shortage of spare parts. A new machine was bought to dip steel tubes destined for export. Suddenly. the manager said that 300 huge irrig-

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ation derricks had to be produced to increase farm production. These were far too big for the new machine which had to be dismantled and left 'forlornly in a corner'. Instead the derrick tubes had to be laboriously lifted in and out of a bath of molten metal by three young men wielding improvised hooks.

There are supposed to be four year development plans and undoubtedly the investment of large sums of public money has enormously assisted the development of heavy industry. But the Wall Street Journal described the situation as that of a "tired closed socialist system"

Markets

The 'tired system' is not socialist. The Algerian economy is in crisis, not because of 'socialist planning'. but because the dominant state sector is controlled by an elite which is incapable of developing a modern economi from above by bureaucratic methods. The privileged managers of state enterprises are both inefficient and corrupt.

What it most urgentl! needs is the oxygen of workers' ucmocracy to plan, develop and control the organisation of production geared to the needs of the whole population and not to a small and prosperous minority. The cold winds of competition are no solution.

As the Financial Times reporter asked: "How can agricultural reform aimed at encouraging production of badly needed food succee if long-leases of hitherto state-owned land are systematically attributed to the friends and ministers of forme: freedom fighters' rather than thore who have tilled the land since 19t3'

As the Ecorine: put it on 10 December: "The garamment hesitates to push faster tower: in unrigged market, fearing higher consumer prices and more jobless people. Anti-elitist Algerians could Fu: up with austerity better if the thought it more fairly shared.

"The mixture i Cromwellian discipline. Thir

.... pride and state planning have failed to put the 'cous-cous' on the table". There are serious doubts as to whether any way forward will be found by the breaking up of the monopolies and by allowing state enterprises and banks to set their own prices and hire and fire at will.

All the bourgeois commentators agree that worse is in store if no solution can be found for the severe economic problems which face Algeria. The author Alistair Horne concludes: "Things may be quietening down temporarily but there remains a great dan-

ger for the West as a whole. Chadlis benevolent Algeria, tacing deprivation and possible bankruptcy, could be replaced by something far less stable and much more intractable to Western interests"

With the onset of recession on a world scale even bigger upheavals impend. At present, the direction being taken by Chadli is towards a larger degree of private ownership and enterp-

There is naturally a resistance to these moves by those whose privileges are at stake. And undoubtedly wide layers of the population would resist change if it meant there was a real prospect of losing the tremendous gains in health and welfare. There are also those who voice a genuine fear of a 'get-rich-quick exploitative class' being established through these so-called reforms.

The Stalinist states of Russia and Easiern Europe can no longer be held up as models of miraculous growth in productive forces and social facilities. Capitalism on a world scale, during the current upturn, has been looking as if it has something to offer.

But the scale of problems in the underdeveloped countries are too great to be resolved within the confines and limits of private property and the nation state. However, the delay of socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries and the absence of mass Marxist parties in the crisis-ridden underdeveloped lands, have led to a grotesque aggravation of the contradictions thrown up by capitalism.

In Algeria, Islamic fundamentalism could begin to get a hold. In 1986 an outbreak of protests originally over food shortages took a religious 'holy war' colouring. Unless the working class takes the lead in Algeria, the situation could be complicated by reactionary religious trends.

But the pressure from below, the anger and indignation of the youth and women and the working class as a whole, will be the impetus to the growth of a mass movement of opposition and the rapid growth of Marxism in Algeria. Once more the youth will cry 'this time, we will go to the end'.

The possibility will be posed many times of a victory for the proletariat and the youth, who could, with a clear lead, proceed with the task of constructing the beginnings of a genuine socialist society. An appeal to the workers and peasants of the whole of the Maghreb would fall on fertile ground.

Borders that have been arbitrarily imposed by imperialism still divide North African families. The Libyan leader Gadaffi, in his own eccentric way, tries

President Chadli.

to pretend that his own frontiers do not exist. Not long ago he cancelled a football match between Libya and Tunisia, declaring them to be the same nation! This action in itself caused a minor riot as the supporters of both teams were already in the stadium!

Only on the basis of socialism - with workers' control and management of industry - could a real federation of North African states be built, linking up with a socialist Middle East.

Reverberations

Even the world bourgeois - especially the European banks - are fearful of repercussions. What if Algeria stops servicing its $23 billion debt? Payments have been at the level of $5.2bn per annum - 60 per cent of export revenue.

French capitalism in particular, and the 'socialist' 'government, immediately took fright at the prospect of the more than one million Algerians in France being infected by the mood of revolt. They suddenly showed uncharacteristic leniency on the price they were prepared to pay tor Algerian gas.

Algerian immigrants in France do not even have the vote, let alone a fair share of the wealth produced in that country. Every Algerian family has at least one relative in France. The Mitterand government were also forced to voice disapproval of the brutal manner in which the rising had been put down.

The hapless French ruler, Louis Philippe, commented 150 years ago in 1835: "What does it matter if a hundred thousand shots are fired in Africa? Europe does not hear them." Today, it matters!

by Clare Doyle

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