[page 35]
the Paris Commune Whenever we look at the history of the Commune we see it in a new light thanks to the experience of the latest revolutionary struggles, especially of the recent revolutions not only of the Russian revolution, but also of the German and Hungarian revolutions. The Franco-German war was a bloody explosion, the omen of an immense The Commune is an example of the heroism of the working class, or their capacity to unite into a single fighting force, of ability to sacrifice themselves in the name of the future, but at the same time it shows us the inability of the petit-bourgeois to choose their path, their indecisions as regards the way forward for the movement and their fatal tendency to stop after their first successes, thus allowing the enemy to regain lost ground and The Commune came too late. It had every chance of seizing power on the 4th September which would have allowed the proletariat of Paris to put itself at once at the head of all the workers of the country, to Lead them in their struggle against all the forces of the into the hands of the loud-mouthed democrats, the deputies of Paris. The Parisian workers had neither party nor the leaders who could unite their struggle with those in the rest of the country. The petitbourgeois patriots, imagining they were Socialists and seeking the support of the workers, had, in fact, no confidence in them. tricked the proletariat into giving them their support, they continually hovered about in the wake of famous lawyers, of journalists, of deputies whose whole stock of opinions consisted of nothing but ten or so vaguely revolutionary phrases, in order to entrust them with the running of the From the Archives Lessons of It is now one hundred years since the workers took a tremendous and formed step forward Paris Commune. We are marking the Centenary of the Commune by publishing, for the first world-wide bloodbath.
a world-wide proletarian revolution.
their re-establish its position.
past, against Bismarck movement.
of Paris historical the The Paris Commune was the striking omen of as well as against Thiers.
LEON TROTSKY time in English, an article by Leon Trotsky, published as the preface to "Le Commune de . the Paris" by C. Tales, on fiftieth anniversary in 1921.
The translation is by J. Erber.
EDITOR.
But the power fell 33.
[page 36]
The reason why Jules Favre, Picard, Garnier-Pages & Co. could take power in Paris on 4th September is the same as that which allowed Paul-Boncour, A. Verenne, Renaudel and several others to be the masters The Renaudels and Boncours, and even the longuets are, by their sympathies, intellectual leanings and deeds, far nearer to Jules Favre and Jules Ferry than the revolutionary proletariat. socialist phraseology is nothing but a historical mask which allowed Simon, Picard and others abused the democratic-liberal phraseology, that their sons and grandsons were obliged to have recourse to the socialist vocabulary. But have the sons and grandsors remained worthy of their fathers? And when it became necessary to decide the question not of the composition of a ministerial clique, but the far more important one of knowing which class of French society was to take power, Renaudel, Varenne, Ionguet and their ilk were on the side of Millerand - the collaborator of Galliffet, the hangman of the Commune •..... with the advent of the revolution, in real life, the revolutionary salon Iions and parliamentary lackeys found themselves on the opposite side, although they did not realise it.
The genuine working class party is not a machine for parliamentary manoeuvreing but the accumulated and organised experiences of the proletariat. It is only with the help of the party, based on its whole past history, foreseeing on a theoretical level the way ahead for the future and all the stages on this way, extracting from this the necessity of continually repeating from the beginning its hesitations, The Parisian workers did not have such a party. The bourgeois socialists, with which the Commune was teeming, raised their eyes to heaven, awaiting a miracle or even a word of prophecy, hesitated, and during this time the masses wavered and lost their heads : to the indecision of some people and the futile illusions of The result was that revolution broke out in their midst before the proletariat were reminded of what they had learnt from previous revolutions, of past combats, of repeated betrayals of the These six months were an irreparable loss. If, in September 1870, the centralised party for revolutionary activity had been at the head of the French Proletariat, French history, and with it the history of mankind would have taken a totally different direction. of the proletarian cause.
them to impose on the masses.
The Need for a Party indecisions and mistakes.
owing others.
too late, for Paris had been surrounded.
democracy; and seized power.
34.
Their And it is exactly because Favre, Six months had gone by
[page 37]
If on the l8th of March, the power was in the hands of the workers of Paris, it was not that it had been consciously seized, but The latter lost ground more and more, the workers mistrustec them, the petit-bourgeois no longer had any confidence in them, and the bigger bourgeoisie thought they were no longer able to The government fled Paris to muster its forces else- And thus it was that the proletariat became master of the situation. But it only realised it the day after. The revolution The first success was a new reason for the workers to rest on their laurels. The enemy had fled to Versailles. victory? At this moment the government clique could have been wiped Thiers at their head could have been imprisoned. Non-one would have a centrally organised party, which had an overall view of the situation and special means of carrying out its decisions. The remains of the infantry did not want to retreat to The bond between officers and rank-and-file was indeed And if there had been at Paris a party headquarters they could have incorporated into the retreating army - since there had been the possibility of retreat - several hundreds of devoted workers who would have been given the following orders: arouse further the discontent of the rank-and-file against the officers and profit from the first favourable psychological moment to liberate them from the officers and bring them back to Paris to unite with the people. That could have been easily carried out, even in the opinion of most of to think of it. In view of the great events which took place elsewhere such decisions could only have been taken by a revolutionary party awaiting and preparing itself for a revolution not having lost its head, by a party which is used to having a comprensive view of the The central committee of the National Guard was, in fact, a Council of Deputies (Soviets) for the militant workers and the petitbourgeois. Such a council immediately elected by the masses who had taken the revolutionary path, gives an excellent impression of action. But at the same time it reflects exactly because of its obvious and simple connection with the masses who are in the state that the revol. ution found them in, not only the strong points, but even more so the weak spots of the masses: it manifests the spirit of indecision, of expectancy, the tendency to lie dormant after the first successes. and hated defend them.
where.
out almost without bloodshed.
lifted a finger to help them.
Versailles.
tenuous.
Thiers' partisans.
because their enemies had left Paris.
came upon them without their expecting it.
No-one even thought of it.
situation and is not afraid to act.
In Paris all the ministers with They did not do that. There was not Was it not a There was no-one 35.
[page 38]
National Guard Central Committee Vacillates The Central Committee of the National Guard needed guidance. It was indispensable to have an organisation which incorporated the political experience of the proletariat and was always present, not only on the Central Committees, but also in the legions, in the battalions, in the deepest strongholds of the French working-class. By means of the Council of Deputies - in this case it was by means of the organs of the National Guard - the party could have been in continual contact with the masses, could know the level of their morale; the central party could each day have given the word of command, which transmitted by the militant members could have spread to the masses, raising the level of their thought and their will. Scarcely had the Government retreated to Versailles when the National Guard hastened to rid itself of its responsibility at the very had visions of "legal" elections for the Commune. negotiations with the mayors of Paris to "legalise" this. same time a violent attack had been prepared on Versailles the negotiations with the mayors would have been a wholly justified and a premeditated military tactic. But in reality these negotiations were only started to somehow avoid an armed struggle.
radicals and the utopian socialists who respected "legality" and the individuals who incarnated a part of the "legal" state, the deputies, mayors eto., hoped at the bottom of their hearts that Thiers would give way respectfully to revolutionary Paris and would go over to join The passivity and inaction were in this case justified by the nothing but a commune in the midst of other communes. force nothing on anybody else; it is not fighting for a dictatorship. In all, it was nothing but an attempt at replacing the developing proletarian revolution with a petit-bourgeois reform: communal The truly revolutionary task consisted of assuring that, throughout the whole country, the power was in the hands of the people. should have served as a base, as a citadel, as an army for all And to attain this goal it was necessary to conquer Versailles without further delay and to serd out agitators, organisers, and armed men to all parts of France. It was necessary to get in touch with sympathisers, reassure those who took the middle way, and break the aggression, which was the only thing capable of saving the situation, the Parisian leaders sought to retreat behind their "communal autonomy"; they did not attack the others if the others did not attack them: each town had its sacred right of self-government. This idealistic chatter the "legalised" Commune.
autonomy.
Paris this. I opposition of the adversaries.
36.
moment that this responsibility was enormous.
sacred principle of federation and autonomy.
Instead of this strategy of attack and The Central Committee It entered into If at the The petit-bourgeois tor raris, you see, i Paris wants to
[page 39]
reminiscent of out-and-out anarchy - hid in reality the unwillingness to carry out revolutionary activity, which had to be brought to its local conclusion since otherwise it was not worthwhile beginning. The hostility shown towards the centralist organisation - a heritage of the petit-bourgeois parochialism and autonomism is without doubt the weak spot of a certain section of the French working class. The self-government of the counties, sections, districts, army battalion. towns is for some revolutions the highest guarantee of true activity Under the guise of a form of struggle against "despotic centralism", against the "stifling discipline" is fought a struggle for the self-preservation of the several groups and sub-groups of the working class, each with their minor local leaders and visionaries. The working class as a whole, while preserving its culture and trends of political thought, can act with reason and with firmness, without lagging behind events, each time striking its mortal blows at the weak points of its enemies; on condition that at its head above the arondissements, the distrets, the groups, a centralised apparatus towards particularism, whatever form it takes, is a Ihe sooner French communism - both socialist and syndicalist communism - frees itself from this the better it will be for A party does not create the revolution at its own whim. It does not arbitrarily choose the moment to seize power, but it intervenes actively in events, gauging every moment the state of mind of thus determining the most favourable moment for decisive action. That in every situation. A correct theory is needed, a firm connection with the masses, an understanding of the situation, revolutionary into every corner of the proletarian struggle the more it is united in its aims and discipline, and the better and quicker it can resolve its The difficulty lies in getting a firm connection between thi: central party organisation, united by an iron discipline, and the ebb powerful revolutionary pressure by the working masses. this an element of preparation is completely inevitable. And the bet and individual freedom.
French working class paid a heavy penalty.
organised and bound together dead past.
the proletarian revolution Revolutionary Intervention the revolutionary masses is the most difficult part of its task.
insight, bold decision.
tasks.
and flow of the masses.
But this is a great mistake, for which the and evaluating the resistence of the enemy, with an iron discipline. The tendency • heritage of a The party is not infallible The deeper a revolutionary party penetrates The conquest of power can only be attained bi:
But to achievi 37.
[page 40]
the party understands the situation and the moment, the better the bases of resistance will be organised: the better the tasks are distributed, the surer will be the success and the less victims it will cost. The co-ordination of a carefully prepared action with the rising of the masses is the politico-strategic Comparison with the Russian October The comparison of the 18th March, 1871, with the 7th November, 1917, is from this point of view very instructive. leading revolutionary circles. The proletariat, armed by the bourgeois government, was, in fact, master of the town, provided with all the material means of power - cannons and rifles - but it did not realise this. The bourgeoisie made an attempt to take back all its arms at once; it wanted to steal the cannons from the proletariat. that the proletariat realised it was master of Paris. The "leaders" were tail-ending the events and only realised them when everything had already happened and did their best to blunt the revolutionary knife- At Petrograd the events turned out differently, the party went on firmly and decisely to seize power, having its men everywhere reinforcing each position, making greater the distance between the workers and the soldiers on the one hand; and the government on the The armed demonstrations of the July days was a strong feeler put out by the party to sound out how strong the connection was between the masses and the enemies' power to resist. transformed into a struggle between the advance guard of both sides. We were forced to retreat, but at the same time there was a bond established between the party and the masses by the action. months of August, September and October saw a powerful revolutionary movement. The party profited from it and increased in a considerable manner its strongholds in the working class and the soldiers. Later the harmony between the preparations for the conspiracy and the action of the people went almost automatically. The Second Soviet Congress Ihis fact was well known and understood by the enemy. Kerensky and his advisers could not make any attempts to consolidate their position in even the smallest way for the decisive moment in Petrograd. So they had to try ard move the most revolutionary section of the gartasks when taking power.
there The attempt failed.
Versailles.
edge.
other.
was fixed for the 7th November.
to the seizing of power by the Congress.
was adopted in advance for 7th November.
rison out of the capital.
38.
was a complete lack of initiative for Ine government fled in panic from Paris to The field was free.
the forces and In Paris action on the part of the But it was not until the next day The feeler was All our previous agitation was to lead Inerefore the coup d'etat Un our part we profited from this attempt
[page 41]
- something out of this new conflict, which had a our accusation was later confirmed in writing by an official document of having planned the transfer of a third of the garrison at Petrograd not because of military considerations, but for counter-revolutionary This conflict put us into closer contact with the garrison and posed before the latter the clear task of upholding the Soviet insisted - although in a lax enough fashion - that the garrison be moved, we created, besides the Soviet of Petrograd, which was already in our hands, a revolutionary committee of war, under the pretext of verifying the military reasons for the governments' plan. Thus we had a purely military organ at the head of the Petro grad garrison, which was, in reality, a legal organ of armed insurrection. At the same time, we put commissars (communists) in charge of revolutionary committee of war, for the important military tasks, with militants in whom it could have complete confidence. tial work of preparation, the realisation of armed insurrection was done openly and with such method and clarity that the bourgeoisie, with Kerensky at its head, could hardly understand what was going on in front of their eyes. (In Paris the proletariat did not realise until the next day its real victory - which moreover it had not consciously looked for - that it was master of the situation. In Petrograd it was the Our Party, with the support of the workers and the soldiers, had already taken power, the bourgeoisie spent a quiet enough night and only learned the next day that the government of the country was In all that concerns strategy there were many differences of One section of the Central Committee declared itself, as is well known, to be against the seizure of power, believing that the moment for it had not yet come, that Petrograd the rest of the country, the proletariat, the peasants, etc. Other comrades believed that we did not attribute enough importance to the military sides of the scheme. One of the members of the Central Committee demanded the surrounding in October of the Alexandrine Theatre, where the Kadet Conference held its sessions, and its Central Cormittee put out its proclamations. They said: by concentrating our agitational work as well as our military preparations on the day of the Second Congress we would give away our plan to the enemy, we would give them the possibility of arming themseires. attempt at a military coup and the surrounding of the Alexandrire Theatre would have been too hasty a move for the natural develorre.: by Kerensky to make decisive importance.
reasons.
Congress fixed for the 7th of November.
military units, military stores, etc.
organisation carried out its special opposite.
in the hands of its gravediggers.) opinion in our party.
and even of dealing us a fatal blow.
We openly accused the Kerensky government - And since the government The clandestine military . technical tasks and provided the The essenwould be isolated from But there was no doubt tha: =.
[page 42]
of events, and that it would have been disconcerting for the masses. Even in the Petrograd Soviet where our faction was in the majority a similar undertaking which prevented the logical development of the struggle would at this moment have provoked great confusion above all amongst the garrison where some regiments would have hesitated and lost their confidence in us - especially the cavalry regiments. would have been easier for Kerensky to crush a coup the masses than to attack the garrison, then consolidating himself more and more on this position: the defence of his inviolability in the Central Committee rejected the plan to surround the Kadet Conferalmost without the spilling of blood triumphed on the very day, fixed openly in advance, for the convocation of the Second Soviet Congress. This strategy could not, however, become a general rule, it with the Germans, and the soldiers, the least revolutionary group, did for this reason that the soldiers were on the side of the workers, they became more militant as Kerensky's machinations became more and But this state of mind of the Petrograd Garrison had a still deeper cause in the situation of the peasant class and the develsome of the regiments, our plan would have fallen through. military elements of the scheme (conspiracy and mobility in action) would have prevailed. It would have been necessary, obviously to Similarly the Commune had the chance of taking over regiments composed of peasants in the same way, since they had lost all confidence and all esteem of the government and their cormanding officers. However, it undertook nothing to this end. The blame lies here, not in the Lack of connection between the peasants and the working class, What will be the situation for this connection in the European countries in our own time? It is not easy to make any predict- However, events are unfolding slowly and the bourgeois governments are making their efforts to utilise past experience and it is easy to see that the proletariat, in order to win over the sympathy of the soldiers will, at a given moment, have to overcome a great the same time propitious for the revolution will therefore The duty of the party is to prepare for this. That is exactly why it is necessary to maintain and to develop its character as a centralised organisation, which openly directs the revolutionary movement and the masses and is, at the same time, a clandestine the name of the future Soviet Congress.
ence, and with reason.
required special conditions.
not want to leave Petrograd for the front.
more obvious.
opment of the imperialist war.
rison and if Kerensky had had choose another moment for the insurrection.
but in the revolutionary strategy.
ions about it.
resistance, and a well organised one.
out and at be necessary.
apparatus of armed insurrection.
40.
No - situation of to mad It not supported by Therefore, the majority of The time was well chosen; armed insurrection one-believed any more in the war And, although it was solely If there had been a split in the garthe opportunity of putting pressure on The purely An attack which is well carried
[page 43]
The question of the election of the commanding officers was one of the reasons for the conflict between the National Guard and Paris refused to accept the commanding officers delegated Varlin then formulated the claim, after which all the commanding officers of the National Guard, from top to bottom, would be elected by the men of the National Guard themselves. the Central Committee of the National Guard found its support. This question must be envisaged in two ways; politically and militarily, which are linked with each other, but must be distinthe National Guard of the counter-revolutionary commanders. right of election was the sole means to this end, the majority of the National Guard being composed of workers and revolutionary petit- And besides if the slogan "election of the commanding officers" had also applied to the infantry, Thiers would have been deprived in one go of his essential weapons, the counter-revolutionary A party organisation in order to achieve this aim was missing, an organisation having men in all levels of the army. In a word the principle of election had as a task in this case not to give good commanders to the battallions, but to liberate them from commanders devoted to the cause of the bourgeoisie. The principle of election served as a wedge to split the army into two parts according to the the Kerensky period, especially before the beginning of October. But the liberation of the army from the old apparatus of command leads inevitably to the weakening of the organisation's cohesion and to the lowering of its combative strength. command is most often weakest on the technico-military side and in the army is liberated from the old counter-revolutionary command which oppress them, there arises the question of giving it a revolutionary command, capable of fulfilling its mission. And this question soldiers acquire the experience to pick and choose their commanding officers well, the revolution will be beaten by its enemies, who are guided in their choice of officers by the experience of centuries. The methods of informed democracy (simple elections) must be ended and to a certain extent replaced by a degree of selection from above. If particularism and democratic autonomism are dangerous for the proletarian revolution in general, they are ten times more dangerous The authority of the Central Committee of the National Guard stemmed from the democratic right of election. At the moment when the Thiers:
Thiers.
quished from each other.
bourgeois.
officers.
distinctions of class.
what concerns for the army• the maintenance of order and discipline.
cannot simply be resolved by elections.
We have seen this The political task consisted of purging Similarly things happened thus amongst us in from the tragic example of the Commune.
This is how Complete An elected Thus, when Before the great majority of =.
[page 44]
Central Committee needs to develop to the greatest extent its initiative in the offensive, deprived of the leadership of a proletarian party, it lost its head and hastened to transfer its power to the representatives of the Commune, who needed a wider democratic basis. It was at this time a great mistake to have elections. But once the elections were over and the Commune was reunited it was necessary to concentrate wholly and completely on the Commune and create for it an organ possessing the power to re-organise the National Guard. It was At the side of the Commune stood the Central Committee; the fact that the latter was elected gave it political authority, thanks to which it could exist in competition with the Commune.But that deprived it at the same time of the energy and firmness necessary in the purely military questions which, according to the organisation of the Commune justified its existence. The right of election and democratio methods are ONLY ONE OF THE WEAPONS in the hands of the proletariat and its party. Elections can in no way be a fetish or a remedy against all evils. They must be combined with the concept of delegation. pwer of the Commune came from the elected members of the National Guard. But once it was set up the Commune should have reorganised the National Guard from top to bottom with an iron hand, given it trustworthy Leaders and established a severe discipline. The Commune did not do this being itself deprived of a powerful revolutionary leadership. Thus it was We would thus look over all the history of the Commune page by page and we would find therein a single lesson: a strong party leadership is essential. The French proletariat more than any other has has been misled. The bourgeoisie has produced, with the help of its agents, its lawyers and its journalists, a whole mass of democratic, parliamentary and autonomist formulas which are nothing but fetters on the feet of the proletariat, hindering its movement forward. The temperament of the French proletariat is a raging revolutionary furnace. But this furnace is blocked at present by the ash of scepticism - the result of many deceptions and disappoinments. Also, the revolutionary proletarians of France must be more sevre towards their party and unmask all the more mercillessly the contradictions between word and deed. The workers of t'rance need an active organisation, strong as iron with leaders controlled by the masses at each new stage of the revolutionary movement. How much time will history give us to prepare outselves? We do not know. For fifty years the power was again in the hands of the French bourgeoisie, who drove the Third Republic over the bones of the Communards. The fighters of 171 centralised organisation to lead thenfrenon the Communards. did not lack heroism. What they did lack was clarifty of method and a centralised organisation to lead them. That is why they were defeated. Half a century has passed before the French proletariat is now able to pose the question of avenging the deaths of the Communards. But this time the action will be more decisive, more concentrated. Ihiers' heirs will have to pay their historic debt in its entirity. not to be.
crushed.
Zlatoust, 4th February, 1921.
42.
made sacrifices to the revolution.
Be engine to the or ant The But more than any other too, it
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