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A negotiated settlement?
30L MR Postscript: 12 December, 1990 L WAR AND PEACE still hang in the balance. recent polls). and the anti-war movement has begun. Memories of Vietnam, with the horren- Saddam's release of the hostages and talks dous body counts and casualties, are still strong. hereen top is and Iraqi officials appear to This mood, together with the fears of a section oifer hope of a peaceful settlement. But the world map could once again be stained with the of big business, has been reflected in Congress's blood of millions of workers sacrificed for profit strong opposition to the war option. adroitly timed release of the hostages has and power.
There are significant factors on both sides of strengthened this.
the equation. Some. at the moment, weigh on Under this pressure. Bush has wavered. His strategic aims have appeared confused, his the side of a settlement.
tactics faltering. With the support of Gior- The representatives of is imperialism are bacher, Bush secured a LN resolution authorissplit. Some, like Kissinger, support Bush's initial ing the use of force if Saddam does not impulse to smash Saddam to uphold the USA'S global power. Others, like Brezinzski, a former withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January. But then National Security Advisor. calculate that the his offer of high-level talks with Irag appeared price of war would be too high: a massive to be a concession to the unbending Saddam. economic drain on the l'S, explosive repercus- Whatever Bush's intention (possibly to put the sions in the Middle East, and a tidal wave of final blame for war onto Saddam), this move appears to have tipped the scales towards opposition at home.
negotiations Is public opinion is overwhelmingly against the Is initiating hostilities (by seven to three in The wealthy ruling elite of Saudi Arabia are
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uneasy about their military dependence on the L'S. A massive US garrison on Arabian soil would sooner or later provoke a popular revolt. The Saudi rulers are well aware that while Mubarak, Assad and other bonapartist rulers support the Ls-led coalition (in exchange for billion dollar bribes), the Arab masses sympathise with Saddam's stand against the US - which backs Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In the event of war, the coalition would be shattered by movements within the Arab states.
War would wreak destruction unparalleled since the second world war. The fireball engulfing the oilfields would far exceed the damage caused by Saddam's plundering of Kuwait.
Unsettled by Washington's talks with Baghdad, therefore, the Saudi and Kuwaiti rulers, through Yemeni, Omani and PLO intermediaries, have opened up secret talks with Iraq. They are reportedly proposing that, if Saddam withdraws, he would be granted a 99-year lease on the two islands (Bubiyan and Warba) which control Iraq's access to the Gulf and be ceded a five-mile strip of Kuwaiti desert to give Iraq complete control of the Rumeilla oilfield.
If Saddam offers to withdraw in return for firm guarantees that the US would not attack Iraq and that the Saudi/Kuwait deal would be honoured, or especially if he unilaterally pulls out, it would make it extremely hard, if not impossible given the opposition in the US, for Bush to go to war.
Saddam is publicly uncompromising, but may be holding out for more concessions to follow an Iraqi withdrawal. How far the Iraqi dictator is prepared to go in risking war is one is one of the great unknown quantities.
There should be no doubt that powerful factors weighing on war.
The unspoken aim of Bush's policy has been to smash Saddam's military power (previously built up against Iran with US help). If allowed to withdraw peacefully, Iraq would be confirmed as the region's dominant power, especially if Saddam gains the oilfield and islands. IS power and prestige internationally would suffer a devastating decline.
Instead of sending a small task force as a trip wire' to deter Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia, Bush has mobilised a massive army, which has already reached Vietnam levels. "If you deploy an enormous force anywhere," comments a former British Air Commodore, 'it acquires a sort of momentum of its own. The training and culture of the force is to take offensive action. The pressures to do so are quite enormous."
For Saddam to
* be attacked
be reassured atter leaving
there the
are still side Of
that Iraq Kuwait,
would the U'S
forces would almost certainly have first to be switched from the present offensive stance to defensive positions. Phased US withdrawal following any negotiated settlement would raise the question, very awkward for Bush, of why such a massive force was sent in the first place.
Then there is Israel. Shamir's ultra-right, Zionist government is already alarmed at US proposals for a UN conference on the Middle East. which (despite US denials of 'linkage') will unavoidably raise the Palestinian issue.
Shamir's spokesmen have warned that they will act unilaterally if they consider Israel to be threatened. It is possible that they will attempt to provoke a U'S assault on Iraq. A pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iraq cannot be completely ruled out.
The working class has nothing to gain from US intervention in the Gulf. Socialists must call for the withdrawal of all imperialist forces. The Labour leaders poodle-like support for the
Tories' hawkish backing ‹ We have no sympathy for regime. Nevertheless, we with the people of Iraqimperialist powers and thi against their exploiters home. ( This can be done only th for a Socialist Federation Support for the high-sout the United Nations, whic perialism's real motives, c workers of the world.
› Bush is shameful.
Saddam's repressive
stand in solidarity above all against the e oil giants. but also and oppressors at
rough raising the call of the Middle East.
iding resolutions of h merely cloak iman only mislead the
Unavoidably there will be 'linkage'
with the Palestinian question
MIR
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The end of the upswing
Very few
capitalist commentators now deny that