[page 20]
James Long analyses the recent dramatic After У заля, нетра ва на най оран / ELTSIN'S VICTORY IN crushing the Russian sorship, attempting to intimidate opposition, dissolving the regional and local councils, has further consolidated the Russian counter-revolution. These events have strenghtened the presidency's bonapartist role, prepared the way for a serious attempt at the economic 'restructuring which imperialism has been demanding, and further advanced the consolidation of a capitalist state through a new purging of the state machine. These events have confirmed the basic analysis made by Militant Labour at the time of the earlier battle between Yeltsin and parliament in March, followed by April's referenda. However the events of last spring did not turn out to be a culmination of the struggle between Yeltsin and the bulk of the parliamentary leadership. As we said then there was the possibility of a certain Yeltsin's events in Russia and the likely developments now.
period of time.
stand off for a short period which turned out to be the case. While Yeltsin was strengthened by his referenda victories he hesitated in exploiting them. Nevertheless over the following six months the parliamentary leaders were weakened as their parliamentary manoeuvres increasingly were seen as ridiculous in the face of economic collapse and social disintegration.
In March we analysed the battle as reflecting not only different personal ambitions but broader social conflicts and interests over how to proceed with the establishment of capitalist property relations. Those forces which supported Yeltsin and those who had lent support to the parliament were both welded to supporting the introduction of capitalist property relations, the only difference being at what speed and how. Events since then have confirmed this analysis and partially explain why the mass of workers remained inactive.
The Rutskoi/Khasbulatov grouping never made a serious attempt to mobilise mass support in the whole period up to Yeltsin's dismissal of parliament. The reason was that they had no programme which could inspire the masses with confidence that parliament knew a way out of the social crisis. Secondly, like Yeltsin, they feared a movement of the working class. This battle between reactionary counter-revolutionary forces was being fought over the heads of the working class.
Neither the parliament nor the president had any solid social basis or substantial crystallised support. Until the end of the battle between Yeltsin and parliament it was, not certain that the military, also wracked by social discontent, could be relied upon by either side. Significantly the tanks which fired on the White House were entirely crewed by officers, with no other ranks in them. Clearly Yeltsin's gang felt they could only rely on handpicked elements whose support had been bought over a After his victory in the April referenda Yeltsin increasingly ignored parliament's attempts to block his policies, but still held back from taking decisive action to tackle the obstacles to the fast track' breaking-up of the nationalised industries. Simultaneously the central government's role was being increasingly challenged by the republics and regions within the Russian Federation. Regions, which Russia • 19
[page 21]
Can Yeltsin retain the support of the generals? ¡ tend to be richer and more populous than the republics, were begining to demand that they be recognised as republics, thereby gaining greater local power.
MPERIALISM HAD BEEN demanding decisive •for Yeltsin's coup provides another example, Chilean coup, of how the capitalists toss consitutional legalities to one side when laws stand in the military annulled the result of a semi-free presidential election (which was less democratic than the March 1990 Russian parliamentary election) which they themselves organised. But as the imperialists looked with fear at a mass movement developing in Nigeria they told the nominal election victor to compromise with the un-elected military-backed regime.
The leaders of both sides in this struggle were pro-capitalist ex-Stalinists.
The propaganda of both Yeltsin and imperialism tries to present these events as a 'second October when in reality the leaders of both revolution, sides in this struggle were pro-capitalist ex-Communists, in reality ex-Stalinists. The West presents Yeltsin as a 'democrat' fighting against a 'red-brown' dictatorship by a coup! They can only do this by hiding the truth that because both sides supported capitalist restoration and Russian central power they both, sooner or later, would have to begin repressing the working class and nationalities. 20 • Russia But for mass propaganda purposes Yeltsin had | to be presented as a 'democrat. Yeltsin's own past career of working his way to the old politbureau, the very top of the Stalinist bureaucracy, was ignored. Hardly any mention was made that Yeltsin's , was fully backed by Zhirinovsky's ultracoup reactionary Liberal Democratic party. When Yeltsin suspended the Constitutional Court he said it was 'negative and collaborationist, yet he had personally nominated all its members in 1991! Occasionally the imperialists' 'democratic mask slipped. The Financial Times revealed their real thinking and, unconsciously, provided a fresh confirmation of the Marxist theory of the state. Just after parliament's suspension it wrote "when a country's constitution prevents it from being governed, extra-constitutional action is inescapable. In such situations power resides with those who command the loyalty of the apparatus of coercion. President Yeltsin has this far proved to be that person". The day after the shelling of the White House the Financial Times commented "Force is and always will be ultima ratio regum: the final argument of kings".
The fact that the leaders of the so-called Socialist International rushed to support Yeltsin's complete disregard of Russia's existing law will be remembered by militant workers when reformist labour leaders preach about the necessity for the working class to accept bosses' laws.
Now it is possible that for domestic and image reasons the imperialists will attempt to distance themselves from some of the repressive measures and ballot-rigging that Yeltsin is attempting to implement. But this must not be allowed to hide the fact that they were one of the main forces behind Yeltsin's coup.
'OR SOME TIME Yeltsin has hesitated, con- Fo make deals with tine republic and regiona, to make deals with the republics and regions, and hesitated before attacking the working class.
[page 22]
The IMF has been demanding a strict control of the money supply to try to halt hyper-inflation. The IMFs proposals would mean the working class paying for the halting of inflation through mass unemployment and cutbacks. But Yeltsin was wary of the effects of such a policy. Thus in August his government announced that the credit growth target for each of the last two quarters of 1993 would be 30%, when they had previously agreed with the IMF targets of 20% and then 15%. In fact in the third quarter it was 43%, which while a reduction on previous levels was no-way as tight as the IMF demanding. Clearly Yeltsin did not want to further attack the working class without first removing parliamentary rivals who could gain from his social unrest.
Last year, more people died in Russia than were born.
But Yeltsin could not dely much longer. During the summer the trade unions stepped up their campaign against the lack of funds in many workplaces which meant workers were not getting their wages and were producing cutbacks. Strikes were being threatened. In this situation the imperialists were demanding Yeltsin acted before was any large movement of the working Yeltsin's September 21 coup broke the impasse which had developed in the struggle between his faction and the parliamentary leaders. However the break-up of the Yeltsin/Rutskoi/Khasbulatov coalition which had fought both the August 1991 coup attempt and Gorbachev was not simply a struggle between different cliques. It reflected the immense obstacles which exist in creating a viable capitalist economy in Russia.
The first results of the break-up of the planned economy have been economic collapse, hyper-inflation, a massive drop in living standards, huge increase in crime, and growing tensions between the centre and the regions and republics. Officially 80% of Russians now live below the poverty line. Previously eradicated diseases like diphtheria are breaking out again. Last year, for the first time since world war two, more people died in Russia than were born.
This drastic situation opened up divisions among the 1991 Russian leadership. Increasingly the parliamentary leadership, closer to the industrial management, urged a slower pace in both privatisation and the so-called 'restructuring of the economy. This wing of the former Stalinist bureaucracy wished to perserve its position of power in the restored capitalist economy, a position which was threatened by the imperialists demands for creative destruction' of bankrupting enterprises and foreign takeovers. They also feared the possibility of this policy provoking an explosion of discontent from Yeltsin himself hesitated a number of times. This situation enraged the imperialist powers who began to pile on the pressure for action to be taken to break the deadlock. Increasingly from July threats were made of no further imperialist financial support and that Yeltsin himself was not irreplacable. The Western leaders feared that unless the old structures were quickly broken-up there would be the danger, for them, of attempts to hold back capitalist restoration. The victory in the September 19 Polish elections of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the party The battle for the White House.
Russia • 21
[page 23]
of the bulk of the old Stalinist bureaucracy, sent shock-waves throughout the Russian government. While itself procapitalist and pro-privatisation, the SLD won support on the basis of opposition to and disappointment with the first results of capitalism in Poland. The imperialists feared that a similar development in Russia could lead to even greater instability, possibly opening the door to a government under pressure from the working class not to fully complete breaking-up the old nationalised economy or to hold down living standards.
While the Russian working class has been stunned by the economic collapse it cannot at all be excluded that there can be movements of desperate protest at the terrible situation which many workers and pensioners face. It has been precisely the fear of such explosions of anger which have, so far, stopped the government from forcing through the mass closures and sackings which imperialism is demanding. This, alongside the rivalry between Yeltsin and the parliament, created the paralysis which prevented any decisive policy being implemented.
For imperialism it is not enough that the old economic plan has been smashed, the state monopoly of foreign trade scrapped, and that a bourgeois state is being constructed. They see the privatisation and break up of the old economic combines as vital to securing the capitalist economy in Russia and opening up trading opportunities for themselves. This is why steadily throughout this year imperialism has been demanding decisive action from Yeltsin.
Neither Yeltsin nor tskoi and Khasbulatou
able to mobilise
active upport.
active support.
Already for some time now many of the new capitalists had backed Yeltsin, but as the crisis unfolded many elements of the old bureaucracy switched their support from parliament to Yeltsin. Through the summer Yeltsin's clique prepared for the coup politically and by strengthening their links with the military. During this time Yeltsin openly warned that August was the time for 'artillery preparation' and September will see 'Russia's decisive political battle'.
HE FACT THAT this was a struggle between
different pro-capitalist groups did not mean
that it was of no concern to the working class. The labour movement always has the responsibility to fight to defend and extend democratic rights. The Russian workers could not be indifferent to Yeltsin's move to permanently concentrate power
22 • Russia
in the president's hands elected assembly. Equally economy in Russia has mean that privatisation vitable. Even in the most privatisation has to be door to profiteering and conditions.
Yeltsin's victory was based upon the isolation and then crushing of the parliamentary leaders. Only a mobilisation of the working class could have defeated Yeltsin's coup. The August 1991 coup was defeated by the beginning of mass opposition to the plotters' attempt to abolish what fragile democratic rights then existed and go back to the old regime. At that time many pro-market illusions and hopes existed. Now the illusions have gone but most workers do not know what the alternative is. During this struggle workers remained inactive. Rutskoi made a call for a general strike which got no response. From then on the parliamentary leadership concentrated on appeals to the state apparatus to support them, finally attempting a desperate military adventure.
The workers' inactivity was not accidental. Partly it was the result of the economic crisis. But neither Yeltsin nor Rutskoi and Khasbulator were able to mobilise active support. Neither were seen as having any way out of the crisis and were regarded as being out for themselves. It was on this basis that Yeltsin's wing emerged victorious and presidential bonapartism strenghtened. But the absence of class struggle did not mean that sections of the proletariat were not angry at what happened, particularly the October 4 assault on the White House after it was already surrounded, and the subsequent attacks on democratic rights. The question was, what was the alternative to fight for?
What could have been done to defeat Yeltsin's coup? Last spring we argued that Marxists must oppose any attempt to strengthen the presidency in a bonapartist manner which will be used against the proletariat. On the other hand we could not lend any support to the reactionary forces in the parliament in opposition to Yeltsin. But this does not mean that while fighting capitalist restoration Marxists were indifferent to Yeltsin's moves towards bonapartism.
The Marxists in Russia have come out against the idea of an executive presidency. They stand for the most energetic defense, and extension, of democratic rights. This means fighting against the extension of bonapartist powers, the suppression of parties, censoring and banning of the media, and attempts to rig elections. The Russian people themselves must democratically decide upon the future character of the country.
But it is utopian to think that a US or Western
European-style capitalist democracy can be established in the wild chaos of capitalist Russia.
Russia under capitalism will be more like Latin
America, with its regular periods of sharp class
i at the expense of any the fact that the planned been destroyed does not must be accepted as inestable capitalist economies resisted as it opens the
a worsening of workers'
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struggle followed by repression. This is why at the same time as fighting for democratic rights today, the Russian Marxists explain that these rights can only be guarenteed in a workers' democracy, based upon the democratic planning of a sccialised economy.
In September the question was concretely posed:
how could democratic rights be defended from Yeltsin's coup? In particular how could the working class be mobilised? It is clear that the call to defend the parliament received an extremely limited response. The fact of the matter was that the parliamentary leadership was an obstacle to the mobilisation of the working class. There was no confidence that Rutskoi et al had any viable alternative. Their months of sparing with Yeltsin confirmed the impression that they were mainly interested in their own positions. Rutskoi's occasional left' rhetoric was not aimed at mobilising support. Although a confrontation with Yeltsin was clearly coming, the parliamentary leaders did not build a mass movement because they themselves were scared of the mass of workers moving into action. Additionally the fact that their active supporters included Stalinists, nationalists, and fascists limited their appeal.
The parliamentary leadership never based themselves on the working class, but neither did Yelstin in 1991. The difference in 1991 was that then workers saw that coup as a threat to their newly won democratic rights and an attempt to turn the clock back towards the old form of Stalinist rule. But now, faced with the reality of economic collapse and elements of social disintegration, workers did not see either side as offering a way out.
For Yeltsin everything worked out just as he needed. After September 21 the parliamentary leaders sat relatively isolated in terms of active support. Around the White House their supporters included extreme nationalists and fascists which enabled the media to start the 'red-brown' scare campaign. The October 3 fighting had all the characteristics of a badly prepared putsch attempt, but one which gave Yeltsin exactly the excuse he was looking for to demonstrate his power by using military force. The October 4 bombardment of the White House was a warning to all the opposition. All in all the parliamentary leaders tactics played into Yeltsin's hands, enabling him to make a far wider clamp down on the opposition.
A mobilisation of workers
and youth could only have
occured against both Yelt-
sin and the parliamentary
leadership. While totally
opposing Yeltsin's coup
Marxists argued that only
through independent activ-
ity could the working class
stop the move towards bo-
napartism. The parliamen-
tary leaders neither offered
an alternative nor were
capable of mobilising mass
opposition to Yeltsin. In-
deed had they won they
would have been forced
to also move towards bo-
napartist rule as the weak-
ness of capitalism in
Russia and the potential
strength of the working
class create the conditions
where the new capitalist class have increasingly to rule through authoritarian methods.
However bonapartism does not mean continuous repression. Bonapartism implies a combination of balancing and repression, with or without a parliamentary smokescreen, and usually laced with nationalism. Yeltsin has already showed many of these features both in regard to his policies towards the working class and with the republics and regions within the Russian Federation. This also illustrates that the process of capitalist counterrevolution will not proceed in a straight line.
Yeltsin with Khasbulatov in August 1991.
N IMPORTANT ASPECT of the counter-
A revolution in Russia has been the development
of ultra-nationalist and fascist groupings. Basing themselves on the anger at the unprecedented social collapse which all parts of the former USSR have suffered, they campaign against Russia's 'national humiliation'. Wrapping this national banner around themselves the fascists and extreme nationalists have been able to participate without hindrance, so far, in many demonstrations and meetings. During the clash between Yelstin and parliament these elements were present among the supporters of both sides.
The growth of these forces represents a serious warning to the working class. The fascist groupings will inevitably play a key role in attacking the development of genuine workers' movements, serving as auxiliaries to state repression. Nationalism will be used in an attempt to blind and confuse workers, peasants, and the middle class. It will combine opposition to the major imperialist powers with the idea of building a bloc of Russian workers and bosses, ie trying to direct workers anger away from the Russian capitalists. At the same time nationalism will be used as a means of dividing the different nationalities and religions
Russia • 23
[page 25]
within the Russian Federation.
Yeltsin's victory over the parliament was secured only with the help of the military. The deepening involvement of the military tops in running the country opens the way to the possibility of future military coups. Although the military's political role was strenghtened by Yeltsin's dependence on the army and its capture of the White House, it is unlikely in the short-term that the generals would attempt to take over power directly. However given the inevitable instability of a capitalist Russia there will be a deepening involvement of the military in running the country, which could take an open character in some of the regions.
Both Russian nationalism and the military will not only be threats within the Russian Federation, they will also effect the dealings between Moscow and rest of the former USSR. Outside the Federation the Russian military are now demanding special rights in this area they call the 'near abroad. Already there are Balkan-style conflicts and wars in many parts of the former USSR. The Russian military's demand is a recipe for possible future Russian military interventions. Significantly, days before his coup, Yeltsin warned the West not to take Moscow's former satellites in central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) into NATO. In other words they should remain within Moscow's sphere of influence.
Despite his victory it is still not certain how far Yeltsin can go in restructuring the economy. It depends on how the working class reacts to the massive burden of the restructuring. Equally uncertain in the medium term is to what extent can Moscow re-establish central control over the republics and regions. While the areas outside Moscow and St Petersburg now appear to be bowing to Yeltsin's demands for elections to be held for the new-style local councils, new conflicts are certain to break out between and among the different parts of the Russian Federation.
Struggling to survive in Moscow.
24 • Russia
Only
tiu
through ity could
class towards
independent
the working stop the move bonapartism.
Although the imperialists have welcomed Yeltsin's victory and promised aid, as the last few years have shown, there is a big gap between what is promised and what is actually received. While some aid is likely to go into Russia, large-scale investment is unlikely. The Economics Ministry has estimated that Russia requires between $30bn to $50bn in foreign aid and investment each year until 2000, but they expect only between $1.5bn-$2bn next year. In fact, there is a large-scale flow of money out of Russia. A total of $9bn in cash was exported in 1992, $4.6bn illegally. The combination of low investment, slow world economic growth, and instability will prevent any quick recovery from the collapse of the past few years. That means for the vast majority of Russians a continuing struggle to survive.
In this situation Yeltsin's own future is not secure. Time and time again the imperialists have complained about his unreliability and are concerned at his fall in popularity. Already there is a discussion about a possible successor if he becomes a liability.
The key factor is how and when will the working class begin to move. As we argued last spring the proletariat has been stunned by the consequences of the process of capitalist restoration. There is disillusionment with the effects of the market. However, confusion still exists over privatisation. With the absence of an alternative leadership and programme it will inevitably take some time for the working class to recover from the defeat which has taken place. At the same time there is the prospect of explosive outbursts of anger flowing from the desperate economic situation. It has been a feature of the movement throughout Russia's stormy revolutionary history that deep and quite long periods of apparent quiescence rapidly give way to big upheavals. At a certain stage this will feature as the working class is driven again to take to the path of struggle. It will need to come to terms with the new situation which exists and rebuild its confidence, understanding and organisations.
Yeltsin's coup already has had a effect in radicalising a small layer of workers and youth. Through its experiences, over a period of time, a bigger shift in the consciousness of the working class will begin to take place, preparing the way for new struggles and the eventual re-birth of mass support for the genuine ideas of Marxism.
14 October 1993
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