POPULAR FRONTISM IN SRI LANKA

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CHRISANTHA

MADAPATHA

In May 1970, the Popular Front alliance of the SLFP, the LSSP and the CP - wrongly named the United (Left) Front - was swept into power by a landslide parliamentary majority. The overwhelming victory of the Front was made possible by the previous five years of UNP rule, which weighed heavily on all except the capitalists and landlords and the privileged upper-middle class of Colombo.

The formerly Trotskyist LSSP and the smaller Moscow-oriented CP, which are the major parties of the working class, are the junior parties in the alliance. The SLFP of Mrs Bandaranaike, which draws its electoral support from the Sinhala rural masses, is the party of the liberal bourgeoisie. Like Mrs Gandhi of India, Mrs Bandaranaike' hold over the peasantry rests on the support of the small capitalists and landlords that constitute the direct exploiters of the peasantry. The UNP, the party of the most reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie, is the representative of the interests of imperialism and of the pro-imperialist big capitalists and landlords.

Any serious analysis of the political developments which led to the formation of the Popular Front, must take as its starting point the economic and political transformations that took place under the yoke of British imperialism and in the first two decades after 'Independence'. These again, can only be understood within the context of the strategy of imperialism on the Indian sub-continent as a whole. Capitalism, in the 20th Century, has so bound the individual national economies into one vast, interconnected system, that it is futile to study national developments except in relation to global processes as a whole.

At the same time, a Marxist strategy for any given country cannot be based on just the general features of imperialism. Arguing against Stalin's mechanistic political formulations based on the 'general features' alone, Trotsky wrote : "It is false that the specific features are'merely supplementary to the general features' like warts on a

In reality, the national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic features of the world process. This originality can be of decisive significance for revolutionary strategy over a span of many years." (Introduction to the German edition of the Permanent Revolution). Thus the specific features of India or Sri-Lanka are the summary result of an organic fusion of the internal processes with the overall movement of imperialism. To treat the internal features as 'merely supplementary' (Stalin) or alternatively to represent them as the "fundamental cause of development' (Mao), leads inevitably to a one-sided and un-Marxist appraisal of the problem.

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THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND BRITISH IMPERIALISM From as far back as Greek and Roman times, Sri Lanka has been subject to a wide variety of foreign influences, the dominant streams of which had their origin in the Indian sub-continent upto colonial times. The spice trade had brought the Arabs and in their wake the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British, each of whom stayed for approximately one and a half centuries. The British, who finally seized control over the whole country in 1815, were primarily motivated by the strategic advantage it gave them, controlling the trade routes to the East and in the colonial domination of India.

It is hardly necessary to say that the colonial administration was just as much än instrument of British capitalism as the state apparatus in Britain; the difference was that in the colonies, the needs of British 'enterprise' were serviced with a brutal directness that revealed this essential relationship in all its stark simplicity. Around 1840, by means of new land laws, all uncultivated land was appropriated by the State, which subsequently sold it at nominal prices, mostly to British plantation entrepreneurs. Among these were forests and grazing lands which were essential to the village economy. In addition to the great hardship caused by this, whole villages. were ruthlessly uprooted when they happened to fall entirely within areas suitable for plantation crops. Aided by the State, the plantations expanded until they covered almost the entire central highlands. Initially, coffee was grown and then supplanted by tea in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. With the transition to tea, the characteristic features of the plantation system emerged, a permanent labour force and relatively complex processing plants. The tea industry required much greater capital investment than coffee, but this became readily available in the new era of imperialism; and individually-owned estates were taken over by big tea companies. Around the turn of the century, rubber was also introduced. class The land laws also set up the landed gentry as a landlord/freed of pre-capitalist constraints on their landowning rights. A similar change was instituted in India around the turn of the century. Formerly the British yoke had fallen on all classes and had resulted in a resurgence of armed opposition in both countries. From then on, the landlords were transformed into a pro-imperialist class and opposition died down.

ECONOMIC EXPANSION The post-1870 imperialist boom generated a rapid expansion of economic activity in Sri-Lanka, as in India. The direct expansion of capitalism was sustained and supplemented by a parallel diversification of the activities of the colonial state, which built up an extensive system of road and rail transport and a well organised adminstrative apparatus to service the growing complexity of the colonial economy. Together with these, there grew a vast network of retail and wholesale trade and service industries, which penetrated through into the remotest peasant areas and thereby linked it to the urban-plantation system.

This economic expansion was accompanied by the emergence of a proletariat and a 'middle class' sustained on state employment and the professions. This middle-class, English-educted bureaucracy was recruited mainly from the landlord class and such employment was often the occasion for rapid advancement up the economic and social scale within the class itself.

The working class was generated in two isolated sections, one more or less urban and the other tied to the big plantations. In Colombo, the core of the urban proletariat consisted of the transport, engineering and dock workers. The plantation workers, however, were almost entirely of South Indian origin, since the local Sinhala peasantry could not be induced to work in the abysmal conditions that prevailed on the estates. Though the estate workers lived contiguous to the Sinhala villages, the two communities were separated by language and other cultural barriers, in addition to that of class.

The peasantry itself continued under the semi-feudal relations, which were breaking up under the dominant capitalist system.

The expansion of the plantation economy also induced an expansion of the non-agricultural petty bourgeoisie, on the one hand shopkeepers and merchants and on the other, a whole host of artisans and craftsmen to serve the increasing demand. From out of their ranks emerged the native entrepreneurs, who in turn produced a weak national bourgeoisie. As in India, the entrepreneurs originated outside the landlord class, but soon after, in Sri-Lanka, a partial amalgamation took place with elements from both going into rubber, coconut and mining, all of which required only limited capital. Unlike in India, where the bourgeoisie could grow into a powerful economic force on account of its enormously large internal market and the strong roots of this class in pre-capitalist merchant capital, the Sri-Lankan bourgeoisie remained very weak in relation to the other classes.

STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM The struggle against imperialism on the Indian sub-continent gathered great strength from the economic expansion of the second half of the nineteenth century and particularly from the rapid growth of transport, industry and trade since 1870. The real force of the anti-imperialist movement was throughout the struggle of the workers and peasants against capitalism and landlordism, but its leadership and ideological expression changed, along with the 25

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The subversion of the pre-capitalist socio-cconomic structure and its cultural superstructure. forced through a rapid rise of consciousness, particularly within the now classes howed out by imperialism. In its initial stages in Sri-Lanka, this found expression only as a defence and revival of national cultural values, the leadership being taken, characteristically, by monks, teachers, etc, who were the most threatened by the expansion of Western Subsequently, the leadership passed to the now bourgeois intelligentsia. which coupled national renaissance with accoptance of the 'best? elements of Western culture, which meant essentially the idcas and values of the Enlightenment; it clearly represented the interests of this class against the colonial obstacles to its further expansion. At the same time, the nationalist form of the bourgeois-led movement served the import- The struggle of all national classes against Imporialism and its comprador allios has a bourgeois-democratio character as much as that of the anti-feudal bourgeois movements in Europe. But in the era of Imporialism. it is impossible for any national capitalist class to achiovo any real independence of landlords or of the international capitalist system since it is closely linked to landlordism and dependent on imperialism. This is the enduring lesson of the theory of Permanent Rovolution which takes as its starting point the international character of capitalism and which identifies the conflict botween capital and labour as the dominant contradiction on a world scale. Consequently, in opposition to the superficial and schematic analyses of the Stalinists, this theory explains that it is only under the leadership of the proletariat that genuino national liberation from Imperialism This dominant contradiction found its clear and concrete expression in the anti-imperialist leadership that working class into communist partics, which was the first step in winning leadership of the popular movement. This polarisation of the class struggle on an international scale pushed the landlord and capitalist class in Sri- Lanka decisively into the camp of imperialism; this was particularly easy ashero bourgeois nationalism was very narrowly based. In India and China, however, the anti-imperialist struggle was broadly based on workers, peasants and other patty bourgeois sections and had become a powerful democratic movement with a populist ideology. Just as the urban democracy temporarily acquired a certain independence of the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution, under the impact of October, the consciousness of the vanguard of Indian and Chinese populism was hurtled far in advance of its class basis, so much so that the communist parties and the Comintern were recognised as allies by Gandhi and Sun Yat-sen. But soon after the communist parties were seriously handicapped by the Stalinist degeneration of the Comintern. The Indian CP vacillated in its attitude to the Congress and ended up in open collaboration with the British; it thus lost the opportunity to win leadership of the national movement. In failed to solve either the agrarian or the colonial questions; but the strength of the agrarian movement, which had gathered immense momentum, was such that it selected out a leadership Lanka, where the working class was organised in the LSSP only later, after the popular frontist treachery of Stalinism had been fully revealed, the LSSP reached out directly for revolutionary Trotskyism. In the already established CPs, where the leaders had already formed a deadly dependence on the Stalinist Comintern, Trotskyism entered via the younger members; but here, as in the Soviet Union and Europe, the Stalinists met the Trotsky- With the formation of the LSSP in 1935, the anti-imperialist movement assumed a genuinely popular character; the party soon won leadership of the urban and plantation workers and the radical intelligentsia. The preceding bourgois nationalism had raised to its apex a small group of leaders drawn .

classes. Unlike the Indian leaders, these men were distinguished only by their servile dependence on the British and it was an easy task for the LSSP to expose them before the politically conscious elements. The granting of the general franchise in 1931, however, had installed these compradors as ministers in the State Council of the colonial administration; thus they were kept in the public eye and built up by the British as the the Part! was weak, as the leadership had failed to realise in time the importance of a strong Leninist organisation. With the onset of the War, the LSSP was outlawed, on account of its heroic anti-war position, and the antiimperialist struggle was effectively defused. The ensuing decade was one of confusion, splits and defeats; even the post-war upsurge, which culminated in the general strike of 1947 and which brought the LSSP to the zenith of its popularity, was brutally suppressed. Since the LSSP-led struggle was not linked to a similar one in India, its the war. The British used these defeats to install the bourgeoisie in power; in 1948 they withdrew, leaving Taking advantage of the weakness of the LSSP, the UNP deprived the plantation workers of citizenship and the franchise, on the grounds that their ancestors were Indian; again the LSSP failed to mobilise effectively against this reactionary measure. At about the same time, a number of welfarist measures were instituted, often as direct developmentof the struggle itself.

issued forth from the October Revolution.

China, the bourgeoisio from within the Communist Party, which ist criticism with the 'criticism of weapons'.

THE LSSP and capitalist leaders of the people.

chances of success were slim in any case; the State power in the reluctant but loyal hands of the reactionaries, 26 Almost everywhere it led to the independent organisation of the carried through the Revolution in spite of the Stalinist fetters. In Srifrom the intersection of the landlord situation was thus similar to that in the Philippines at the end of newly organised in the UNP

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concessions to the ISSP-led mass agitation; these included the free education scheme, the health services, price controls. pensions, poor relief and the food subsidies. Those concessions were possible on account of the substantial surpluses gencrated be the plantations. These measures could be sustained as long as the plantation workers were paid subsistence wages and the country continued to benefit from the general post-war boom. The end of the short-lived Korean boom alone. forced the UNP to cut the rice subsidy, which precipitated the 1953 "artal, a nationwide stoppage of work and direct action by workers. The Hartal of the ISSP leaders, who refused to lead this struggle for the overthrow of the UNP, in what it later recognised as The theory of Permanent Revolution is the theoretical sunming up of the experience of revolutionary struggle in backward countries. The Russian revolution was its most outstanding realisation: it is sometimes not appreciated horever. that its perspectises were vindicated in the Chines revolution and in the failure of the The theory pointed out that in the era of imperialism. when the indigenousbourgeoisic is linked to landlordism and dependent on imperialism. even the democratic dasks posed. ie. national liberation and agrarian revolution, can only be achieved in tho struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this is simultaneously a struggle against capitalism, since it is the pre-proletarian state that provides the political conditions for its survival. In Sri-Lanka, the issue was clear: since the big capital was entirely British, national liberation must inevitably include the take-over of industry and the estatos by the workers. In China, the seizure of stato power by the Communist Party was de-facto anti-capitalist as well. for henceforth the 'national bourgeoisic' survived only on sufferance. What. Mao later mystified as a "non-antagonistic contradiction' between the national bourgeoisie and the workers, to fit the Stalinist schoma, was in reality a contradiction that had already been resolved in alignment In India, the objective developments were similar: from very carly on. the workers struggled against the Indian capitalists as well as the British. But at the critical juncture. the CPI switched to a policy of support for the British, when even Congress leaders refused to do so; this greatiy weakened the CPI in relation to the Congress. At the same time, the British, who were aware of the weakness of their own position; withdrew, leaving the Congress leaders in power, as the best hedge against revolution. But precisely on account of this, the basic tasks of the democratic revolution were not achieved. apart from the hollow 'Independence'. Sri Lanka's 'Independence' was a by-product of this sub-continental tactic of imperialism, which again left untouched the basic democratic tasks; the economy remained closely dependent on British capitalism. in the interests of the plantation owners and the urban, upper and middle class society, while the conditions of the doubly-exploited peasantry It is necessary to emphasise that the plantations, which were responsible for the carly prosperity of the country, represent a partial and distorted agrarian transformation of fairly wide extent, and hence a transformation of a part of the democratic tasks into a socialist one. The plantations then occupied more land area than what was used for the cultivation of the staple food of rice; hence the greater part of food and other commodities were This transformation, which benefited the indigenous privileged classes. had actually reduced the standard of living of the peasantry, since it deprived them of secondary foods from the forests and grazing lands; further, there was no room to accomodate the expanding rural population except in the inhospitable and semi-arid 'dry zone'; the high degree of land fragmentation in the "wet zone' is a product of these factors. Such is the specific feature of the agrarian question in Sri-Lanka. Superimposed on this were the burdens imposed by capitalism; the most important of these was the tendency of agricultural prices to stagnate in relation to manufactured goods, which rose rapidly. This 'terms of trade' effect between town and country steadily moved it did between Sri Lanka and Western capitalism. While the peasants lived near subsistence, fat surpluses were extracted by merchant middle-men; these surpluses were dissipated in conspicuous consumption of imported goods, rather than investment and, hence, generated no new employment within the The other economic barrier to the peasants' progress was indebtedness. The small, independent peasant is often in need of short-term credit, until his crop is harvested. This need was met by usurers from the village landlord, trade and professional classes. Even when state help was extended at a later date, the village usurers were In addition, there were the various extra-economic constraints associated with semi-feudal remnants; theso generally took the form of sharecropping and tenant cultivation and was prevalent in monastic lands and in the The paddy lands Act of 1958, which stripped semi-feudal relations of legality, attempted to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship. On account of the hostility of monks and other landlord interests, it was finally passed with its teeth drawn and, consequently, its effects were marginal. On top of the above factors, is the effect of the second order interactions between them; for example, indebtedextremely favourable circumstances.

PERMANENT REVOLUTION Indian revolution as well.

with the perspectives of Permanent Revolution.

remained unchanged.

RISE OF THE SLFP THE PEASANTRY imported.

against the peasantry, as country.

much more accessible to the peasants.

Tamil areas of the north and east.

revealed clearly the bankruptcy 27

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nes the

s forces the peasant to sell loss of lands in redemption

his produce of debt.

THE SLFP

In the SLEP, we see the rise of a populist movement similar to that of India, but based on Sinhala, Buddhist 'nationalism'. The main content of its political programme was the struggle of a section of the Sinhala middle class to gain access to the state apparatus and offices, which was the chief dispenser of the country's share of the plantation surplus. Until then, the state departments functioned in the English language and, hence, were dominated by the English-educated bourgeois and petty bourgeois sections. This clearly represented an important part of even bourgeois national emancipation and had been completely excluded from the false Independence of 1948. The SLFP won electoral support by promising to replace English by Sinhala as the official language and to extend state patronage to Buddhism. The real needs of the impoverished peasantry were not represented within the SLFP, but their support was canvassed through the small merchants, landowners, teachers, the Buddhist c and othèr leaders of rural society, whose party it really was. The powerful emphasis on language and religion were used - as they are now - to conceal the class tensions between the populist movement and its political leadership.

The SLFP became a powerful political force during the early post-'independence' years, as a result of the s ulus to local economic expansion, provided by the war and the post-war boom. The success of SLFP populism nearly half a century after Indian populism, was directly related to the failure of the LSSP to correctly apprehend the specific post-War developments and to advance a transitional programme, embracing the national and agrarian questions. The first part of such a programme would have advanced Sinhala and Tamil as the official languages and the second would have taken the class struggle into the country, thereby undermining the peasant bases of the UNP and SLFP. It would also have avoided the murderous communalism which followed the SLFP's 'solution of the national question.

Swept into power in 1956, the SLFP and its coalition partners, opened the state bureaucracy to the Sinhalaeducated, by making Sinhala the official language. It also built up an industrial infrastructure by means of state corporations, nationalised the Colombo port and bus services and encouraged the development of national capitalism by restricting commodity imports. The government also introduced very limited reforms relating to paddy-land alone, through the agency of its partner in coalition, the VLSSP, which had splintered away from the LSSP. Though it was possible for the SLFP to carry through these measures, it could not, naturally, establish any real independence of imperialism; even the initial economic expansion which ate into the country's external reserve only increased the dependence on imperialist financial institutions.

Very soon the SLFP itself fe which were brought to a climax

Il a victim to the by the assasinati

sharp class contradiction on of Mr Bandaranaike.

inherent

lerg

REVISIONISM

The LSSP's present strategy of popular frontism was launched in 1964 as a reaction to the long period of confu. sion dating from 1939. The failure to realise the general perspectives of Marxism in the concrete situation, were interpreted by many as a failure of Marxism itself. On the one hand, it laid the basis for the rise to power of an un-Marxist, pragmatic leadership within the Party; on the other, it gave rise to a serious defection of a third of of the membership, to Stalinist two stage-ism and, in consequence, to the camp of the liberal bourgeoisie. Since 1948, the Party had also abandoned its correct perspective of forging links with the Indian revolution. Neither could these mistakes be corrected from outside, on account of the failure of the Fourth International.

The rise of Bandaranaike populism drew a substantial part of the LSSP's mass support into the SLFP, especially from the more backward sections that were located in the transitional semi-urban, semi-rural areas. By 1959, however, the disintegration of the SLFP was openly manifest; but it still retained the greater part of its mass base. Misjudging the movement of consciousness in the peasantry, the LSSP contested 100 of a total 150 seats in the March 1960 elections: 10 candidates were returned. In the subsequent election of July 1960, the SLFP was returned to power with Mrs Bandaranaike as the new prime minister.

This ignominious defeat at the polls paved the way for the alliance with the SLFP. Thus popular frontism was, in reality, a capitulation to the phenomenon of populi sm; it was the direct result of the failure to correctly apprehend the political developments of the 'fifties within the context of the overall movement of international capitalist They failed to understand that it was the post-war upswing in international capitalism that supplied the material basis for the long period of stalemate in the class-struggle and also made possible the temporary stability of petty bourgeois-based populist regimes all over the former colonial world. Instead, the LSSP succumbed to the empiricis thesis that it was now possible to advance to Socialism by politically strengthening these populist regimes.

By the early 'sixties, the boom had ended and the period of recession had begun; the consequence for Sri-Lanka was a steady decline of the terms of trade, which means that imports began to cost more and exports to earn less and less. In a country so closely tied to imperialist markets, the contradictions of post-colonial capitalism would inevitably have alienated the majority of the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie from both bourgeois parties. There is little doubt that in such a situation, the SLFP would have broken up - as it in fact began to do in 1959 with its bourgeois section going over into coalition with the UNP and its mass base coming over to the LSSP.

Alla.

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The mass enthusiasm which accompanied the formation of the short-lived United Left Front of 1963 (involving the three major working class parties) was a clear herald of this historical trend. In March 1960, the three parties which later constituted the 1963 Front, actually polled more votes than the SLFP.

By the early 'sixties, Mrs Bandarankaike had already begun to feel the ebb; the formation of the United Left She reacted promptly by offering coalition to the LSSP alone, with three ministries in her government. This was accepted in 1964; it gave rise to splits in both parties. The most reactionary leaders of the SLFP defected to the UNP, leaving the liberal bourgeois section firmly in control of the Party. In the LSSP, the supporters of Samarakkody and Tampoe broke away in ultra-left fashion, aided by Mandel, Frank, and Healy. The subsequent defeat of the SLFP-LSSP government in 1964 resulted in elections which led to the formation government of 1965, which was a collection of all the assorted reactionaries in the country, This return of the UNP was facilitated by the confusion generated in this period of rapid re-alignments; in any case, the rural masses had not as yet awakened to its real class nature. By 1970, however, the deepening crisis had forced the UNP to impose a number of burdens on the masses and push through a crash programme of food production, which strengthened the class of rich peasants and which further differentiated the peasantry. This agricultural expansion itself was financed out of loans, which greatly increased the foreign debt. In 1968, the SLFP and the LSSP together with the CP (Moscow), had formed a new and stronger alliance on the basis of a 'common programme', the so-called United (Left) Front. The Front was returned to power in 1970 in a resounding defeat for the UNP. The victory of the Front was assisted by extravagent promises of reform and restitution of welfare cuts; on account of the crisis-laden nature of the economy, these promises could not possibly The economy in 1970 had made little progress from colonial times. Of a GDP (gross domestic product) of Rs. 11,900 million, the share of agricultural production alone was 36.3%, with the export crops of tea, rubber and coconut constituting 14.8% and domestic agriculture accounting for 21.5%. The share of industry was 13%, with nearly one-third of this being accounted for by the basic state industries such as steel; this figure compares with 14% for Venezuala, which is considered one of the most developed in its class. If construction industry is added, this figure rises to 19.5%, or nearly one-fifth of the GDP. In the previous decade, industry had grown at the comparatively poor rate of about 6% and even then, in an unhealthy manner, for nearly 75% of the total material input was imported. The remaining 44.2% of the GDP was made up of the various services, including the extensive POPULAR FRONT Front was a clear danger sign.

of the UNP 'National'

TAMKESANTURA (murniture) THE SITUATION IN 1970 THE ECONOMY welfare, transport and other CEYLON'S STATE INDUSTRY INT PAS!

services of the state.

CEYLON'S PRIVATE- SECTOR INDUSTRY (DISTRICT -WISE) NOTE : Numbers denote Unite 29

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The extent of land and labour used is itlustrated by the following quote from the Seers Report: "Tea covers about 570,000 acres al about 1.25 man-yeurs (of 240 days eucli) per acre; coconuis 1.1 million acres at 0.1; rubber 190,000 at 0.35; rice, a gross harvested acreage of 1.7 million at 0.25 - about 1.3 million man-years in the four major crops. Other field crops provide about 180,000 man-years. Other tree crops and animal husbandry, forestry and fisheries could, at best, make up the total of man-years in 1971, to 1.7 million. Even if we accept that a man-year comprises only 240 days, this represents underutilisation The total foreign exchange expenditure in 1970 on current account was Rs 2,502 million, which represented 21% of the GDP. Of this figure, 42.8% was spent on food imports, 27% on drugs, textiles and other essential goods, while the remaining 30.2% was taken up in debt servicing. The total foreign exchange earnings during this period amounted to only Rs 2,264 million, or just over 20% of the GDP; in the 1950's this ratio fell between 30-35%. Of this, Rs 2,033 million was obtained from export earnings; nearly 90% of this was contributed by the plantation exports of tea, rubher and coconut, which was exactly the same position as in 1948. If canital expenditure is included as well, the balance of payments gap was around Rs 1,100 million, just as in the previous year; this figure represents 50% of the total foreign exchange earnings; it is also greatly in excess of the deficit in the first half of the decade, which was between Rs 125-350 million. It was largely the result of the adverse movement of the terms of trade: while export earnings stagnated, import prices in general rose by more than 33% during the period 1964 to 1970 and the price of capital goods, by as much as 57%. The foreign exchange reserves dropped from $ 379.5 million in 1945, to $ 268 million in 1956, to $ 73.7 million in 1964 and 67.7 million in 1970. (The exchange rate was Rs 3.32=$1 upto the end of 1949, Rs 4.76-$ 1 upto the end of 1967, Rs 5.95=$ 1 upto March The deficits were financed by external borrowings and increasingly by short termcredit at high interest rates. The foreign debt increased from Rs 374 million in 1964 to Rs 1551million in 1970, of which nearly half was shortterm credit, which the UNP had resorted to in desperation after 1965. In 1970, 65% of the gross borrowing of Rs 1124 million were used for the repayment and servicing of debts. All this greatly increased the country's dependence on the IMF, which used it to extract harsh internal changes in favour of capital. Around 1970, about a third of the area under tea and rubber were still foreign-owned, but these were the larger and more productive estates, since they accounted for nearly half the output. In tea and rubber, the larger units are higher yielding, more labour intensive and better managed. Foreign control of the plantation industry is exercised, not so much through ownership, but by controlling the pricing; marketing and even shipping and insurance, which is in British hands; nominal or zero profits are declared in production by the local agency houses, while In 1970, the total revenues of the state amounted to Rs 2,736 million, while expenditure on current account was Rs 2873 million; capital expenditure took another Rs 812 million: This entailed a budget deficit of Rs 1150 million, Of the total expenditure on current account, 14.4% was spent on the state administrative structure (inclusive of 3.2% on defence), 25.7% on education, health and other social services (education alone taking 16.6 %), 6.4% on The remainder was taken up in economic serviceś such as transport, communications and irrigation, interest on public debt and other miscellaneous activities. subsidy was around Rs 600 million. These figures illustrate the welfare measures, which are unusually comprehensive by Asian standards and which were made possible by the large surplus generated by the plantations. 1972 and Rs 6.4=$ 1 thereafter).

pensions and 21% on food subsidies.

Tea Plantation 30 of almost one-quarter of the agricultural workforce."

fat profits are made between buying and marketing abroad.

• The actual value of the food

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The preliminary report of the Socio-economic survey of 69/70 (from which all the subsequent figures are taken), shows that of a population of 12.3 million, those aged 5 and over can be classified as follows: A breakdown of the total 'work force' by class categories, is as follows; it is based on careful estimates made Of the 916. thous thousand non-agricultural workers, about 700 thousand constitute the hard-core of the proletaria issociated with manufacturing industry, the transport services and construction. In their conditions of work an total separation from property, the plantation workers are just as essentially proletarian. Hence the proletariat as a whole is over 40% of the working population, whereas the peasantry is under 25%! Inclusive of the peasant owner-cultivators, the real petty bourgeoisie constitute 26.5% of the total. That the high proportion of proletarians is not associated with a proportionate development of capitalism, is testified to by the existence of nearly 3½m housewives and dependants, which is nearly as much as the employed population.

A comparison of the above statistics with rural surveys carried out in 1950 and 1957, reveal only marginal paddy-land holdings and 33% of area cultivated, were worked by leeses and sharecroppers, whereas 61% of holdings and 55% of area cultivated were worked by owner-cultivators. The degree of separation of land and labour in the production of rice, is shown by the estimates that 64% of holdings, constituting 23% of area cultivated, were under 1 acre in extent, whereas 15% of holdings, corresponding to 56% of land, were more than 2 acres in size. These figures also testify to the high degree of fragmentation of peasant lands, which is a major problem in the wet zone. It is also important to point out that semi-feudal remnants relate to a very small portion (probably between 5-10 %) of the work force; their importance is greatly exaggerated by many who mechanically try to 'fit The Socio-economic survey of 69/70 estimates that the average household size is 5.8 persons; of this, 1.7 are income receivers and 4.1 are dependants. Rural and urban sectors average 1.6 income receivers per household, to nearly three times as many dependents, whereas the plantation sector averages 2.6 wage earners to 2.6 dependents per household; yet the respective average monthly household incomes are Rs 453, Rs 264 and Rs 211 for urban, THE CLASS STRUCTURE Category No. in millions 'Work force'

7.141 3.209 Students Housewives, 3.+26 disabled, old etc Total 10.776 from the results of the Survey:

Category 4. Peasant Sector (domestic agriculture) 'elf-employed peasants (inclusive of ow amily labour Landlords (inclusive of a small number of capitalist farmers) Other agricultural labour (inclusive of sharecroppers) Fishermen Total for peasant sector B. Other.

Shopkeepers, merchants, craftsmen etc.

(non-agricultural petty bourgeois) Teachers, clerks & othet white-collar Workers in transport, manufacturing, services etc Plantation workers Employers, inclusive of top bureaucracy Total employed population C. Unemployed Total 'work force'

differences in the rural class structure.

These early the Sri Lankan foot into the Chinese shoe'.

38.7 29.8 31.8 100.0 No. in thousands 713.0 34.5 230.0 38.0 1015.5 386.0 380.0 916.7 806.2 91:0 3595.4 545.7 7141.1 %c 17.21 .83 5.54 .92 24.51 9.33 9.18 22.10 19.76 2.20 86.77 13.20 99.87 surveys, which were more detailed, reveal that 30% of all 31

[page 33]

rural and estate households, which shows clearly the position of the estate workers as the most exploited class. The all-island average household income was Rs 289; but while 43.6% of households drawing Rs 200 or less received only 20.4% of the total income, 1.8% of households drawing over Rs 1000 received9.7% of the total income. In the urban and plantation sectors, the non-monetary component of the household income was of the order of 10%, in the rural sector about 26%.

Individual monthly incomes averaged Rs 257, 139 and 71 for the urban, rural and estate sectors respectively and men in general earned twice as much as women; the overall average income was Rs 145 per month. Between 1959 and 1970 per capita real incomes had risen by 2.1% per year. It must also be borne in mind that average incomes in Sri Lanka are considerably higher than in India, since the former's GNP is nearly twice that of the latter. These figures do not, of course, indicate income in relation to class, except in the case of plantation workers; one could also hazard that agricultural labourers were not paid much more than the estate workers. Urban workers could earn anything from Rs 100 to Rs 350 per month, but figures of Rs 150-200 were much more representative. White collar employees such as teachers and clerks average around Rs 300 per month. The salaries of top bureaucrats, profess. ionals and managers, by contrast, are well in excess of Rs 2000 per month.

Above- Tyre Corporation Below - Leather Products factory.

Right - Ceramics factory SPECIAL FEATURES OF SRI LANKA Of the features peculiar to Sri Lanka, in relation to other post-colonial countries, the clear numerical superiority of the proletariat over the peasant and urban petty bourgeoisie, is the most significant. It is an indication of the greater relative development of capitalism than, for example, in India. Even India as a whole, is far closer to pre- Revolution Russia in this respect, than to China.

Another special feature of Sri Lanka is the age structure and literacy of its population: while 9.4% were over 55 years of age, as much as 60.5% fell into the 0-24 age group and 39.3% into the 0-14 age group in 1970. Of those aged 10 years and over, 82.1% were literate and for those in the age group 10-24, (who had benefited most from the free education system) the literacy rate was 91%. Literacy rates in the estate sector were considerably lower at 61%. Educational attainment was correspondingly high, especially among the youth: of those in the age group 15-34, just over 90% have had primary schooling and 63%, secondary education of some form. The table of the previous section shows the rate of open unemployment at 13.2%, corresponding to over ½ million people. Of this figure, 82.6% were in the age group 15-24, 26.5% of whom had got beyond the O-level at least; 12.7% fell into the age group 25-35, 36.7% of whom had O-levels at least. It has also been estimated that of all those between 15 and 24 with O-level passes alone, the rate of open unemployment was more than 70% and higher 32

[page 34]

still in rural areas. Most of the unemployed youth were seeking 'white collar ' employment, which brought higher incomes (see previous section) and was socially much more acceptable than that of a worker or peasant. Since the initial spurt of expansion begun in 1956 could not be sustained, the supply of such jobs thinned down to a A question that immediately springs to mind is, if the proletariat is 40% of the work force, why is it that the workers' parties are so weakly represented in the National Assembly? The most important reason is that the plantation workers are denied the franchise. The other reason is rooted in the geographical factors of the well-developed public transport system of the country. The great majority of manufacturing, construction and state service industries are located in the Colombo district in the immediate hinterland of Colombo; but since it is possible to commute to work from relatively long distances, the concentration of industry has not given rise to a corresponding concentration of the proletariat, leading to its physical isolation from rural society, as, for instance, happened in Russia with her immense spaces. Consequently the development of the consciousness of some sections of the workers has been retarded by the continued influence of obscurantist rural ideology, such as false On the other hand, the reciprocal influence of the working class has greatly advanced political consciousness in the villages. Most of the JVP insurrectionists, for example, were the products of these semi-urban, conurbations in the Colombo, Kegalle and Kalutara districts. It is also the key to the problem of taking the class struggle on the Agrarian question directly into the peasantry. It opens up the perspective of making the socialist content of the revolutionary struggle more broad-based than has been the case upto now. Further, if the strongly unionized and politicised white collar workers and rural labourers are included, the working class alone forms 57% The bourgeois leadership of the SLFP, which is probably more acutely aware of the above potentialities than the LSSP leaders, is already attempting to redress the balance in its favour. On the one hand, it is trying to convert the large reservoir of unemployed youth into individual agricultural producers. On the other, it has already concluded agreements with India to 'repatriate' 600,000 plantation workers, while granting citizenship to 375,700. In 1968, when applications were called, only 400,000 wished to be recognized as Indians, whereas 625,000 applied for Sri Lnaka citizenship; it is therefore clear that the agreement implies the use of some form of compulsion. Both measures are reactionary in economic terms as well: with their education and social experience (ie. for collective work) the youth would work more productively - and more happily - in large scale co-operative units; in the 600,000 estate workers, the government proposes to dispense with the services of the greater part of a strongly collectivised labour force, with invaluable experience in large-scale intensive agriculture, at a time when It is highly unlikely that these maneouvres would succeed; the deepening crisis has effectively pushed the white collar workers into the ranks of the proletariat and, in the JVP, the youth have already demonstrated a strong tendency for organised political action with a high degree of consciousness. Onde a clear lead is given by the working class, all these forces which are more volatile than itself, would immediately fall in step. The above statistics show that the Popular Front inherited a post-colonial capitalist economy which was sharply sustained budget deficits - factors usually spotlighted by bourgeois economists - are only the symptoms of the a) The continued chronic dependence of the plantation crop dominated economy b) The failure to carry out thoroughgoing agrarian reform. The agrarian question, which dates from pre-capitalist times, has been severely modified by plantation colonialism; today it is posed in an entirely new way, embracing the plantations as well and uniting socialist tasks with democratic tasks of land reform. The situation has not changed qualitatively since 1948; the problems have only been modified and extended and indeed worsened - by more than two decades of neglect. The tasks posed are, in short, the resolution of the • Agrarian question to the advantage of the poor peasantry and unemployed plantation labour and the take-over of the state corporations, the plantations and big private industry by the working class. The political task, which is inseparably linked to the above tasks is the seizure of state power from the bourgeoisie, which is dependent on trickle in the 'sixties.

consciousness associated with race, religion and feudal social relations.

of the working population, quite apart from the unemployed 13.2%.

food production is of the utmost importance!

THE POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT THE TASKS POSED in decline, and headed towards total bankruptcy.

decay. The fundamental reasons could be summed up as follows:

when that system itself is in recession.

imperialism and is intimately tied to both plantation and peasant land.

size and The enormous foreign debt, the high level of unemployment and on the Western capitalist system, 33

[page 35]

These tasks could only have been carried through to completion by a revolutionary proletariat supported by the the essential lesson of the theory of Permanent Revolution. To imagine that they could be effectively tackled from a position of junior partnership in a SLFP dominated alliance, was to abandon the perspec- Though the electoral victory of the Front was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm, including widespread mass action, it soon became clear that the government had no intention of taking any revolutionary steps; mass initiative was squashed, a few bureaucrats were changed and it settled down to implementing a few reforms through laboriously bureaucratic, but legal, methods (these are discussed in a subsequent section). Experts were set the task of drafting a new constitution and steps were taken to tide over the immediate problems of the short-term debt and the massive food bills. Constitutional reform was possible because the Front had more than a two-thirds The decline of the capitalist economy manifested itself in the specifics of Sri Lanka, as an unemployment problem of enormous proportions, affecting mainly the educated youth. As a result the youth - of which Sri Lanka has many more in proportion than most countries - began separating out of the UNP or SLFP political orientations of their parents, in search of radical solutions. This process was particularly marked in the rural areas; it represented the first stage in the shift in consciousness of the peasantry. This radicalisation was given an ideological Not finding a revolutionary lead in the LSSP, which was in coalition with the SLFP, or in the Stalinist parties, they threw up radical populist-style organisations of their own. The JVP was by far the largest of these, on account of the quick solutions promised in its 'one-day revolution'. The widespread disenchantment generated by the failure of the Front to take decisive action against capitalism and landlordism, rapidly swelled the ranks of the JVP. The eclectic policies and Blanquist orientation of this Party, inevitably led them into insurrectionary In spite of the reactionary features in their political ideology, such as their total rejection of the urban and plantation workers and their identification of the latter with 'Indian expansionism', they had empirically arrived at important conclusions which had quite eluded the CPs, on account of their Stalinist blinkers. Thus they recognised that the struggle in Sri Lanka was against imperialism and national capitalism as a whole, that there was no 'national' bourgeoisie independent of imperialism and that feudal remnants were very few. They also realised that in the specifics of the country, it was armed insurrection and not guerilla or 'protracted' war that was appropriate; in practice, however they substituted their own organisation for the revolutionary class. It is ironical that these renegades from Maoism should have arrived at some of the basic theses of Permanent Revolution more than a decade after the LSSP itself had abandoned it, on the grounds that modern history had superseded its perspectives! The Insurrection was undoubtedly a by-product of the sharp recoil of the mass movement from the reality of Popular Front rule. As Lenin repeated many times, adventurism or other varieties of petty bourgeois revolutionism is often the penalty paid for the opportunist sins of the working class leadership. A further by-product was the strengthening of the repressive organs of the State. The Insurrection also compelled the government to embark Needless to say, the basic problems as described above have not been solved. But in its first three years of office, the Popular Front government has taken some definite steps which have to be considered and interpreted. The first of these was the constitutional reform, which in transforming Sri Lanka into a republic, eliminated political interference by Britain and local reactionaries via appeals to the Privy Council and the Senate; the abolished. It vested all legislative, judicial and administrative power in the elected 'National Assembly', which means in effect that the Prime Minister has wide control over all these functions. It also gave Secondly, the Front has fashioned out legislation to enable it to take over any large company without notice. These powers have, in fact, been used to take over the most reactionary of the economic and propagandist institutions of the bourgeoisie; they have thus asserted the ascendency of the government over all private capitalist institutions as well and brought the local agents of imperialism to heel. In addition, a number of other, less signi- Of the economic measures, the most important is that of land reform. It did not initially figure in the Common Programme and, even now, is only a caricature of what is necessary in the current context, all thanks to the intervention of the bourgeois leadership of the SLFP. Even this is being vitiated by the incompetence and corruption of the SLFP appointees and the reactionary attempt of the SLFP to parcel up some of the acquired plantations into individual holdings to be given to unemployed youths. As a result of retrograde fragmentation and the replacement of skilled by inexperienced personnel, some estates have reverted to a lower level of utilization. At the same time skilled labour has been thrown out of employment and communal antagonisms have been fanned between the peasant and plantation communities. The estates under the control of the LSSP-run Plantation Corporation, however, are peasantry; that is tives of Marxism for wishful thinking.

majority in the Assembly.

THE JVP INSURRECTION action isolated from the movement of the oppressed masses.

hesitantly on land reform.

1970-1973 ficant political steps have been taken, in the same direction.

being run efficiently.

34 the government greater power to suppress internal opposition.

[page 36]

Under the present measures, it is estimated that about 500, 100 acres will become available for village expansion; this is just under one-third of the presently cultivated acreage of rice alone. Already most of this has been taken over.

Furthermore, effective steps have been taken to combat urban landlordism, to acquire monopoly control over the gem export and consumer goods import trade, to establish a state shipping line and to set up regional development organisations to assist small scale agricultural and manufacturing projects. A number of individual industrial ventures are planned in co-operation with foreign private companies and governments. Self sufficiency has been achieved in a number of subsidiary foodstuffs and gem exports have grown so fast that it is now as important an exchange earner as rubber.

Only manioc, jack seeds and maize for sale in Talawakelle CRISIS In spite of all this, the overall economic situation steadily worsened from 1970, leading to a precipitate maturing of the crisis in late 1973. The nominal value of the export earnings did not change appreciably from the 1970 level, which means that the real value dropped; by mid-73 they had fallen 5% from the '71, 72 levels. The foreign debt rose to Rs 2245 million by mid-72 and the food subsidy rose from Rs 600 million in 1970 to Rs 710 million in 1973. Meanwhile the world-wide shortfall in food production, coupled to the currency instability which unleashed a wave of speculation in grain, sent food prices shooting upwards. This forced the government to cut back on the subsidised food rations. In 1970 in fulfilment of their election promise, the Front had been compelled to restore the subsidised rice ration of 4lb/person/week, which the UNP had halved in December 1966 in response to World Bank demands. In February 1973 the supply situation was so bad that the rice subsidy was cut and the sugar ration halved to 1lb/month: The government quickly began a nationwide 'food drive'. In August, the food drive was put on a 'war footing' with all possible resources mobilized. In October, the food situation was so bad that the government imposed further cuts and offered strong incentives to producers: thus, the guaranteed purchase price of rice was raised from Rs 18 to Rs 25 per bushel; this immediately pushed up the free market price of rice. Also, the rice ration was reduced to 1lb/week, flour prices were raised and rationed to 11b/week and bread was raised to Rs 0.76 per Ib, which was double the 1972 price. The open market price of rice was about Rs 1.25/1b at this time and that of sugar about Rs 2/1b. 1974 brought further increases, partly on account of increased transport costs due to oil price hikes and partly as a result of speculation; the open market price of rice, in February, was around Rs 3.25/ Ib and that of sugar Rs 5/1b. (The nominal exchange rate is about Rs 15 to the £, but the market rate is closer to Rs 25 to the £, or Rs 1 to about 4 pence). The oil crisis has also resulted in a shortage of fertiliser, 35

[page 37]

The budget for 1974 was presented in November 1973, before the oil price rises. Even then the estimated deficit was Rs 1442 on a total estimated revenue of Rs 4115 million. Debt servicing alone. was to take Rs 1161 million, about 60% more than in 1970. The food subsidy bill was expected to fall to Rs 600m from a projected Rs 1000 m on account of the cuts. The oil price hike which came soon after, however, has blown a gaping hole in these estimates. The oil bill alone is expected to rise by about Rs 350m to Rs 1000m. The total food bill, which was estimated at Rs 925 m, is now expected to be Rs 600m more, mainly on account of flour and bill would therefore rise by Rs 1000m at least, which implies further drastic cuts unless credit is forthcoming. Rice, flour and sugar, which in 1973 cost £34, £42 and £74 per ton on the world market, now costs f160, £124 and £132 respectively. The cost of public transport has also risen: in February 1974, bus fares were raised by upto The maturing of the crisis forced the government to lean even further on imperialism and to impose more burdens on the masses. A socialist response to the crisis would have been to use it as the occasion for revolutionary political and economic change, by mobilizing the masses under working class leadership; this would have been the real solution to the bankruptcy of neo-colonial capitalism. But such a response was precluded by the dominant class nature of the Front government, which had steadily impelled it more and more to the right since the Insurrection and the passing of the land reform legislation. This shift was naturally appreciated by imperialism. In March 1973, the Aid Consortium - set up in 1965 to sustain the UNP - promised to make available $65m ($1=Rs6.4), the highest commitment ever; between 1965-70 the average commitment had been $ 50m a year, but since then it had fallen off; in 1972, it had been only $27m. These funds were to be advanced by Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, USA, Canada and Australia. A fair quantity of aid has been offered by China as well, but this has been too small to alter the main trend of increasing dependence on Western capitalism. At the same time, the government has been forced to make concessions to local and foreign capital. SLFP ministers loudly declared that there would be 'no throttling of any sector' and promised, in Ottowa and London, that Sri Lanka was firmly committed-to 'democracy'. More concretely, proposals were brought forward to involve the private sector in rural development and foreign capital in tourist and industrial expansion. In the budget of November 1973, concessions were made to the middle classes as well and company tax was reduced for companies with 'broadbased capital'. The convertible currency allowance for earnings from non-traditional exports was raised from 2% to 3%; this scheme which brings hard currency into the hands of exporters, with the right to import even banned commodities, has proved to be a remarkable success. Industrial exports rose from Rs 59m in 1971 to Rs 90m in 1972 and Rs 143 m in 1973. The total volume is still small compared to traditional plantation exports, but are likely to expand rapidly. Already demands are being made to extend the scheme to import saving food projects and even to plantation exports; this is likely to be done, on account of its success. It is a clear indication of the powerful tendency of local capitalism to integrate with the international capitalist system. The world food shortage and the crash food drive has been used by the Front to keep the country in something like a war regime. It has not, however, prevented the UNP from launching a massive campaign to topple the Government, ostensibly on the issue of fresh elections in 1975 - which itself would mean certain defeat for the Front on account of the wide spread discontent over food shortages and rising prices. The UNP campaign involves not only agitation, but organised political action on the streets, designed to break down civil order; its The sharply rising discontent of the working class could not, however, be kept down. in the 28 demands of the JCTUO (Joint Council of Trade Union Organisations) which represents workers in a large number of industries. These include "a minimum wage of Rs 200 to all categories of workers, take-over of agency houses and foreign-owned banks, greater state control of the plantation sector, sterling companies and banks, the abolition of foreign monopoly by the immediate enactment of the Law of Registration of Sterling Companies, a five day working week, an allowance of Rs 2.50 for every rising point in the living index paid to workers, the immediate enactment of the Workers' Charter, a national pension scheme and a monthly wage for the estate workers." Thus the working class is already fighting for socialist demands which it has recognised as the real solution to its In November 1973 the JCTUO intensified its campaign for the 28 demands. A few months later eleven public sector trade unions raised demands for a minimum monthly wage of Rs 250 for all categories of workers, a minimum daily wage of Rs 10 for daily-rated workers and a monthly wage for estate workers plus Rs 1 a day. only the tip of the iceberg is revealed by the Prime Minister's recent appeal to the trade unions to 'co-operate in development'. Together with the food subsidy cuts, the government granted upto 10% wage increases to low paid workers; but this was miserably inadequate. Already a number of strikes have been launched in Colombo and on the plantations. It is very likely that a new wave of strikes would be launched on the above demands in the near The working class has in effect demonstrated that it is not prepared to support a capitalist system at its expense. The sharp rise of food prices, which has imposed intolerable burdens on its shoulders, has broken down its popular RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS the real genuine the bantupley nf neo-colonice this thi real aim is probably to prepare the way for a military government.

THE PRESENT SITUATION THE WORKING CLASS misery.

sugar.

It was The total import first expressed

[page 38]

front illusions and is rapidly eroding its faith in the LSSP and CP leaders. Since the high prices benefit peasant producers, the SLFP is relatively less affected by them. The sharp class tensions in the Front, brought about this shift to the right, have already broken out openly, when a section of the CP split a ray from the government. But the workers wero not prepared to rally to just any "left" focus, whether of the Left CP or of the other left groups. Only a revolutionary leadership coming up within its own organisations, armed with clear perspectives for political action, could win the confidence of the great majority of the class. Until such a development links the political experience of the class to a revolutionary consciousness, it is unlikely that decisive action would ho taken. If the present campaign of the UNP proves a serious threat to the Government, class, poses a political threat to the Front, since the UNP calculates that many workers would not rally to its defence, thereby leaving the Front to rely on the uncertain support of the Armed forces In assessing the record of the Popular Front, it is necessary to recognise that considerable political power has been obtained for the liberal bourgeoisie by hammering out the state apparatus into its pliant instrument and eliminaries, whose economic and political power has been curbed In consequence, the hasis has been laid for the unification of the bourgeoisie as a whole in the immediate future. This has been possible largely on account of the support of the working class and the initial impetus of the mass movement behind the Front. But the mass movement itself had developed a clear anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist consciousness during the previous five years of UNP rule and had fully expected revolutionary changes from the Front which presented itself in socialist terms. The subsequent actions of the Front have, now, clearly exposed the real class nature of its ruling group, particularly to the working class and the intelligentsia. The JVP Insurrection, which itself was a product of the recoil of the frustrated mass movement, was an important contributory factor in this process. The Insurrection compelled the liberal bourgeoisie to embark hesitantly on land reform and the subsequent food crisis lent it added impetus. The agrarian question, however, has only been partially resolved; it has been complicated by measures far removed from the specific solutions demanded by historical developments. The estates under the LSSP-run Plantation Corporation could generate an expansion of production on the basis of collective labour, modern techniques of intensive agriculture and efficient management under the direction of workers' councils. Large-scale intensive agriculture could also draw in the unemployed youth as a part of a well paid labour force, on new collective schemes. But it is unlikely that all this could be realised except under a workers' government. Nevertheless, it is likely that food production would expand rapidly, mainly as a result of the strong incentives supplied to producers since 1973. The problem of shori-term food shortages, however, remains. The deepening crisis has pushed the government into even greater dependence on imperialism. In bringing all economic activity under the control of the state, the Front itself is forced to strike a direct compromise with This is the relentless logic of all bourgenis-led 'anti-imperialist' struggles which must end in some new compromise with imperialism, for the other alternative of revolution must lead to the suppression of bourgeois property as well. Thus the maturing of the crisis has now forced the government back onto the path taken by the UNP before it; having expropriated the reactionary bourgeoisie, the Front leadership is compelled to assume its Post-war developments in Sri Lanka bear out the general perspectives of Permanent Revolution; that an antiimperialist struggle which is not at the same time anti-capitalist, cannot succeed. Thus the failure of the LSSP to provide revolutionary leadership in the immediate post-war years against imperialism and its client bourgeoisie, coupled with the post-war boom, generated the conditions for the rise of a bourgeois populist movement such as had begun in India and China more than a half-century before. The completion of that cycle of world capitalism has now brought about the collapse of Populism, reproducing the old pattern of class forces, but at a higher level The decisive factor which precipitated the present situation was the current crisis in the international capitalist system, which was manifested as currency instabilities and sharp rises in commodity prices, culminating in the oil price hike. Whereas previously the terms of trade had moved against Sri Lanka at a steady annual rato of 4-5'i, the crisis brought about a sudden sharp drop. This in turn compelled the government to shift the internal price 'balance' strongly in favour of food producers, against the working class and the urban middle class; it also impar- •ted a more radical interpretation to land reform legislation in implementation. In addition to high prices, further incentives have been offered to food producers as well as to export-orientated industry; these are likely to be The government is now compelled to strive for rapid growth regardless of its social consequences. The expansion of agricultural production and the institution of export incentives, supply the necessary conditions for the growth of manufacturing industry as well. This will in turn further differentiate the peasantry and the urban potty bourgeoisie, even though in the short term a large number of the unemployed would be transformed into agricultural small producers. The growth of industry in co-operation with foreign capital, as well as the expansion of exports. END OF POPULISM nating all features inconsistent with its class rule.

imperialism.

historical role.

PERSPECTIVES of differentiation.

increased in the near future.

it is even likely that the working class would rally to its defence.

In the short term the UNP's campaign of "direct action'

, based on the hostility of the entire urban middle This was carried out in the teeth of opposition of the reactio- 37

[page 39]

er the dependence l the bourgeoisie on imperialis

ou also

In addition to the differentiation of the petty bourgeoisie, the expansion of the productive forces, together with the social ferment resulting from land reform, will inevitably generate a rapid rise and polarization of class consciousness throughout society. In Trotsky's words, " ...when development takes place not gradually, not 'organically but by means of terrible shocks and abrupt shifts in the old social layers, then critical thought finds its revolutionary expression incomparably more easily and rapidly, providing there is of course the necessary theoretical prerequisites for this." As a consequence of the opportunist political alignment of the LSSP, it is likely that initially some sections of the intelligentsia and de-classed petty bourgeoisie would turn to the right. But the long term alignment of class forces will depend to a large extent on the revolutionary initiative of the working class

THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

0 030P:0 3 of tea workers'

family

71.7% of the population are Sinhala, 'Ceylon Tamils' constitute 12.7% and the 'Indian Tamils', who are largely plantation workers (so-called because they are of recent Indian origin) make up 9.4% of the total. The only other significant mindrity is the 'Ceylon Moors' who constitute 5.4%; this is a trading community which is mainly confined to the towns and which is fairly well integrated with the Sinhala population. The three main communities are socially and culturally isolated except at the upper and middle class English-speaking strata, even though a common language links the latter two. The Tamils, by which we mean only the 'Ceylon' Tamils, occupied the Northernand Eastern provinces and mainly the Jaffna peninsula, before the British Raj; even now around 85% of the population of these regions are Tamils. On account of the difficulty of working the land in these areas, much stronger property relations had emerged, with smaller and more widespread holdings, which were confirmed by the capitalist land laws. The plantation economy, however, left these areas quite untouched except for the usual effects, such as the expansion of trade and suppression of local craft as in the rest of the country. Consequently semi-feudai relations remained much stronger; even today they are much stronger than elsewhere in the country, with such barbaric features as caste restrictions on temple entry.

On accpunt of the relatively larger number of mission schools set up in Jaffna, the Tamils entered the national mainstream via English education and employment in the state departments. In this way the surplus of the plantation economy directly contributed to the formation of a professional and bureaucratic class which quickly forged strong links with the landlordism of its home areas, just as in the case of their Sinhala counterparts. But on account of the greater availability of education, the state bureaucracy acquired a disproportionate number of Tami just as the armed services did of Christians, which in turn stimulated the hostility of the Sinhala Buddhists who sought the same positions. Even today, 18.6% of the urban population is Tamil, because of this. Both these communities were the targets of Bandaranaike's Sinhala Buddhist 'nationalism', which supplied a powerful stimulus to aparallel Tamil chauvinism under the landlord and capitalist leadership of the Federal Party. Feeding on each other, these two forces produced the racial conflagration of 1958, which was triggered off by the commercial rivalry between Sinhala and Tamil traders. Subsequently this conflict died down. After 1970 a new wave of militancy arose among the Tamils under the TUF (Tamil United Front) which after 1972 carried out a powerful agitatio against the new Constitution; some sections even advanced the demand for a separate state. The real content of this struggle, however, is entirely different, since the base of the TUF consists largely of unemployed youth. Thi the new militancy is a product of the same factors that produced the JVP, though the political form is different; as leadership was offered by the LSSP and because there was no significant working class element among the Tamils to supply an enduring basis for socialist ideas the great majority of the youth - which is in essence fighting

[page 40]

against a moribund capitalism - was drawn to a false communal consciousness by the TUF leadership, which, being drawn from the most reactionary class interests (whose property was threatened), opposed the government from the right. Consequently the movement as a whole assumed dangerously reactionary forms. The fact that it was more difficult for Tamil youths to get jobs in the Sinhala-dominated patronage system of the UF government (based on letters of recommendation from MPs) was what fuelled the communal agitation of the TUF leaders. It is also quite clear that if the LSSP had not abandoned its principled position on the national question, the greater part of the radical Tamil youth would already have aligned itself with the working class, bypassing the It is of the utmost importance for the Tamil youth and peasantry to realize that their real struggle is against a backward capitalist system which can no longer provide even the basic needs such as jobs, education etc. The semi-feudal remnants and the capitalist system that sustains them, and to develop labour-intensive industrial and agricultural ventures throughout the country on a co-operative basis. their needs are essentially the same as those of the Sinhala youth and peasantry. But state assistance is necessary for the rapid implementation of such a programme. Since such assistance can be extended only by a state power based on the working class which has no interest in sustaining landlordism and capitalism, it is first necessary to join the revolutionary struggle to establish such a state, which is the first step on the road to a Socialist society. Thus the real answer to the problems of the Tamils is to join the urban and plantation workers, the Sinhala youth for the development of Tamil culture, as well as the culture of all minorities, freed from The interests of the 'Indian Tamil' plantation workers is closely tied to that of other workers. Prior to the 'forties this had been so in practice. Since then the bourgeoisie and its agents took advantage of the confusion and defeats of the LSSP to deprive these workers of their citizenship rights and to inveigle them into communalist unions. In the last decade, however, the plantation workers have been breaking free of these reactionary fetters and finding a road to a unified struggle with all workers. Significantly the current demands of the JCTUO and others specifically include the plantation workers, which is an important step in the right direction; there is little doubt that in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism- of which they have more experience than other workers - they would easily shake off the communalist leaders who remain, leaders whose alliance with the reactionaries has already A revolutionary situation, by itself, does not lead to revolution; it can do so only if the struggles of the working class and its allies are firmly guided by the perspectives of Marxism. The critical role of leadership has already been shown up, negatively, in the enormous problems created by the failure of the old working class leaders: if popular frontism had not propped up bourgeois populism in its period of decline, a revolutionary situation would have developed much sooner, under more favourable circumstances. Thus popular frontism has alienated many secand Militant International Review now!! ADDRESS communal politics of the reactionary TUF leaders.

real solution is to abolish landlordism, such as caste-ism.

been revealed.

REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP Militant is workers.

and the poor peasants in all areas, in the struggle for a socialist state.

MILITANT Socialist weekly newspaper. Essential reading for all subscribe now order Militant, Militant Irish Monthly return to:- Militant, London E2 9RA.

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tions of the petty bourgeoisie, the youth- especially Tamil youth - and the Tamil minority in general, from the Al the same time it gave rise to the setbacks deriving from the abortive Insurrection and the strengthening of the state apparatus. The formidable tasks posed by all these setbacks can only he orercome by a revolutionary leadership soundly based on Marxism. Such a leadership cun rise, only from within the The first phase of revolutionary struggle has already been launched by the working class in the present series of strikes. The general programme of such a struggle would combine the tasks of socialist rovolution with the specific democratic tasks posed, including that of the national question (see 'tasks posed' and the 'Question of the national minorities'). These aspects of a general programme have already been advanced by the workers' unions. It is a task of the revolutionary leadership to present the programme in such a way as to mobilize the widest support behind it. This first phase of struggle must lead to breaking away of the working class from the Front government; it is also the necessary condition for winning mass support outside of the class.

In breaking away from the Front, it is of the utmost importance for the revolutionary vanguard to move with the class as a whole; the isolation of the vanguard from the class, especially from the rank and file of the LSSP, would be an enormously retrograde step and amount to a second ultra-left betrayal; it is particularly important to guard against this now, when the rapid mobilization of the entire class is necessary to avert military dictatorship. In the first part of this essay, it has been shown how closely the developments in Sri Lanka were tied to those in India. In the first two decades after 1948, since the LSSP abandoned its attempt to link up with the Indian Revolution, the implicit belief has prevailed that a revolutionary strategy for Sri Lanka need not take account of India. This idea has been reinforced by the downright reactionary thesis that revolutions are the 'internal affairs' of countries and need not affect "friendly' relations between governments. That thispioushope - for it is nothing more than that - is profoundly mistaken, has already been demonstrated in practice by the active interest that India took in the JVP Insurrection. It is therefore of great importance to forge strong links with the Indian working class, with the utmost urgency. There is little doubt that the revolution in Sri Lanka is closely linked to that of India, especially now that the sharp decline of Sri Lanka's early prosperity has evened up objective differences between the two countries; this is to the advantage of Sri Lanka, since it would make it more difficult for the Indian It is also of the greatest importance for the proletarian vanguard to win over the Sinhala and Tamil youth. In Russia, the intelligentsia as a whole recoiled back from the proletarian revolution; but the political nature of an intelligentsia is rooted in the specific conditions of its existence. Thus it would be a serious mistake to dismiss sections we have attempted to show that they are a transitional group between the intelligentsia and the proletariat with a high degree of consciousness; this is because the sharp economic decline makes it impossible for the intelligentsia to rise up into bourgeois society in the way it was possible for the relatively much smaller Russian intelligentsia. Therefore in the specifics of the Sri Lankan revolution, the intelligentsia is likely to be a more important ally of the proletariat than the peasantry, on account of their numerical strength, high level of consciousness and capacity for collective political action. The concrete realization of this potentiality is, perhaps the most struggles of the working class.

ranks of the LSSP, in a struggle against the old revisionist leaders.

bourgeoisie to intervene, if revolutionary struggles were the Sri Lankan youth as 'petty bourgeois' or important task of the revolutionary proletariat.

40 simultaneous.

even to treat tham as 'peasants', for they are neither; in previous

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